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SUMMARY 
Aim of the Research 
The purpose of the thesis was to seek a general explanation of 
merger acti vi ty. 
Methodology 
A multitude of explanatory theories existed and it was deemed 
necessary to determine explicitly the criterion to be used in 
developing a general theory of mergers. An analysis of major 
categories of merger theory indicated that the analysis of motive is 
essential to the provision of an adequate explanation. 
The theory of the managerial firm was chosen for analysis since 
it is both logically prior to market explanations and richer in 
motivational possibilities. 
Difficulties in testing a theory had been exposed by "growth of 
knowledge" methodologists. It was decided to utilise the proposi tions 
for theory testing and development proposed by Lakatos. 
Two samples of firms were drawn: quoted companies engaged in the 
supply of consumer goods from 1970 to 1978, and 100 firms engaged in 
merger activity in 1978 or 1979 and a control group of 50 firms not 
involved in mergers. Univariate statistical analysis, multiple 
regression and discriminant analysis were then involved in determining 
the financial and structural characteristics of firms with respect to 
merger behaviour. 
i 
Findings 
The claim by Lakatos that knowledge could be advanced in a 
rational and progressive manner was not substantiated. 
The view that growth and profit are opposing aims of the 
managerial firm was rejected. 
Takeover victims could not be identified with failing firms. 
Shareholders do not benefit from increasing growth and profits 
proportionately. 
The theory of the managerial firm (distinguished from that 
found in the literature) receives some support. 
Shareholders seem more concerned with security than is 
compatible with wealth maximisation theory. 
Merger activity is best understood as a normal form of 
investment activity. 
The development of merger theory requires further analysis of 
the growth strategies of firms in oligopolistic markets under 
uncertainty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The preliminary reading for this thesis was begun in 1973, 
and at that time merger activity had accelerated from modest beginnings 
in the 1950s through a decade of increasing activity in the 1960s to 
unprecedented heights by 1972 and 1973, whether one measured the impact 
in terms of numbers or the value of assets acqui red. 
This had been accompanieri by evidence of increasing concentration 
in many manufacturing industries, and the demonstration that the 100 
largest enterprises controlled 41% of manufacturing net output 
(Prais, 173/1976) by 1972 led to the conclusion that a major structural 
change was taking place in British industry. Various research studies 
indicated that mergers and acquisitions were responsible for about 50% 
of the change in concentration over the 1960s (Aaronovi tch and Sawyer, 
27/1975 and Prais, 173/1976) and that amalgamations had become the major 
source of the death of firms in the 1960s (Singh, 198/1971). 
The motive for \Uldertaking the research was in the first place to 
seek the underlying causes of this important factor in industrial change 
and was also partially inspired by the oft quoted dictum of J • Markham 
in an earlier survey of merger activity in the U.S.A. that "the paths 
of economic theory and merger 11 terature have rarely crossed" 
(Markham, page 143, 142/1955). 
Examination of the evi dence, however, led to contradictory 
conclusions to those implied by Markham'S dictum. The situation was 
not one of an absence of hypotheses concerning why mergers and takeovers 
occurred, but rather of discovering a plethora of theories. The 
problem was not to seek to develop some initial explanatory theory, 
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but rather to find some way of imposing order upon a series of 
different conceptual frameworks. Why should anyone framework be 
superior to any other? How did one distinguish between theories in 
order to determine that one theory was likely to be more fruitful in 
explaining the behaviour? 
At the same time, it became clear that answers to this sort of 
problem were being attempted by a group of philosophers working on 
the problems of the growth of knowledge in the physical sciences. 
Taking the lBldoubted success of the physical sciences in gaining 
increasing lBlderstanding of physical reality, a number of attempts 
were being made to explain how these successes had been gained. 
Popper (171/1963), Lakatos (122/1978) and Laudan (124/1977) were 
expressly involved in searching for methodological rules which would 
enable theory development to be carried out in a rational and progressive 
way. The situation was not lacking in controversy, and there was 
opposition to the view that the path of scientific progress could be 
made subject to rational processes. This opposition was prominently 
lead by Kuhn (119/1962) who argued for the significance of the social 
environment in which scientists worked, and Feyerabend (68/1975) who 
cast doubt on whether theories could ever be successfully compared 
because the meaning of observation statements intended to test the 
theory were inherently linked to the theory itself, thus making 
theories "incommensurable". 
Despi te the obvious di fferences between the natural sciences and 
a social science such as economics, it was considered that Lakatos's 
formulation of how to evaluate theories (in which he sought to counter 
many of the criticisms made of the earlier work of Popper) could be 
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utilised in this research in order to find a way through the maze 
of merger hypotheses and hopefully make progress in the lmderstanding 
of merger behaviour. The Lakatos propositions were, briefly :-
a) '1b. at no theory ever stands by i tse If but is a part of a 
larger network of theories (what he termed a "research 
programme") • 
b) That no theory is ever evaluated in isolation but must be 
analysed in terms of a rival theory. 
c) That the hallmarks of a good theory are the way it can 
accommodate the facts already explained by an earlier theory 
and at the same time can predict "novel facts" not dealt 
with by the competing explanations. 
Initially there was no commitment to any particular framework 
for the analysis of merger behaviour. One common method of analysis 
is to consider the form of merge;r, investigating the nature of 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate.amalgamations. Another useful 
approach is to examine the gains from merger, categorising them as 
either "real" (I.e. the appropriation of physical assets) or financial 
(i.e. exploiting discrepancies in the valuation of assets). 
Both forms of analysis imposed order upon difficult material, but 
mergers in practice are made up of, a medley of aims and in ten tions 
which do not naturally fit into such classifications. Other modes 
of attack upon the problem, Such as (a) case studies, (b) technical 
analysis of such matters as bidding procedures or the effect of 
mergers on share valuation, or (c) the asking of specific questions 
on such matters as welfare implications, the profitability of 
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mergers or their contribution to concentration, lack generality 
and do not directly deal with problems of causation. 
It became clear that the analysis of cause in the social 
sciences cannot be divorced from the problem of the purpose of the 
activity. Analysis takes two major forms, and there is constant 
controversy about the value of the two procedures. In sociology, 
holistic theories are developed under the structural/functionalist 
paradigm which strive to explain behaviour in terms of social forces. 
The method is not unknown in economics, where Marxist theory adopts 
this system of explanation. Traditionally, the bulk of economic 
theory has been built on "methodological indi vidual1sm", that is, 
that a limited range of motivations has been ascribed to participants 
in the economic system (e.g. consumers, producers, Government, etc.) 
and from these motivations rational arguments are-used to justify 
theories governing interactions. .This argument is the basis of the 
conclusion of Chapter 2 that a motivational theory of causation is 
the surest way of discriminating between theories of merger behaviour. 
Since the 1920s the neo-classical theory of the firm has suffered 
some severe setbacks. The growth in size of firms (and other 
economic institutions) has increased the complexity of the relationships, 
permitted greater discretion to be exercised and also increased the 
uncertainty of the environment. As a result, difficulties in defining 
the constraints under which firms operate (which is necessary to any 
quantitative and determinate means of analysis of firm/market relation-
ships) has forced attention to be concentrated on the actual firm as 
against any ideal model of an average enterprise. This has made the 
study of the motivation underlying a firm's behaviour even more 
significant. 
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Since empirical resewrch·has cAst doubt upon· the pr~fitability 
of merger activity, and analysis in a perfect market context had 
found mergers to be an inadequate way of combining earning streams 
compared with those open to the individual investor (see Alberts, 
• 29/1966), theories based on profit maximising behaviour faced a serious 
anomaly; it was therefore the growth theory of the managerial firm 
which was selected as the "research programme". to be followed. 
The work of Robin Marris (144/1963, 145/1964 and 146/1971) was used 
as the most adequate representation of this type of theory. This was 
not only because the theory had been worked out in Marris in greater 
detail than in other works, nor because a theory of takeovers was 
intrinsic to his account, 'but because, unlike other growth theorists, 
such as Baumol (36/1962) and J.B.Williamson (223/1966), his account 
was cast in terms of long run policy decisions. Merger behaviour 
is obviously a type of investment act! vi ty which can only be understood 
by assessing the effect of asset accumUlation over a ~ong period of 
time. Chapter 3 concerns itself with the growth theory of the firm. 
It especially seeks to deal with the growth maximisation theory as a 
competitor in explaining merger behaviour to the profit maximising 
theory, and thus act as a test for the Lakatos propOSition that only 
such theory contrast permits decisions on the value of a theory to 
be made. • 
In order to assess the growth maximisation theory as a source of 
understanding of merger behaviour, two samples of firms were drawn 
and subject to statistical analysis. The overall purpose of the 
empirical analysis was to test how successfully certain chosen structural 
end f·inancial characteristics of acquired and acquiring companies 
conformed to that theory. 
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The first sample of firms consisted of all independent companies, 
quoted on the Stock Exchange in 1970, contained within the categories 
devoted to the production of Consumer Durable and Non-Durable Goods 
in the Stock Exchange Year Book for that year. All firms who survived 
to 1978 were analysed over the nine year period and the fate of firms 
who failed to survive was also traced. The purpose of this sample was 
to survey the relevant characteristics and experience of these firms 
over a lengthy time span. Since taken-over firms vanished from the 
sample, only limi ted comparisons could be made of victim firms, and 
the main conclusions of this group relate to acquiring companies. 
In order to provide further analysis of the nature of acquired 
companies, a further sample of industrial/commercial enterprises 
involved in merger activity in 1978 and 1979 was taken. This consisted 
of 50 acquiring companies, 50 acquired companies and a control group 
of 50 enterprises which were not involved in merger activity. 
Chapter 1 provides some historical background concerning merger 
activity prior to 1970 and also describes some of the trends in total 
activity which occurred during the sample period up to 1978. A 
subsidiary aim of this Chapter is to demonstrate that the samples 
chosen were representative ones insofar as they reflected the general 
experience of the period. 
The concerns of Chapters 2 and 3 are with two inter-related themes. 
The first of these is the manner in which merger theories have been 
employed as analytical "tools" in the research 11 terature, culminating 
towards the end of Chapter 3 in a detailed examination of motivational 
classifications of the acti vi ty with special reference to the managerial 
theories of the firm. But this investigation raises the issue of how 
useful the various conceptual schemes of analysis have been, or 
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potentially could be. This problem then begs an answer to the question 
of how we should define "usefulness" in such a context, and leads 
naturally to the recent controversies in the methodological literature 
of whether there are rational strategies by which progress may be 
assured in scientific research, and by· analogy research in the social 
sciences. Therefore interwoven into the two chapters is the second 
major focus of interest, which is the extent to which philosophical 
theories of the growth of knowledge in science may be employed 
fruitfully to discriminate between theories of takeover activity in 
order to decide which of the theoretical schemes of analysis afford 
the best opportunity to contribute to the development of understanding 
of merger behaviour. 
Chapters 4 and 5 use univariate and multivariate statistical 
methods respectively· to examine the profile of acqUiring, acquired and 
the::control groups of firms, and use the results to test the growth 
theory of the firm as a motivational theory of use in explaining 
merger behaviour. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of the thesis with regard to 
the value of the growth maximisation hypothesis in understanding merger 
behaviour and the worth of the Lakatos prescriptions as a guide to 
theory development. 
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CHAPTER 1 
AN ANALYSIS OF MERGER ACTIVITY 
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1.0. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. FiTst, it is to examine 
the record of takeover activity in the period 1960 to 1978. This 
will provide the historical setting for the study and permit 
explanation of the main features of merger activity. Secondly, 
it will describe the sources of data used in the research. By the 
juxtaposition of these two themes it is hoped to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of the data sources and thus provide a justification 
of those sources in the more detailed analysis of takeover 
behaviour to be found in the,succeeding chapters. 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1. Denni tions 
The terms "mergers" and "takeovers" occur frequently in 
the literature as almost interchangeable words. This is 
technically incorrect. Takeover refers to a situation 
where one firm purchases another firm from its shareholders 
and control of the enlarged company thus brought into 
being lies with the acquiring firm. A merger arises when 
two existing companies are brought together to form a new 
entity, jointly controlled by the two partners according 
to the agreed terms of the amalgamation. In practice, 
the distinction is a matter of legal form and not a 
description of the behaviour involved. Mergers are often 
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a kindly way of making a takeover and a takeover bid is 
frequently welcomed and even invited in some instances 
by the acquired firm. Consequently, within this study 
no importance will be attached to the difference between 
the two methods of uniting companies. Both methods will 
be incorporated within the general classification of 
acquisitions. Within the text the terms merger and 
acquisition will be used as synonyms. It will be left 
to the context of the passage to indicate those instances 
where the distinct legal forms are intended. 
As an example of the lack of essential meaning in 
the use of the terms "merger" and ."takeover", one may 
instance the merger in 1968 between the General Electric 
Company and the English Electric Company. As is made 
clear in the account given by Jones and Marriott (103/1970) 
the English Electric Company chose to merge with the 
General Electric Company in order to avoid an unwelcome 
takeover bid by Plessey. The merger was a takeover in all 
but name, as was shown by the fact that the new name of 
the joint firms "The General Electric and English Electric 
Companies" which was established in 1968 had reverted to 
"The General Electric Company" wi thin two years. 
Even as a legal form, mergers are a very small 
percentage of all acquisitions. Evidence of this is 
provided in Table 1.1. 
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TABLE 1.1. 
RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS 1970-1978 
(INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL COMPANIES) 
Number of Number of Mergers 
Acquisi tions Number of as a Percentage of 
Year (incl uding Mergers) Mergers Total Acquisitions 
1970 793 6 0.8% 
1971 884 0 0% 
1972 1,210 7 0.6% 
1973 1,205 2 0.2% 
1974 504 1 0.2% 
1975 315 3 1.0% 
353 1 0.3% " 1976 
1977 481 2 0.4% 
1978 567 3 0.5% 
TOTALS 6,312 25 4.0% 
AVERAGE 701.3 2.8 0.4% 
SOuRCE: Business Monitor M Q7. 4th Quarter 1979. 
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1.1.2. Early History of Merger Activity 
The history of acquisition activity in the United 
Kingdom prior to 1960 is only relevant to this study 
insofar as certain features which can be recognised in 
the earlier period recur. It is therefore worthwhile 
to give a brief summary of that history and to indicate 
the nature of these features. The best and most comprehensive 
coverage of this period is to be found in Hannah (85/1974) 
and Hannah and Kay (86/1977). An excellent survey of 
the American experience between 1895 and 1956 is to be 
found in Nelson (164/1959). 
Data collected by Hannah and Kay and Nelson on 
annual firm disappearances due to merger indicate that 
merger activity has followed a coincidental cyclical 
pattern in both the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. This 
activity reached a simultaneous peak in 1899 and 1929 in 
both countries, and troughs occurred in 1909 and 1940 (U.K.) 
and 1915 and 1939 (U.S.A.). The latest upturn in the 
frequency of acquisitions began in 1950 in both cases. 
We can see from our own data (Table 1.2, page 23) that the U.K. 
series for industrial and commercial companies reached 
its pinnacle in 1972, while data produced by the American 
Federal Trade Commission covering large acquisitions 
(large being defined as firms with assets over 10 million 
dollars) in manufacturing and mining reached its climax 
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in 1970. In the U.K. the line has climbed again to reach 
a total of 567 mergers and acquisitions in 1978 and fallen 
back to 452 by 1981. This suggests thls mode of firm 
development may be diminishing in importance. 
The similarities should not, however, blind us to 
important differences between the experience of the two 
nations. The scale of acquisition frequency was much 
greater in the American situation, both in 1899 and 1929. 
In the United States, 979 firms disappeared through merger 
in 1899, while the number of firms vanishing trhough merger 
in the United Kingdom was 255. Moreover, whereas in 1929 
Nelson's figures indicate just over 1,000 companies being 
acquired, the comparable figure for the United Kingdom 
was 431 in 1929. A trend line drawn through the American 
data between 1895 and 1950 would be approximately straight, 
while the same line applied to the U.K. experience would 
be monotonically increasing from a low level. 
Some concept of the change in scale of the U.K. 
experience can be gathered from comparing Hannah's estimate 
(85/1974) that during the whole of the period 1880-1918 
there were 1,093 mergers, compared with the 1,210 acquisitions 
reported for the single year of 1927 by the Business 
Statistics Office. Care should be taken in judging this 
comparison. In the earlier period mergers often involved 
the consolidation of a large number of companies. For 
example, the Salt Union in 1888 involved in one single 
merger 63 firms, and between 1890 and 1899 there were 
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six mergers where 20 or more firms were consolidated into 
a single entity, and 28 embracing 5 or more firms. Both 
Hannah's and Weston's iigures show that multi-iirm mergers 
declined sharply irom the turn of the century onwards 
and the later data quoted refers to single firm acquisitions. 
Both Hannah and Weston confirm the importance of the 
consolidation movement in the turn of the century merger 
episode and its decline over the courSe of the century. 
What is referred to, however, is the simultaneous consol-
idation of a large number of firms at one moment in time. 
Such consolidations now occur in a sequential fashion 
though the ultimate effect is not very different. As an 
example taken from a multitude of possible such examples, 
Whitbread and Company made the following acquisitions 
over the time span 1958 to 1969 : 
(a) Scarsdale Brewery (1958) 
(b) Tennant Brothers (1961) 
(c) Norman and Pring (1962) 
Starkey Knight (1962) 
Flower (1962) 
(d) Dutton's Blackburn (1963) 
J.Nimmo (1963) 
(e) West Country Breweries (1964) 
(f) Thresher and Company (1965) 
E. Lacon and Company (1965) 
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(g) Rhymney Breweries (1966) 
James Thomson Company (1966) 
(h) Threlfalls Chesters (1967) 
Evans Evans Bevan (1967) 
Archibald Campbell (1967) 
Fremlins (1967) 
(i) Bentley (1968) 
Richard Whitaker (1968) 
(j) John Young (1969) 
R.White and Sons (1969) 
Strong of Romsey (1969) 
(Source: K.H.Hawkins and C.L.Pass (90/1979) • 
The strongest contrast between early American and 
British experience is that not only was the scale diffeent 
but that the British mergers were heavily concentrated 
in the sectors of textiles and brewing (Hannah: 85/1974), 
whereas it was widely spread among many industrial groups 
in the U.S.A. (Nelson:164/1959). Hannah, in his 1974 
article, proposed that the difference is due to the lack 
of monopoly regulation by Government in the U.K. in comparison 
with the U.S.A. where control of the situation commenced 
with the Sherman Act of 1890 and was reinforced with the 
passing of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission 
Act in 1914. The first legislation of this nature in the 
United Kingdom was the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
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Act of 1948; prior to this, reliance was placed on the 
common law doctrines on restraint of trade and conspiracy. 
One possible hypothesis to explain the acceleration of 
acquisitive behaviour in more recent times in the British 
Isles is that firms achieved co-operative control of 
markets through cartels and price-fixing agreements in 
earlier times which method was increasingly denied them 
latterly, especially since the passage of the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act of 1956. 
Two features of this early history need to be singled 
out for attention, since they reappear in the modern data. 
The first of these is the international occurrence of the 
phenomena. The close parallels between the cycles of 
merger frequency in the U.K. and the U.S.A. are clear. 
The sharp upward trend in merger activity following the 
Second World War can also be noted with respect to the 
Netherlands, Sweden, West Germany, Australia, France and 
Canada. Many commentators have been lead by this to 
suggest that there may be a strong relationship between 
the trade cycle and merger activity, see for example 
J.J . McGowan (150/1971). 
The second aspect which is worth remarking is the 
fact that merger activity throughout the whole period 
appears' to correlate highly with rising stockmarkets, 
although it is an open question whether the true correlation 
is with the increase in share prices or with the buoyant 
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investment conditions implied by the increase in share 
prices. 
Nelson (164/1959) observes:-
"Comparison of the timing of the merger cycles 
with cycles in other specific economic series 
permitted identification of those elements in 
a general business cycle that might be directly 
related to merger activity. Peaks in the expansion 
of merger activity were found to be closest in 
timing to those in industrial stock prices. stock 
market trading, and new business incorporations. 
Mergers were found to lead by a substantial 
interval the peaks in industrial production and 
the reference cycle." 
Hannah (85/1974) echoes this view with respect to British 
circums tances: 
"Inspection of the data on merger peaks and troughs 
and comparison with the peaks and troughs of the 
indices of share prices and manufacturing 
production tend to suggest that both were positively 
related. " 
His calculations-show a simple correlation of 0.79 
between numbers of mergers occurring in 1880 to 1918 and 
an index of share prices, and 0.54 with respect to numbers 
of mergers over that time and an inde x of manufacturing 
productions. 
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Using data on e~~enditure on acquisitions for 
British Industry from 1949 to 1966. Professor Verma (215/1972) 
found that the index of industrial production explarned 
a large part of variation in merger activity. The share 
price index was. however, found to be a less important 
variable. 
18 
1.2. RECORD OF ACQUISITIONS 1960 TO 1978 
1.2.1. Sources of Data 
The research which forms the basis of this study is 
limited to acquisitions which took place between 1970 
and 1978. It is based on two samples, the first being 
all independent companies in the Durable and Non-Durable 
Consumer Goods Category recorded in the Stock Exchange 
Year Book for 1970 which traces the acquisitions occurring 
between 1970 and 1978, and the second which considers 
a group of takeovers which took place in 1977 and 1978. 
Further details of these samples are contained in a 
later section of this chapter. Nevertheless, it was 
considered appropriate to use Government statistics to 
'display''8 longer run 'of ·figures commencing in 1960 for 
two reasons:-
(a) to permit analysis of a longer time sequence in 
order to examine the characteristics of takeover 
activity in relation to trends in that activity; 
(b) to demonstrate that the samples used are fairly 
representative of the current takeover situation. 
Since the publication of the Business Monitor 
"Acquisitions and Mergers of Industrial and Commercial 
Companies" in May 1971, there has been an extensive series 
of statistics available on a quarterly basis covering 
acquisitions by industrial and commercial companies in 
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the tnited Kingdom. This includes somewhat more limited 
information on takeovers and mergers by U.K. companies 
of foreign companies and the acquisition of U.K. companies 
by foreign companies. Acquisitions by financial companies 
such as insurance and banking are not included, although 
details of these can be found in the Central Statistical 
Office's monthly publications "Financial Statistics". 
Prior to this the longest consistent series on acquisitions 
is derived from the Department of Trade and Industry (as 
it then was) analysis of quoted company accounts stretching 
back to 1954. Details of merger activity are to be found 
prior to 1971 in various editions of "Economic Trends" 
and the Board of Trade Journal (now entitled "British 
Business"). Certain changes in definition and scope of 
the statistics have occurred between 1960 and 1978, but 
fortunately the third quarter issue of the Business Monitor 
for 1971 has provided a linked series going back to 1960. 
A discussion of the changes in the series prior to 1969 
(which was the time of the last major change in this 
series) can be found in "Trade and Industry" in the 
edi tion of the 26 August 1971 (24/1971). 
In considering the 18 years of merger activity, it 
should be noted that there was a serious change made in 
1969 to the way in which the data was collected. Before 
that date the series was based on the analysis carried 
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out by the Board of Trade of public companies quoted 
(except for a few important exceptions) on a United 
Kingdom Stock Exchange. This analysis related to 
companies engaged mainly in the United Kingdom in 
manufacturing, distribution, construction, transport and 
certain other services. Companies whose main interests 
were in agriculture, shipping, insurance, banking, finance 
and property and those operating wholly or mainly overseas 
were not included. From 1961 the population was confined 
to quoted companies with assets of £0.5 million or income 
of £50,000 or more per year. 
From 1969 onwards, mainly in order to overcome the 
delays imposed on the publication of results by variations 
in accounting periods and their reporting, the figures 
are now based on reports in the financial press concerning 
industrial and commercial companies. As a result, the 
data is much more up-to-date, covers a wider range of 
firms, and relates to the calendar year and not the 
variable accounting year. Small takeovers which do not 
receive a mention in the press are missed by this system. 
In order to indicate the effect of the change, it 
will be observed in Tables 1.2. and 1.3. that two figures 
are quoted for the number of acquisitions in 1969. This 
is to allow the reader to judge the impact of the different 
methods of collecting the information. Whether in fact 
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this is useful illustration of the result of the varying 
methods depends on the extent to which 1969 was a 
representative year. It can be seen from the table which 
follows (Table 1.2.) that the number of acquisitions based 
on press reports in 1969 was lower than those derived 
from the analysis of company accounts in that year. Since 
the new series was claimed to have a wider coverage than 
the previous one, this claim is not entirely supported 
in practice for this year. If one compares the two 1969 
figures for acquisition expenditure, it can be seen that 
the revised figure is 15% greater than the earlier one. 
This suggests that the analysis of company accounts 
included a large number of very small firms that were 
acquired that would not normally attract the attention 
of newspapers and journals. The later figure is therefore 
probably a better guide to the behaviour of medium sized 
to large enterprises. 
Tables 1.2. and 1.3. (following) present the data in 
two forms. One related to the count of the number of firms 
involved, the other to the expenditure on acquisitions and 
mergers. By comparing these two tables it is possible to 
perceive not only the changes in intensity of acquisitons 
from year to year but also the extent to which it involved 
large and small sizes of enterprises. Sufficient has 
already been said about the manner in which the number of 
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TABLE 1.2. 
ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMr.IERCIAL COMPANIES 1960-1978 
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
YEAR ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS ACQUISITIONS MERGERS 
1960 739 736 3 
1961 639 632 7 
1962 640 636 4 
1963 888 885 3 
1964 940 939 1 
1965 1,000 995 5 
1966 807 805 2 
1967 763 763 
1968 946 942 4 
1969 906 904 2 
CHANGE OF SERIES FROM ONE BASED ON QUOTED COMPANY ACCOUNTS TO ONE DRAWN 
FROM PRESS REPORTS ON ALL INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL COMPANIES. 
1969 846 844 2 
1970 793 787 6 
1971 884 884 
1972 1,210 1,203 7 
1973 1,205 1,203 2 
1974 504 503 1 
1975 315 312 3 
1976 353 352 1 
1977 481 479 2 
1978 567 564 3 
SOURCES: BUSINESS MONITOR M7 
TRADE AND INDUSTRY FOR 1960-1964. 
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TABLE 1.3. 
EXPENDITURE ON ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL 
COMPANIES 1960-1978 
(£ million) 
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
YEAR ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS ACQUISITIONS MERGERS 
1960 358 338 20 
1961 521 368 153 
1962 370 336 34 
1963 352 329 23 
1964 505 502 3 
1965 517 507 10 
1966 500 447 53 
1967 822 822 
1968 1,946 1,774 172 
1969 935 927 8 
CHANGE OF SERIES FROM ONE BASED ON QUOTED C01WANY ACCOUNTS TO ONE DRAWN 
FROM PRESS REPORTS ON ALL INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL C01WANIES. 
1969 1,069 1,061 8 
1970 1,122 1,080 42 
1971 911 911 
1972 2,532 2,523 9 
1973 1,304 1,302 2 
1974 508 500 8 
1975 291 285 6 
1976 448 448 
1977 824 794 30 
1978 1,140 1,090 50 
SOURCES: BUSINESS MONITOR M7. 
TRADE AND INDUSTRY FOR 1960-1964. 
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acquisitions are identified in the statistics. Some 
further detail is, however, required in respect of the 
expenditure on acquisitions and mergers. 
The post-1969 series relates to expenditure on the 
company acquired using market values, that is the cash 
paid or the market price at the date of issue of shares 
or loan stock (including the value of warrants to 
subscribe for issues of ordinary shares). In some cases 
market values are not available because the company taken 
over is unlisted, in which case the net book value of 
the acquired company is utilised. Where payment is made 
over a period, the full value is recorded in the period when 
the transaction was finalised. However, it should be noted 
that this is not the same as an estimate of the value of 
a business taken over. In many cases an acquiring firm 
will have a stake in a potential victim prior to the time 
of making a bid. Under the rules established by the Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers, a firm may acquire up to 30% of 
the shares carrying voting rights of a company without 
being required to make a full unconditional 'offer for that 
company as a whole (Rule 34, City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers (9/1981». Such a holding enables a predator 
company to monitor the performance of a potential victim, 
even to the extent of gaining a seat on the Board of 
Directors, and thus gaining detailed information. It is 
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in fact a fairly common practice, especially where 
motives for acquisition of a company may relate to gaining 
possession of a customer or supplying firm as a trade 
investment in order to establish a relationship with the 
firm in question as an associate company. 
In the earlier period up to 1969, the valuation was 
based similarly on market value excluding any previous 
investment. Where such a value was not available. as in the 
case of unlisted companies, then the estimate is based on 
the nominal value of the shares acquired. 
The timing of the report was in the original series 
dependent on the date of the publication of accounts. 
After the revision it is related to the date at which a 
bid is declared unconditional. Since some bids turn into 
long-running battles and last for up to six months, there 
is often a great difference between the date at which an 
offer is first made and the time of its acceptance. 
There is a dissimilar manner of valuing mergers in 
the old and new series. Prior to 1969 the merger of two 
companies A and B in order to Form C was treated as an 
acquisition by C of A and B. Post-1969 a merger of A and B 
to form C is treated as an acquisition by the larger 
company (let us assume.it is A) of B (assumed to be the 
smaller company). and therefore the valuation entered into 
(1) 
the report is of B only. Th is could make a 
(1) Board of Trade Journal "Acquisitions and Mergers of Companies in 1968" 
14 March 1969. (5/1969). 
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considerable difference to the figures for expenditure on 
acquisitions. Consideration of the expenditure figures in 
Table 1.3 for mergers (strictly defined) shows that 
either there were much larger firms involved in merging 
between 1960 and 1969 in comparison with the following 
period up to 1978, or that one is witnessing a change in 
the way data is handled, and on the basis of this paragraph 
it is probable that the latter view is the correct one. 
27 
1.2.2. Analysis of Data 
Consideration of Table 1.2. shows that, from 1960 to a peak 
of 1,210 total acquisitions in 1972, and 1,205 acquisitions 
in 1973, there has been a steady rise in the number of 
acquisitions occurring. The trend line over this period 
posses~es a linear regression coefficient of 29.3, 
indicating that there was an average year by year growth 
of 29 additional acquisitions as each of the 14 years 
passed, or alternatively that there was a 50% increase in 
acquisitions from about an average of 660 per year in 1960 
to over 1,000 by 1972. 
After 1973 there was a sharp fall in the incidence 
of acquisitions to a low point of 353 in 1976. The number 
of acquisitions started to climb again but failed to reach 
in any year between 1974 and 1978, the level of activity 
recorded in any single year between 1960 and 1973~2)On the 
other hand, mergers treated as a separate form from 
acquisitions, average over the whole 19 year period from 
1960 to 1978 of about 3 per year remained fairly constant 
in number. The trend line has a negative slope of 0.1 
per year, indicating a slight fall in popularity for this 
form of amalgamation. If one works out the correlation 
coefficient between acquisitions and mergers (both treated 
as distinct forms), it is found to have a value of 0.2, 
indicating little relationship between the two forms. This 
(2) At the time of writing (March 1982) the annual number of 
acquisitions and mergers has started to decline again from a 
peak of 567 in 1978 which is a lower number than that achieved 
in any year in the 19608. 
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implies that if the cyclical behaviour of acquisitions is 
related to prosperity and depression in the economy, as 
has been hypothesised, then agreed consolidation of two 
firms by merger must obey different logical rules and 
probably reflects the needs of firms to deal with their 
structural deficiencies rather than a search for investment 
opportunities to increase profitability or growth. 
The statistics of expenditure on acquisitions and 
mergers of industrial and commercial companies from 1960 
to 1978 exhibit a parallel pattern (see Table 1.3.). There 
is a gradual climb to a peak of expenditure attained in 
1972 and then a sharp fall in the following year. The two 
series are not, however, identical. The subsidiary peak 
in Table 1.2. for the number of total acquisitions for 1973 
melts away when expressed in money terms. The total 
, 
acquisitions expenditure of 1968 gives that year a prominence 
not previously discerned. The pinnacle is achieved in both 
the numbers table and the expenditure table in 1972, but 
the financial peak is almost 100% higher than its near 
neighbours in time. The climb back following the 1973 fall 
is much faster, and by 1978 the magnitude of expenditure 
is analogous to that. occurring around the start of the 
decade. The size of expenditure on the merger form 
of acquisition is clearly greater in the period to 
1969 than after this date, though an explanation 
of why this is probably arising more from the 
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definition of mergers than a real difference, has been 
already suggested in this chapter. 
The correlation between the total acquisitions number 
series and financial series is 0.58. This is not very high 
and suggests that there may be a great deal of difference 
in the size of firms being acquired, but the expenditure 
reports may have been much affected by inflation which 
was a growing problem over the time involved. Both these 
problems· are explored in Tables 1.4. and 1.5. 
Table 1.4. uses the Retail Price Index to express 
the expenditure on acquisitions and mergers in 1970 prices. 
The use of the Retail Price Index in order to adjust a 
series of acquisition expenditures is unusual in the 
literature. An index of share prices is more normally 
employed, presumably on the basis that the correct measure 
of the cost of purchasing a company is the value of share 
prices at the appropriate time. Such an index does not 
measure the effect of inflation very -accurately, if in fact 
the number of acquisitions is correlated with the price of 
common shares, as 1s argued for example by Weston (218/1953) 
and Hannah (85/1974). The effect of such correlation would 
be that one series at its high and low points would be being 
adjusted by another index whose high and low points would 
be coincident with it. It is therefore proposed that the 
use of the Index of Retail Prices is a superior measure of 
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TABLE 1.4. 
EXPENDITURE ON ACQUISITIONS AND MERGEr~ OF INDUSTRIAL 
AND COUMERCIAL COMPANIES 1960-1978 DEFLATED BY THE INDEX OF RETAIL PRICES 
RETAIL PRICE TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL TOTAL EXPENDITURE INDEX ON ACQUISITIONS AND 
ACQUISITIONS ON ACQUISITIONS ANNUAL AVERAGES MERGERS EXPRESSED 
YEAR AND MERGERS AND MERGERS 1970 = 100 IN 1970 PRICES 
(£ million) (5 million) 
1960 739 358 67.2 532.7 
1961 639 521 69.5 749.6 
1962 640 370 72.5 510.3 
1963 888 352 73.9 476.3 
1964 940 505 76.3 661.9 
1965 1,000 fi17 80.0 646.2 
1966 807 500 83.1 601.7 
1967 763 822 85.2 964.8 
1968 946 1,946 89.2 2,181.6 
* * 1969 876 1,002 94.0 1,066.0 
1970 793 1,122 100.0 1,122.0 
1971 884 911 109.4 832.7 
1972 1,210 2,532 117.2 2,160.4 
1973 1,205 1,304 128.0 1,018.8 
1974 504 509 148.5 342.1 
1975 315 291 184.4 157.8 
1976 353 448 215.0 208.4 
1977 481 824 249.1 330.8 
1978 567 1,140 269.8 422.5 
* Average of point where 2 series connect. 
SOURCES: ACQUISITIONS. BUSINESS MONITOR M7 
INDEX OF RETAIL PRICES. ECONOMIC TRENDS. 
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TABLE 1.5.' 
EXPENDITURE ON ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS OF INDUSTRIAL 
A~D COMMERCIAL COMPANIES 1960-1978 RELATED TO THE AVERAGE SIZE OF VICTIHS 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE AVERAGE SIZE 
TOTAL TOTAL EXPENDI TURE ON ACQUISITIONS & AVERAGE or VICTIU 
ACQUISITIONS ON ACQUISITIONS MERGERS EXPRESSED SIZE OF EXPRESSED IN 
YEAR AND MERGERS AND MERGERS IN 1970 PRICES VICTIM 1970 PRICES 
(£ mi Ilion) (£ million) (£ m) (5 million) 
1960 739 358 535 0.5 0.7 
1961 639 521 750 0.8 1.2 
1962 640 370 510 0.6 0.8 
1963 888 352 476 0.4 0.5 
1964 940 505 662 0.5 0.7 
1965 1,000 517 646 0.5 0.6 
1966 807 500 602 0.6 0.7 
1967 763 822 965 1.1 1.3 
1968 946 1,946 2,182 2.1 2.3 
* * 1969 876 1,002 1,066 1.1 1.2 
1970 793 1,122 1,122 1.4 1.4 
1971 884 911 833 1.0 0.9 
1972 1,210 2,532 2,160 2.1 1.8 
1973 1,205 1,304 1,019 1.1 0.8 
1974 504 508 342 1.0 0.7 
1975 315 291 158 0.9 0.5 
1976 353 448 208 1.3 0.6 
1977 481 824 331 1.7 0.7 
1978 567 1,140 422 2.0 0.7 
* Average of point where 2 series connect. 
SOURCE: BUSINESS MONITOR M7. 
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inflation in the circumstance. The effect of using the 
expenditure figures adjusted to a 1970 price base is to 
improve the correlation between the total number of 
acquisitions (including mergers) and the amended expenditure 
figures from a value of 0.58 noted in the preceding 
paragraph to 0.7. The use of the corrected expenditure 
figures does not change the general shape of the series 
which still indicates a rising series that reaches its 
climax in the 1960-1978 period in 1972 and then falls. 
It does, however, produce a much more moderate rise between 
1974 and 1978 than is to be derived from the original 
expenditure series. (3) 
The average size of victim over the time span is 
calculated in Table 1.5. This is done in two ways; first 
on all by dividing the total number of acquisitions and 
mergers into the original expenditure data, and secondly 
by dividing the number of mergers and acquisitions into 
a measure of expenditure worked out in terms of the 1970 
prices. Using the original measure of expenditure the 
average size of firms taken over was £1.1 million, whereas 
the deflated measure indicates a size of £0.95 million. 
One conclusion that can be drawn from both sets of 
figures is that during an interval, contained by the years 
1967 to 1973, at a time when merger activity had accelerated, 
the average size of firm acquired also increased. The 
(3) The acquisition by value of expenditure series was also tested 
using the Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices Index (1970 = 100). 
The use of the G.D.P. as a deflator did not change the conclusion 
in any material respect from those arrived at above. 
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average for the series in current prices was £1.4 million 
and for the other using a 1970 price base was also 
£1.4 million. The interpretation of this would, however, 
differ from the subsequent behaviour of each run of figures. 
After 1973 the size of the acquired business remains high 
in the original series. Analysis of the two sequences 
( 4) 
1960 to 1969 and 1969 to 1978 suggests that 
after 1967 the size of victims permanently increased. From 
1960 to 1969 the average acquired firm cost £0.8 million, 
and from 1969 to 1978 this rose to £1.4 million. Except 
for the fact that the sharp jump occurred in 1967 and not 
1969, we might have been led to believe that we were 
witnessing an effect deriving from the method of calculating 
the data, since the analysis of the accounts of quoted 
companies would have undoubtedly caught a number of small 
acquisitions which would have escaped the count based on 
press reports. 
The adjusted series lends itself to another interpretation. 
In this case after a sharp jump in 1967 there was an equally 
sharp fall in 1973 in the amount involved in an average 
acquisition. From 1973 onwards the expenditure falls to 
a level similar to that preceding the 1967-1973 increase. 
Calculation shows that the average victim size in this set 
of figures was £1.0 million from 1960 to 1969 and £0.9 million 
thereafter. We are led, therefore, to the view that there 
(4) The year 1969 is used to end one sequence and to start the next. 
Thus 1969 is used twice; this is because it has been derived 
from an average of the two figures quoted in the Business Monitor 
M7 and therefore represents an average in relation to the methods 
of calculating the series. 
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was, in reality. a period when the average size of 
acquisition did increase, forming a peak in that series. 
If, however, the size of firm being taken over increases 
at a time when merger activity is also at a high level, 
certain other inferences follow. 
It is a matter of general observation that an 
acquired firm is seldom smaller in size than its victim. 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer (27/1975) found that acquiring 
firms were nearly always larger than the acquired firms. 
This proved to be true from their evidence in 78 cases out 
of 86. From this, two possible conclusions follow: 
either that large firms (defined as those with a net 
asset value of £50 million or over) (5) began to increase 
the size of acquisition that they were willing to undertake, 
or that a number of large firms not previously heavily 
involved in takeover activity began to be more active. 
It is known that the very heavy expenditure on 
acquisitions which occurred in 1968 reflects a small 
number of very large mergers and" acquisitions. In this 
year 7 such acquisitions accounted for about half of the 
total consideration ("Mergers. A Guide to Board of Trade 
Practice" (17/1969». These were : 
(5) The Annual Abstract of Statistics (1976) indicates in its analysis 
of listed companies (i.e. those involved in manufacturing, 
distribution and construction with some services) that the 
average size (measured in net assets) of such companies was 
£9.4 million in 1966 and £12.8 million in 1969. 
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1) The merger of British Motor Holdings with 
Leyland Motor Corporation to form British 
Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd. 
2) General Electric Company acquisition of 
English Electric Company 
3) Thorn Electrical Industries' acquisition 
of Radio Rentals 
4) Allied Breweries' acquisition of 
Showerings Vine Products and Whiteways 
5) Land Securities Investment Trust 
acquisition of City Centre Properties 
6) English Sewing Cotton merger with Calico 
Printers Association to form English 
Calico Ltd. 
7) Rank Hovis McDougall's acquisition of 
Cerebos 
TOTAL 
Source: Board of Trade Journal 4/14 March 1969. 
Total 
Expenditure 
£ million 
455 
277 
185.8 
100.1 
71.9 
67.7 
60.3 
£1,217.8 million 
To this indication that larger size of acquisitions 
by major companies was an important factor must be added 
other evidence that the number of large companies involved 
in merger also increased. 
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In a paper prepared by the staff of the Monopolies 
Commission for the Department of Trade and Industry ("A 
Survey of Mergers 1958-1968" (18/1970». an analysis was 
made of the size of acquiring companies (measured by net 
asset value) in terms of the net asset values of 
acquisitions made. A summary of the table shows 
TABLE 1.6. 
DISTRIBUTION OF MERGERS (NET ASSETS) BY SIZE 
CATEGORIES OF ACQUIRING COMPANIES 1958-1968 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NET ASSET VALUES PER PERIOD 
Acquiring Companies 
Net Assets Category 1958/60 1961/63 1964/65 1966 1967 1968 
£50 million to £200 million 27% 25% 46% 58% 82% 73% 
£10 million to £50 million 39% 46% 25% 16% 5% 13% 
£0 million to £10 million 34% . 29% 29% 26% 13% 14% 
TOTALS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
These figures indicate an increasing trend by large 
companies (i.e. over £50 million) to engage in merger 
activity. 
It is possible to examine whether the size of company 
being acquired has increased over the period by devising 
a series based on Trade and Industry reports to 1970 and 
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on the Business Monitor M7 for years after 1970. Table 1.7 
was constructed on this basis. From the table one might 
seem entitled to conclude that after 1966 the number of 
companies with a net asset value of £5 million or over 
having become a larger proportion of the total distribution 
and that there was a persisting tendency for larger firms 
to be acquired. This inference is not, however, sustainable 
when inflation is taken into account. The figures have 
been re-worked from 1971 to 1977 using 1970 price values 
and on the further assumption that the number of 
acquisitions between £5 million and £25 million were evenly 
spread over that range. The results of these amendments 
are shown in Table 1.8. 
Again we are led to the belief that not only did the 
number of acquisitions subside after 1973, but also so did 
the number of larger takeovers also fall. The resumed 
pattern in terms of smaller firms forming almost 98% of 
all activity became again common after the sudden upsurge 
in activity between 1967 and 1973. 
It is well recognised that being taken over is 
something that predominantly happens to small firms. Figures 
drawn from Trade and Industry (various issues) show on 
analysis that 80% of all acquisitions between 1962 and 
1970 involved a consideration of less than £0.5 million 
and that between 1971 and 1974, 90% required an expenditure 
of less than £2 million. 
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TABLE 1. 7. 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ACQUIRED 1962-1977 
YEAR NUMBER OF ACQUISITIONS INVOLVING AN EXPENDITURE OF :-
Up to % of Over % of 
£5 million total £5 million total TOTAL NUMBER 
1962 627 98% 13 2% 640 
1963 874 98% 14 2% 888 
1964 918 98% 22 2% 940 
1965 984 98% 16 2% 1,000 
1966 789 98% 18 2% 807 
1967 729 96% 34 4% 763 
1968 882 93% 64 7% 946 
(Old 
1969 series) 869 96% 38 4% 907 
(New 
1969 series) 799 94% 47 6% 846 
1970 756 95% 37 5% 793 
1971 844 95% 40 5% 884 
1972 1,140 94% 70 6% 1,210 
1973 1,148 95% 57 5% 1,205 
1974 485 96% 19 4% 504 
1975 302 96% 13 4% 315 
1976 335 95% 18 5% 353 
1977 443 92% 38 8% 481 
SOURCES: FIGURES TO 1970 FROM TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
FIGURES FOLLOWING 1970 FROM BUSINESS MONITOR M7. 
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TABLE 1.8 (AMENDMENT TO TABLE 1.7) 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ACQUIRED 1962-1977 
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
ACQUISITIONS % OF ACQUISITIONS % OF TOTAL 
YEAR UP TO £5 MILLION TOTAL OVER £5 MILLION TOTAL NUMBER 
{Expressed in (Expressed in 
1970 prices) 1970 prices) 
1971 848 96% 36 4% 884 
1972 1,150 95% 60 5%.', 1,210 
1973 1,161 96% 44 4% 1,205 
.. 
1974 491 97% 13 3% 504 
1975 308 98% 7 2% 315 
1976 345 98% 8 2% 353 
1977 466 97% 15 3% 481 
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On the basis of the findings of this section, the 
probable judgement must be that over the longer term there 
appears to be a fairly consistent pattern in which smaller 
firms represent about 98% of all acquisitions and only 2% 
of acquisitions fall into a higher category. For these 
purposes a smaller size of firm being defined as valued 
at less than £5 million in net asset terms expressed in 
1970 prices. There does, however, appear to have been a 
peak of activity which occurred between 1967 and 1973 in 
which not only did the number of acquisitions significantly 
increase, but also the average size of victim. 
The period around 1970 has been characterised in the 
Ii terature as one of "merger mania". The expression is a 
form of words and tells us nothing about what actually 
happened, except to indicate that activity intensified. 
Why did activity intensify during this period? It is the 
purpose of the next section to explore some possible 
causes and consequent explanations. 
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1.3. A CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ANALYSIS 
OF THE 1960 - 1978 DATA 
1. 3. 1. The Cyclical Behaviour of Merger Act! vi ty 
It has long been recognised that merger activity occurs 
in a cyclical fashion. Earlier in this chapter the work 
of Nelson ('164/1959), Hannah (85/1974), McGowan (150/1971) 
and Verma (215/1972) has already been referred to in the 
context of the history of merger activity, each of whom 
has sought to establish some relationship between the 
fluctuating frequency of mergers and the business cycle. 
Weston came to the same conclus ion in "The Role of Mergers 
in the Growth of Large Firms (218/1953). Nelson returned 
to make a close analysis of the relationship between 
business cycle factors and the growth of firms (165/1966). 
Since the evidence set out in the previous section 
appears to indicate that between 1960 and 1978 a mer,ger 
pattern with cyclical features existed, it was decided 
to compare this pattern with that displayed by indices of 
Industrial Production and Stock Prices. Two possible 
choices present themselves as indicators of merger behaviour. 
The first of these is the Total Number of Mergers and 
Acquisitions which is used in Table 1.9, and the second 
the Value of Total Expend1 ture on Mergers and Acquisitions 
which occurs in Table 1.10. 
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TABLE 1.9 
NUMBER OF MERGERS. INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND 
FINANCIAL TIMES INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL ORDINARY SHARES 1960-1978 
TOTAL INDEX OF FINANCIAL TIMES INDEX 
ACQUISITIONS INDUSTRIAL OF IN DUS TRI AL 
AND MERGERS PRODUCTION + ORDINARY SHARES YEAR 
1975 = 100 1935 = 100 
1960 739 75.5 318.6 
1961 639 76.5 319.8 
1962 640 77.2 285.5 
1963 888 79.4 316.9 
1964 940 86.1 346.9 
1965 1,000 88.8 337.3 
1966 807 90.1 331.9 
1967 763 91.2 355.0 
1968 946 97.0 463.3 
* 1969 876 99.6 419.8 
1970 793 99.7 361.0 
1971 884 99.7 386.2 
1972 1,210 101.8 503.8 
1973 1,205 109.3 435.6 
1974 504 105.2 251.2 
1975 315 100.0 311.0 
1976 353 100.7 368.0 
1977 481 102.0 452.3 
1978 567 104.1 479.4 
+ Includes all industries other than those engaged in the extraction 
of oil and gas. 
* Average of point where 2 series connect. 
SOURCES: BUSINESS MONITOR M7 
ECONOMIC TRENDS (ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT) • 
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TABLE 1.10 
YEAR 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON MERGERS, INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUcrION AND FINANCIAL THreS INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORDINARY SHARES 1960-1978 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE INDEX OF FINANCIAL TIMES INDEX 
ON ACQUISITIONS INDUSTRIAL OF INDUSTRIAL 
+ AND MERGERS PRODUCTION ORDINARY SHARES 
(£ million) 1975 = 100 1935 = 100 
358 75.5 318.6 
521 76.5 319.8 
370 77.2 285.5 
352 79.4 316.9 
505 86.1 346.9 
517 88.8 337.3 
500 90.1 331.9 
822 91.2 355.0 
1,946 97.0 463.3 
* 1,002 99.6 419.8 
1,122 99.7 361.0 
911 99.7 386.2 
2,532 101.8 503.8 
1,304 109.3 435.6 
508 105.2 251.2 
291 100.0 311.0 
448 100.7 368.0 
824 102.0 452.3 
1,140 104.1 479.4 
+ Includes all industries other than those engaged in the extraction 
of oil and gas. 
* Average of point where 2 series connect. 
SOURCES: BUSINESS MONITOR M7 
ECONOMI C TRENDS (ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT) • 
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TABLE 1.11. 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ACQUISITIONS, EXPENDITURE 
ON ACQUISITIONS, INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND 
FINANCIAL TIMES INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL ORDINARY SHARES 
SIGN I F I CAN CE 
MERGER/ CORRELATION LEVEL OF 
ACQUISITION CORRELATION COEFFI CIENT CORRELATION 
MEASURE RELATED VARIABLE COEFFI CIENT SQUARED COEFFICIENT 
Number of Index of Industrial - 0.004 0.0002 0.49 
mergers and Production. 
acquisitions. 
Number of Financial Times Index + 0.390 0.152 0.05 
mergers and of Indus tri a1 
acquisi tions. Ordinary Shares. 
Expendi ture Index of Industrial + 0.491 0.241 0.02 
on mergers Production. 
and 
acq uis i tions. 
Expendi ture Financial Times Index + 0.822 0.676 0.0001 
on mergers of Industrial 
and Ordinary Shares. 
acquisi tions. 
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The choice is not vdthout significance. The correlation 
bet ..... een the two merger seri es (i. e. number of mergers and 
e>'Jlenditure) 1s 0.576. The significance level of this 
correlation 1s high (0.005) and the last section has established 
that the difference is due to the size of firm being acquired at 
different stages of the cycle. The correlation betweeD series 
is set out in Table 1.11. 
The correl atioD b·etv.een th e number of mergers and the 
Financi al Times Index, and Expendi ture on Mergers and the Index 
of Production and F.T.lndex are all significant at the 5% level. 
The correlati on between the Expendi ture series and the Share 
Index was highly significant. (6) There does therefore appear to 
be evi dence that merger behaviour increases during buoyant phases 
of business expansion and declines when prosperity declines. 
The observati on th at an increase in sh are pri ces during a 
rising stock market .is correlated with an intensification· of merger 
activity demands an explanation. Gort (82/1969) has proposed a 
theory based on value discrepancy between the share price of 
acquirers and acquired companies. In brief, this theory suggests 
that in a period of growth of markets (whieb the stock market 
boom 1s re:f'lecting) the existing stock of information on the 
prospects of companies is rendered obsolete, and as a result some 
companies (presumably the more inefficient ones) have stock 
(6) Nelson (147/1959) found cyclical deviations in the number of mergers 
occurring per year between 1895 and 1954 to be posi ti vely correlatf,d 
with the deviations in stock price, the correlation coefficient being 
0.47. 
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market pri ces whi ch undervalue thei r assets, and other compani es 
. may use a merger in order to purch ase those assets as an 
alternative to internal investment. The major reason advanced 
for the undervaluation consequent upon information confusion is 
that new technology makes the prediction of costs and benefits 
uncertain. 
Crucial objections can be raised against this theory 
a) If technology has introduced new uncertainties into 
the process of predicting the future, why should not 
these uncertainties be equally shared amongst all firms? 
Only if convincing reasons for asymmetry in the 
distribution of information can be prcduced can this 
objection be overcome. 
b) If technologi cal change h as expressed itself in demand 
for a uniquely new product, there can be little sense 
in merging to duplicate existing facilities since the 
plant to manufacture the new product requires to be 
developed ab initio. How can a merger, which merely 
redistributes control over eXisting physical capacity, 
add anything of value in this circumstance? 
c) A share price represents not only a valuation of 
existing assets but also a commentary on future 
expectations. It is perfectly possible that an existing 
collection of assets may have an al ternati ve use which 
could increase earnings, but why should the shareholders 
-
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of the potential yictim company not foresee the 
alternative use and therefore incorporate that 
possibility in the asking price for takeover? Even 
where they may have overlooked the opportunity, the 
announcement of a bid which may take several months 
to consummate, from a bidder whose identity will be 
revealed, should offer indicators of what the 
alternative use might turn out to be. 
A solution to these difficulties requires three assumptions:-
i) that however efficient a market may be when considered 
in terms of financial information, there may be 
asymmetry in the distribution of knowledge concerning 
new technology; 
ii) that investment via merger and internal investment are 
not mutually exclusive categories but overlapping 
categories; 
iii) that since the present value of expected economic rents 
will fall over time due to the working of the competitive 
process, the speed with which new products are introduced 
or cost saving technologies developed may be significant 
in the estimation of economic value. 
Assumption (1) would appear reasonable in view of the secrecy 
which surrounds research until patent protection is secured. 
Assumption (ii) is supported by the fact that innovation (as 
opposed to invention) relates existing production facilities to 
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new knowledge. The third assumption is no more than a 
description of the competitive process and assumes that over 
time equi 1ibri um will be es tablished and economi c rents (except 
for factors in total inelastic supply) will disappear. 
On the presumption that new technology will take the form 
of ei ther new products or more effi cient processes, two examples 
will illustrate the working of these assumptions :-
New Product 
A firm engaged in the manufacture of domestic 
washing machines develops a new computer controlled 
model. The rising market indicates increasing demand. 
Either the firm may lay down a factory in a new greenfield 
site or purchase (possibly by takeover) an existing 
factory which produces washing machines and which can 
be adapted to incorporate the electronic innovations by 
minimum investment. 
New Process 
A chemical company's research laboratories have 
perfected a new process for manufacture of plastic. The 
adaptation of existing facilities secured by means of a 
merger could enable it to secure a larger share of the 
existing market or meet new demand by reducing cost. 
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Both examples depend on imperfections in the dissemination 
of product/production information and the proposition that 
merger plus adaptation will be cheaper than internal investment. 
Both would permit value discrepancies to arise. ~~ether the 
relationship between technological development and merger is, 
in fact, as outlined would lead to an investigation outside the 
scope of the present study. 
The contrast between the low, non-significant correlation 
between the number of acquisitions and the index of industrial 
production and the highly significant, much enhanced correlation 
between the series showing ex~enditure on acquisitions and the 
index of industrial production invites comment. One possible 
answer is that the index of industrial production is lagged, 
reacting much more slowly to growth opportunities than the 
numerical merger series. However, as market demand continues to 
grow, larger firms enter the takeover market and the gap between 
the series showing an increase in expenditure on victims (which 
Table 1.7 shows to involve also an increase in the size of firms 
being acquired) and the index of industrial production diminishes. 
The intervention of large firms may be deduced from the enhanced 
size of victims. This suggestion that large firms are slower to 
involve themselves in merger activit~ may arise from caution as 
to the maintenance of market growth or could indicate an element 
of defensive behaviour aimed to protect their existing markets. 
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In order to check the worth of using the Retail Price 
Index as a deflating adjustment, a further calculation was 
made concerning the association between a deflated series 
on Expenditures on Acquisitions and a deflated Financial 
Times Industrial Ordinary Shares Index. The correlation 
held but was lower than that between the unadjusted figures 
at 0.6. The possible interpretation of this result will 
be referred to below as we consider the meaning of these 
correlations. 
It is the purpose of a later chapter to explore the 
character of merger theory, but it is not possible to 
offer an interpretation of the preceding results without 
making some brief reference to it. 
Merger theory can be usefully classified into two 
main branches. Both offer alternative explanations of the 
way in Which an increase in profitability is sought by 
the amalgamation of two or more independent enterprises • 
• Neither explanation is mutually exclusive and both factors 
may be at work at the same time and reflected in the same 
acquisi tion. The first of these may be named the "real 
effects" model and the second the "financial effects" 
model. 
In the "real effects" model the intention of the takeover 
is to achieve gain by the absorption of tangible and 
intangible assets. Under this rubric a firm will attempt 
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to gain control of additional productive resources, property, a skilled 
workforce, new retail outlets, a marketing organisation or a distribution 
system. It may seek to appropriate under-utilised cash balances or 
buy an effective management team. Access may be secured to research 
"know-how", patents. brand names or the customer goodwill of a business 
as a whole, entry to a new market or the incorporation of an increment 
\ 
in the share of the existing market. This latter type of motive is the 
one nearly always found when a merger is discussed in the financial press. 
The "financial effects" model strives to ensure a growth in 
profitability by lowering the cost of capital, through the combination 
of the capital structure of two formerly independent concerns. For 
example, the capture of tax losses permits a company with adequate 
profi ts to offset these losses against unused capi tal allowances 
(H.M.S.D. 15/1978), the greater safety of investment in a larger 
combination should permit funds to be raised at lower cost. ~~eks 
(pages 57 and 58,153/1977) points out that the issue of shares to finance 
a takeover, because it involves a set ratio between the shares of the 
two firms, is a more certain operation than raising cash for equity for 
physical investment and greater certainty is associated with lower 
(7) 
cost. 
The most well-known examples of this type of financial gain are 
associated wi th the tactics of Sir Charles Clore and Slater Walker t where 
a high share price (reflecting a high price/earnings ratio) 1s used to 
acquire control of a firm whose share price does not represent the full value 
(7) But, as Meeks himself points out, the crucial variable 1n the case of 
a share for share exchange is the exchange rate between th.e acquirer's 
and victim's shares and this reduction in uncertainty will only obtain 
if, despite haphazard changes1n the level of the market, the relative 
posl tlon of the two shares remains the same. (Meeks, page 57, 153/1977). 
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of its assets, after takeover, assets are sold to increase 
profits and thus bolster the high share price for further 
acquisi tions • 
The "real" explanation for the association between 
merger frequency and an index of Production and an index 
of Share Price is well illustrated in Nelson's article 
"Business Cycle Factors in the Choi ce between Internal and 
External Growth" (165/1966). He portrays mergers as a 
competing form of growth to internal investment. In Nelson 
(164/1959) he had put forward an argument that mergers 
would tend to occur when a firm had exhausted its profitable 
opportunities for internal investment: 
"The des ire for merger may be less urgent if the 
various firms are operating at less than full 
capacity, and independent, immediate and profitable 
expansion may be possible. The merger may be 
accomplished only when the expansion of the various 
firms has proceeded to the point at which they are 
operating at full capacity". 
(Nelson: "Merger Movements in American Industry 
1895-1956" (164/1959». 
However, in his 1966 paper he looked at the relationship 
between the timing of peaks of activity with respect to 
merger activity, manufacturers' new eqUipment orders and 
industrial building construction contracts. the latter 
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two series being analogues for internal investment. His 
finding that the merger peaks preceded the internal 
investment peaks led him to revise the view of his earlier 
work and come to the conclusion that in a situation of 
expansion. mergers are a way of achieving growth quickly 
with a possible subsidiary explanation that new investment 
of a physical kind takes longer to mature and thus shows 
later in time than completed mergers. 
This increase in pace of growth argument for the 
enhanced level of mergers during the expanding phase of 
the business cycle is one possible explanation of the 
correlations with production and share prices that occurred 
between 1960 and 1978. 
M.Gort, in his article "An Economic Disturbance Theory 
'Of Mergers" (82/1969) previous ly ci ted, adopts the 
"financial model" viewpoint. He suggests that 
"before proceeding to search for special explanation 
of mergers, we would do well to see whether there 
is anything to explain beyond the phenomen of normal 
turnover in income-producing assets". 
His argument. is that mergers occur when there are 
discrepancies in the valUation of income producing assets 
arising from differences'in expectations about future income 
streams and the risks associated with expected income. 
Such discrepancies lead to the under-valuation of companies 
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which thus become "bargains" for acquiring firms. He relates 
the cause of such discrepancies to two factors: 
a) rapid changes in technology, and 
b) movements in security prices. 
He then associates the coincidence of the upward trend in share 
prices to the acceleration in the number of takeovers by 
suggesting that the expectations of managers and long term 
investors are less volatile than those of speculators and other 
short term investors. Therefore in times of rapidly increasing 
share prices there is a larger opportunity for valuation 
discrepancies to occur and hence the correlation found • 
Therefore, we can possibly explain the cyclical associations 
by reason of the increasing number of bargains to be found in the 
upward phase of the cycle. 
Gort's argument requires further examination. It depends on 
the proposition that heterogeneity of expectation can persist in 
a financial market concerning the valuation of a company. Modern 
financial theory is founded on the basis, however, that value 
discrepancies cannot survive in a perfect capital market which 
will cause price differences to be eliminated by arbi trage. 
A merger will take place, according to Gort's supposition, 
when an acquiring firm A estimates the present value of the 
expected earnings of fi rm B to be greater than the present value 
of these estimated earnings in the opinion of the shareholders of 
firm B. This conflict of opinion may arise from two causes:-
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a) the e>..-pected earnings of B as perceived by A are larger 
than the firm B thinks; 
b) the stockholders of A use a lower discount rate than the 
stockholders of B in calculating the present value of 
the earnings. 
In symbols let : 
E = E>..-pected earnings of Company B. 
E (A) = E:lI:pected earnings of Company B as 
estimated by A. 
E(B) = Expected earnings of Company B as 
estimated by B. 
K(A) = The Discount Rate used to determine 
the present value of E by A. 
K(B) = The DiscolDlt Rate used to determine 
the present value of E by B~ 
peA) = The present value of E to A which is 
equi valent to the price which 
Company A will pay 
PCB) = The present value 
equivalent ot the 
sh areholders of B 
company. 
Then AI s demand price for B will be :-
peA) = 
Bls selling price will be :-
PCB) = 
E (A) 
K(A) 
E (B) 
K(B) 
Value discrepancy will arise when :-
peA) ::> PCB) 
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for Company B. 
of E to B which is 
price at which the 
wi 11 sell their 
(Equation 1.1) 
(Equation 1.2) 
(Equation 1.3) 
which implies that :-
E(A) > E(B) assuming K(A) = K(B) 
or 
K(A) <:. R(B) assuming E(A) = E(B). 
The additional case where E(A) ~ E(B) and K(A)·~ K(B) and various 
permutations of this case are ignored since it does not affect the 
argument. 
Case One. 
Case Two. 
E (A) > E (B) • The Discount Rate for Both Fi rms bei ng Equal 
In tbis circwnstance A's shareholders will find the shares 
of B under-priced. This will induce them to buy B's 
shares causing the price of B's shares to increase. 
B's shareholders will either sell shares in view of the 
enhanced price or hold their shares but revise their 
eA~ectation of earnings. This process will continue until 
all stockholders maintain the same view of B's earning 
potenti a1. 
K(A) ~ K(B). The Estimate of Earnings being Equal 
Under this condition, A's shareholders will consider B to 
be under-pri ced. Given that At s shareholders are 
seeking to maximise their wealth, then shares in A will 
be sold and the money used to buy shares in B. As a 
result,. the price of A's shares will fall and the price 
of B's shares will rise. In consequence of this, A's 
shareholders will increase their rate of discount and B's 
shareholders lower theirs until the two rates of discount 
are equivalent. 
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In short, valuation discrepancies of the above type cannot 
be sustained in perfect capital markets where there is certainty, 
complete information and no transaction costs or other imperfections. 
Therefore Gort's "bargain" thesis can only be justified if 
a plausible explanation can be offered concerning imperfections in 
the capital market which disrupt the arbitrage mechanisms outlined. 
Two possibilities present themselves :-
a) Technological information which can be applied in the 
conditions of market growth is imperfectly distributed 
between companies. (This has already been discussed a 
few pages earlier). 
b) There may be delays in achieving the equilibrium created 
by arbitrage. These delays may be especially Significant 
in markets showing strong growth characteristics. As 
Gort himself says: 
"Cb anges in technology may lead to new products 
or new processes of production. Demand for new 
products are difficult to predict from past 
experience, and so are costs. Conversely when 
production processes change frequently future 
costs are difficult to forecast from past costs. 
In short. when technology changes rapidly, the 
record of the past necessarily contributes less 
to the formation of predictions about income." 
(Gort ( 82/1969) • 
The confusion sUGEested by Gort may take some time to subside, 
thus allowing value discrepancies to exist for a time. 
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It appears to be plausible to assume that managers, 
having developed their investment plans over a long time 
scale, see in a rising price of the firm's shares an 
opportunity to invest at reduced cost. If bargains can 
be found, arising possibly just from different rates at 
which share prices take off, then the high price at that 
time of the acquirer's shares make for a lowering of 
investment costs. This view is consistent with the fact 
that the correlations between merger frequency and the 
production index is lower and less significant whether 
mergers are measured by number or by expenditure. The 
fact that the correlation between a deflated expenditure 
on mergers series and a deflated share price index is 
lower than the correlation in current prices of the same 
series supports the financial explanation since it implies 
that the inflation of prices may have a part in the 
explanation and it is well known that inflation lowers 
costs to borrowers in real terms, providing that the rate 
of inflation has not been anticipated and incorporated into 
the rate of interest. Although there is evidence that 
during the 1960s there was growing awareness of the 
"money illusion" (for example, increasing militancy amongst 
unions in pressing wage claims), 1t 1s probable that the 
expectations of rates of inflation lagged the actual rates 
since these rates continued to accelerate to reach 
unprecedented heights in the United Kingdom in the mid-1970s. 
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The following tentative conclusions appear 
warranted from the analysis of this section: 
a) that the relationship between merger activity 
and the business cycle detected in earlier 
studies of mergers seems to have recurred 
during the period 1960-1978; (8) 
b) that the correlation between the merger series 
and the Index of Industrial Production and the 
Financial Times Index of Industrial Ordinary 
Shares is best explained on the assumption that 
rises and falls in share prices cause mergers 
to fluctuate in harmoney because of the effects 
on the cost of investment; 
c) that when merger frequency increases, it 
expresses itself partly in the acquired firms 
becoming larger in size and the acquiring 
firms also showing the same size increase. 
(8) An article by Maule (149/1968) in which he concludes that "the 
available evidence supports the view that merger cycles are not timed 
closely with business cycles" refers to the problem of the leading 
and lagging of merger series in relation to the business cycle and 
does not refute the general association set out above. 
60 
1.3.2. Mergers and Insolvency 
In order to analyse further the characteristics of 
acquisitive behaviour during the years 1960 to 1978, a 
comparison was made with respect to the trends in insolvency 
statistics during that time span. There are several reasons 
for expecting some sort of relationship to manifest itself. 
In the first place, it is generally believed that 
company liquidations increase during depressed business 
conditions and decrease with the improvement in business 
-circumstances. Therefore if there is a possible link with a 
putative business cycle, and if on the argument of the 
previous section a similar connection is revealed with 
acquisition trends, then we would expect to discover an 
analogous association between liquidations and takeovers. 
Table 1.12 sets out the data underlying this hypothesis. 
Secondly, if the competitive process is to operate 
efficiently, then one would anticipate that firms which 
were not profitably employing the resources allocated to 
them might yield up these resources not only by means of 
compulsory and voluntary liquidations but also be compelled 
to place these assets into the hands of more vigorous 
enterprises. This is the view expressed by Dewey (as/1961) 
when he suggests that "mergers are a civilised alternative 
to bankruptcy". 
Finally, it is possible that when firms are ailing, 
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TABLE 1.12 
NUMBERS AND EXPENDITURE ON MERGERS AND COMPULSOTIY LIQUIDATIONS 1960-1978 
TOTAL TOTAL EXPENDITURE COMPANY 
ACQUISITIONS ON ACQUISITIONS LIQUIDATIONS 
YEAR AND MERGERS AND MERGERS (COMPULSORY) + 
(£ million) 
1960 739 358 525 
1961 639 521 612 
1962 640 370 718 
1963 888 352 729 
1964 940 505 724 
1965 1,000 517 805 
1966 807 500 934 
1967 763 822 1,230 
1968 946 1,946 1,108 
* * 1969 876 1,002 1,181 
1970 793 1,122 1,269 
1971 884 911 1,166 
1972 1,210 2,532 1,150 
1973 1,205 1,304 1,080 
1974 504 508 1.395 
1975 315 291 2,287 
1976 353 448 2,511 
1977 481 824 2,425 
1978 567 1,140 2,265 
+ For Enel and and Wales. 
* 
Average of poin t where 2 series connect. 
SOURCES: BUSINESS MONITOR M7 
ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS. 
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either through facing difficult competitive conditions 
and/or an obsolescence in their product range. they may 
wish to use mergers as a means of revitalising themselves 
by entering more profitable or growth-orientated industries. 
This is a view expressed by Weston and Mansinghka (219/1971). 
Insolvency normally occurs when a company or person 
is unable to pay debts on a due date. It is included in 
the statistics produced by the Department of Trade when it 
is voluntarily acknowledged or determined by the Courts. 
Compulsory liquidations of companies arise from "winding 
up" orders following a petition to the Courts. A "creditors 
voluntary liquidation" is not the subject of legal 
proceedings but stems from an arrangement between company 
and credi tors. "Members voluntary liquidation" is produced 
when a company terminates its own existence. The various 
types of liquidation occur. as may be seen from an 
examination of the statistics in the ratio 
Compulsory liquidations 2 
Voluntary liquidations 3 
Members Liquidations 4. 
Table 1.12 uses the compulsory liquidation statistics 
for England and Wales over the relevant time. 
A glance at the Table shows that compulsory liquidations 
have not followed a fluctuating path between 1960 and 1978 
but instead show a rising trend. The correlations are set 
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out in Table 1.13. 
TABLE 1.13 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS. ACQUISITIONS, EXPENDITURE ON 
ACQUISITIONS AND COMPULSORY LIQUIDATIONS 
lIlERGER/ 
ACQUISITION 
MEASURE 
I"..ELATED 
VARIABLE 
CORRELATION 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
COEFFICIENT SQUARED 
SIGNIFICANCE 
LEVEL OF 
CORRELATION 
COEFFI CIENT 
Number of mergers/ 
acquisi tions. 
Compulsory 
liquidations. 
- 0.64 0.40 0.002. 
Expendi ture on 
mergers/ 
acquisition. 
Compulsory 
liquidations. 
0.04 0.001 
SOURCE: Derived from Table 1.11. 
0.442 
The Department of Industry, in an analysis of 
Insolvency Statistics in 1975 (13/1975) covering the years 
1960 to 1974, observes that company liquidations are 
cyclical with a fall in profits generally associated with 
a rise in liquidations. However, the Department of Industry 
could not find a convincing statist1cal relationship even 
when various lagged relationships were tested. They relate 
their failure to the fact that their statistics on Gross 
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Trading Profits relates to all companies with a few large 
company accounting for a considerable proportion of the 
total. Insolvency statistics, on the other hand, tend to 
reflect the behaviour of a large number of small firms. 
This explanation accords with the previouS analysis 
set out in section 1.3.(1) and the correlation coefficients 
in Table 1.13. There is a low correlation and a non-significant 
result between the Expenditure and the Insolvency figures. 
This is in agreement with the view that the Expenditure data 
reflects the effect of a larger size of business being 
acquired by acquirers of more than average dimension when 
merger activity intensifies. However, the effect of 
business conditions on acquisitions and insolvencies is 
successfully related at a high level of significance when 
numbers of acquisitions is used. The number of acquisitions 
data must of necessity reflect the large number of small 
firm takeovers that are known to occur. 
The negative sign of the correlation shows that 
liquidations are high when mergers are low in frequency. 
Two possible explanations suggest themselves for this. 
One is that liquidations occur during depressed business 
conditions and since mergers occur 1n the rising part of 
the business cycle there is no strong link between the 
two processes. In this view mergers are about growth and 
not about the transfer of badly utilised resources. This 
seems to be' the most likely construction. 
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However, it is not possible to discount entirely the 
interpretation that insolvencies occur with a regular 
frequency through all stages of the cycle, but 
they reveal themselves in the liquidation statistics during 
the down-phase of the cycle and in the merger data in the 
up-phase. R.L.Conn examined the problem of failing firms 
(51.11976) with reference to conglomerate mergers, and found 
no evidence that there was any significant difference 
between the pre-merger profitability of acquired and 
acquiring firms, and equally he found no support for the 
hypothesis that acquiring firms are in declining industries. 
Therefore the collapse of small firms has probably little 
to do with fluctuations in merger activity. This conclusion 
is not, of course, a verdict on the problem of whether 
firms which employ their assets so as to achieve below 
average returns are the potential victims of mergers; it 
is only a verdict on what happens when the smaller size of 
firm employs its assets disastrously. 
It is therefore possible to add to the three previous 
conclusions: 
d) there is no evidence that takeovers are significantly 
involved as a factor in providing an alternative to 
liquidation procedures. 
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1. 3. 3. The Business Cycle Hypothesis Re-examined 
The term "business cycle" (or alternatively "trade cycle") 
refers to oscillations in economic activity marked by 
alternate phases of high and low levels of investment, 
output and employment. They were a well marked feature of 
industrial life in the nineteenth century, but since the 
Depression of the 1930s, Government measures to control 
demand appear to have moderated their amplitude and shortened 
their periodicity. There has been some argument that they 
have ceased to exist. Nevertheless, each month the issue 
of Economic Trends produces charts showing leading, lagged 
and coincident series of cyclical indicators using a 
reference chronology of peaks and troughs representing 
growth cycles in the United Kingdom economy. 
The analysis of merger activity in Sections 1.4. and 
1.6. presumes the existence of such a cycle. There does 
seem undoubted evidence of correlations between indicators 
of business activity. There is obviously no tangible 
enti ty denoted by the term "business cycle" and the value 
of such a concept depends on whether it is a useful construct 
for the examination of economic data. More speCifically'for 
the purpose of this thesis, is it a fruitful method of 
analysing merger activity? By "useful" and "fruitful" in 
this context is meant - is there sufficiently stable 
correlation between merger activity and other indices for 
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hypothesis concerning the meaning of this behaviour to 
(9) be developed? In order to test the usefulness of the 
concept, multiple regression analysis was applied to the 
merger activity series (both by number and by expenditure) 
to see whether the independent variables of product, share 
value and insolvencies had sufficient regularity of 
association to serve the purpose of analysis. Table 1.14 
sets out the results of this analysis. 
The multiple correlations are seen to be high, 
explaining 80% and 90% of the variation in the two 
equations. The level of significance of these correlations 
leave little doubt as to their being a real rather than 
a chance effect. We can therefore accept that there is 
a strong predictive relationship between these series taken 
collectively. This further strengthens the conclusions 
of the previous section by demonstrating that .the concept 
of a business cycle is a valid way of examining merger 
phenomena. 
(9) It is the current practice in the United Kingdom and in the 
U.S.A. to calculate a composite index of various cycles of 
indicators in order to produce a "reference cycle" which can be 
identified with the "business cycle". The remarks above are 
not related to such a sophisticated construct, but to the general 
tendency for certain indicators of economic prosperity or 
depression to move in harmony. 
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TABLE 1.14. 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MERGER SERIES AND INDEX OF 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, FINANCIAL TI~ffiS INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORDINARY SHARES AND INSOL\~NCY STATISTICS. 1960-1978 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR INDEPENDENT VAnIABLES 
DEPENOCNT VARIABLE 
A. Annual total number 
of ,me rgers and 
acquisi tions. 
INDEX OF 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION 
10.7 
(2.9) 
F.T.INDEX 
OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORDINARY SHARES 
1.8 
. (0.4) 
~ruLTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
Nm.!BER OF 
CmlPULSORY 
LI QU!PAT2.~"S 
- 0.4 
(0.04) 
= 0.948 
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED = 0.899 
F TEST. LE~L OF SIGNIFICANCE = <: 0.001 
B. Annual e~~eDditure 
on mergers and 
acquisi tions 
21.5 
(9.4) 
6.4 
( 1.1) 
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
- 0.4 
(0.1) 
= 0.989 
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED = 0.9781 
F TEST. LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE =.(.0.001. 
CON STA."OT 
TERM 
----
- 361. 3 
(214 .0) 
- 3002.6 
(686.5) 
N.B. Figures in brackets show standard error of estimates of regression 
coeffi cients. 
SOURCES: BUSINESS MONITOR M7. 
ECONOMIC TRENDS 
ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS. 
. .. 
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1. 3.4. Types of Expenditure and Categories of Takeover 
The bid for a company is normally couched in terms of cash, 
ordinary shares, preference shares and fixed interest 
securities. Very often an offer is made of some combination 
of securities. In some cases the loan stock offered is 
convertible to equity within a given span of time or 
includes a warrant permitting the purchase of common shares 
at a given exercise price. In certain cases the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers under Rules 33 and 34 (9/1981) 
requires that a cash alternative accompany the offer, however 
expressed. 
Cash is the simplest instrument for making a bid but 
suffers from two disadvantages. The offerer must be in a 
position to raise cash either from its reserves or by means 
of mortgage or overdraft, or by the issue of shares or 
loan stock. This may be difficult for a company whose asets 
are not liquid in form and which finds that funds may 
only be raised on unfavourable terms because, for example, 
of a high interest level on borrowed money. The second 
difficulty is that cash offers become immediately liable 
to capital gains tax if accepted by individuals, or corporation 
tax if the offeree is a company. Such liability is deferred 
in the case of bids using shares until such time as the 
shares are sold. 
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A share for share exchange avoids the costs of raising 
funds by the predator firm but involves difficult problems 
of valuation. If the valuation of the shares of both 
acquirer and acquiree is not correctly established, 
then the shareholders of the bidding firm may find 
themselves suffering from a dilution of earnings subsequently. 
Since there is such uncertainty attached to the valuation 
process, it may be necessary to include an attractive premium 
on the price in order to persuade the shareholders of the 
victim company to accept the "paper" transaction. Newbould 
found in his study of biddine behaviour· ( 166/1970) an 
unrealistic premium in relation to the pricing of bids. 
Preference shares are not often used as a medium for 
takeover becuase they attract corporation tax on interest 
paid, unlike loans which can be treated as a cost to the 
company. 
Unsecured loan stock requires care when used as 
consideration in a takeover lest the debt ratio of the 
acquiring company becomes too large, thus damaging the 
interests of existing debtors of the company and reducing 
the share price by appropriating too large a portion of 
the company's income in interest payments. It is generally 
held that Section 54 of the Companies Act 1948 restricts 
the use of secured loans in making acquisitions since it 
does not allow "a company to give financial assistance for 
71 
the purchase of or subscription for its own shares whether 
by provision of security or otherwise". 
Table 1.15 sets out the percentaees of consideration 
paid in cash or shares and fixed interest securities. It 
can be clearly seen from the figures that during the time 
of merger "boom" the proportion of cash in the consideration 
fell only to rise again as the intensity of merger activity 
decreased. The correlation between expenditure on mergers 
and acquisitions and the proportion of cash used in the 
purchase was found to be - 0.7. If we also take into 
account a study by Firth (69/1976) based on takeovers in 
1973 and 1974, that the ratio of acquisitions being financed 
by equity shares and convertible loan stocks increased 
as the size of the acquisition became larger (which finding 
is also confirmed by Newbould's study (166/1970) of takeovers 
in 1967 and 1968), the argument of the previous section 1s 
strengthened. That argument was that an important factor 
in explaining the high level of merger activity between 
1967 and 1973 was that a high level of share prices during 
that time induced larger takeover bids to be attempted _ 
because of the reduction in the cost of takeover (via the 
high share price) and the possible valuation discrepancies 
arising within a rapidly changing share market. 
Table 1.16 illustrates the types of mergers taking 
place between 1965 and 1973 on the basis of figures to be 
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TABLE 1.15 
CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE ON ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 
YEAR 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 . 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
PAYMENT FOR COMPANIES ACQUIRED 
< 
AS PER CENT OF TOTAL CONSIDERATION 
• SHARES AND FIXED 
CASH INTEREST SECURITIES 
42% 58% 
38% 62% 
61% 39% 
48% 52% 
41% 59% 
33% 67% 
12% 88% 
28% 72% 
22% 78% 
31% 69% 
20% 80% 
53% 47% 
68% 32% 
59% 41% 
72% 28% 
57% 43% 
56% 44% 
SOURCES: ECONOMIC TRENDS, VOL.114. APRIL 1963 
BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL. NOVEMBER 1968 
BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL. MARCH 1969 
BUSINESS MONITOR M7. 
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TABLE 1.16 
INDUSTRI AL r COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL ~ffiRGERS CLASSIFIED 
BY TYPE 1965-1973 
TYPE OF INTEGRATION PERCENTS OF TOTAL 
YEAR HORIZONTAL VERTICAL DIVERSIFIED 
1965 
By number 78% 12% 10~~ 
By value 75% 13% 12% 
1966 
By number 16% 12% 12% 
By value 84%' 9% 7% 
1967 
By number 86% 5% 9% 
By value 91% 4% 5% 
1968 
By nmnber 81% 4% 15% 
By value 79% 4% 17% 
19G9 
By number 80% 2% 18% 
By value 83% 1% 16% 
1970 
By number 84% 1% 15% 
By value 70% 30% 
1971 
By number 75% 6% 19% 
By value 62% 4% 34% 
1972 
By number 65% 7% 28% 
By value 40% 9% 51% 
1973 
By number 79% 5% 16% 
By value 87% 4% 9% 
SOURCE : TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 17 JANUARY 1974. 
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found in Trade and Industry (25/1974). Acquisitions are 
commonly divided into three categories:-
a) Horizontal - where the firm taken over is a 
competitor producing a product which is a close 
substitute for that produced by the acquiring 
company. 
b) Vertical - where the firms involved are at 
different stages of the process of producing 
and marketing a common article or service. 
Typically it arises from the purchase of a 
supplier or a distributor. 
c) Diversified/Conglomerate - the two terms are more 
or less synonymous, although the latter term has 
an implication of diversification undertaken by 
large firms with a pejorative connotation that 
there has been an undesirable increase in market 
power. In the American literature, conglomerate 
mergers are often sub-divided into those involving 
product extension where dissimilar products are 
added to an existing market, and market extension 
where the number of markets in which the same 
product is sold is increased. There remain, of course, 
pure conglomerates where there is neither product 
nor marketing affinity. 
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One of the difficulties with this division is that 
an amalgamation may contain elements of more than one 
of these categories. More 'worrying is the probiem 
that the distinction between horizontal and diversified 
acquisitions depends upon how industries are classified. 
If that classification is narrow. then diversification 
is consequently increased and vice versa when the class 
is extended. There is some evidence (Cowling et al. 54/1980) 
that the classification used by the Office of Fair Trading 
(which was used in the compilation of Table 1:16) is much 
narrower than that which would result from the Minimum 
List Headings of the Standard Industrial Classification. 
As a result. probably some tendency to overestimate the 
extent of diversification is reflected in Table 1.16. 
Over the whole period displayed in that table. the 
average percentage of mergers of each type were:-
TABLE 1.17 AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF MERGERS OF EACH TYPE 
a) Horizontal 
b) Vertical 
c) Diversified 
BY NUMBER 
78.2% 
6.0% 
15.8% 
BY VALUE 
74.6% 
5.3% 
20.1% 
From this we can see that the predominant form of 
acquisition is horizontal, followed by diversified and 
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then vertical takeovers. This finding is confirmed by 
Singh who studied 488 quoted companies in the period 1948-1960 
(198/1971) and found about 60% of the amalgamations were 
wi thin the same industry group, and Newbould (166/1970) who 
reported that of 407 identified mergers in 1967 and 1968, 
over 80% were horizontal. 
If we divide the annual data into two groups, as in 
Table 1.18, from 1965-1968, and 1969 to 1973, there are 
indications that the diversified type of activity has 
increased: 
TABLE 1.18 
A. ANALYSIS BY NUMBER OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
1965-1968 
1969-1973 
Horizontal 
80.25% 
76.6% 
Vertical 
8.25% 
4.2% 
Diversified 
11.5% 
19.2% 
B. ANALYSIS BY VALUE OF TOTAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
1965-1968 
1969-1973 
Horizontal 
82.25% 
68.4% 
Vertical 
7.5% 
3.6% 
Diversified 
10.25% 
28.0% 
An earlier analysis by Utton (212/1969) for the years 
1954 to 1965 which revealed that out of 643 quoted 
company ,amalgamations only 9.3% by number and 15.9% by value 
were diversified, suggests that there does seem some 
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warrant for the view that over the recent past the 
number of horizontal and vertical mergers have been 
decreasing, giving way to increasing diversification in 
takeovers. One striking feature of the data is the way in 
which the value measure i~ larger than the number 
measure by a considerable amount from 1969 to 1973 for 
diversified acquisitions, suggesting that the size of firm 
being taken over in this way was considerably larger than 
for horizontal and vertical mergers in the same period. 
There is a marked contrast to the situation in the 
U.S.A. where according to figures produced by Reid (181/1968) 
between 1948 and 1968 the number of conglomerate mergers 
went from 58.7% to 80.2%. This difference between the two 
countries is normally attributable to the difficulties 
posed for horizontal and vertical mergers in America by the 
anti-trust legislation. 
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1.4. THE SAMPLING FRAMEWORK USED IN THE STUDY 
I t is acknowledged in research that the theory which is under 
scrutiny defines, to a large extent, what constitutes a "fact", 
since theory not only indicates what aspects of the maelstrom of 
reality should be singled out for attention but also dictates to a 
large extent the way in which variables should be constructed in 
order to elucidate the theory. In short. theory provides the 
conceptual framework for the undertaking. The purpose of the 
research also delineates the sampling frame. 
The research aim of this study was to seek out general reasons 
underlying merger activity and to relate these to some consistent 
pattern of firm behaviour. Since there are several different (but 
not necessarily conflicting) theories of the firm. the research 
inevitably became both a test of differing hypotheses about the 
nature and motivations of firms and also an explanation of merger 
activity in relation to these hypotheses. This matter is dealt with 
more fully in a later chapter. For present purposes it suffices 
to say that the sample should be drawn from a representative group 
of companies. This implies that the company selected should be 
neither too large nor too small, but be chosen in proportion to 
the range of sizes existing within the population of all firms. 
Immediately. however. practical difficulties arise. 
The firm in economic theory is a decision taking unit based 
on the combination of factors of production. land. labour, capital 
and management. In practice. it takes many different forms, 
stretching from the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business 
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to a large holding company. A business unit which does not 
incorporate itself under the Companies Act does not gain the 
privilege of limited liability. However, there are certain tax 
advantages for very small enterprises arising from the fact that they 
are not liable to Corporation Tax which makes it advantageous not 
to seek to change its status. Nevertheless, it is sensible because 
of the primitive organisational form of the unincorporated business 
to exclude it from consideration. If, however, we define a company 
as one registered under the Companies Acts of 1948 and 1967 (or some 
earlier version of that Act) there are still difficulties to be faced. 
Companies may have either Private or Public status. 
Pri vate companies have certain pri vi leges which offer a degree 
of privacy denied to public companies. They do not have to issue 
a prospectus when increasing their capital, need not have more than 
two members and can make directorial appointments more easily. Prior 
to the Companies Act of 1967, it was possible to be excused from 
filing financial accounts, though this is now no longer permitted 
A private company is, however, not able to offer shares or debentures 
to the public, is restricted in the manner in which it transfers 
shares, and must limit the number of its members to 50 (excluding 
employees). 
There are in existence a very large number of private companies 
although their share of the total assets of limited liability 
companies is comparatively small. In 1976 the Department of Trade, 
with which all companies must register, reported the existence of 
690,897 companies of which 16,716 were public (i.e. 2.4%) and 674,181 
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(i.e. 97.6%) were private. With this must be contrasted the finding 
of the Monopolies Commission staff (18/1970) in their "Survey of 
Mergers 1958-1968" that if one considered companies with a net asset 
size of £0.5 million or greater, with a quotation on a federated 
Stock Exchange in 1961, and engaged in manufacturing, construction, 
transport, distribution and miscellaneous services, then the leading 
200 firms in 1968 in rank order by size accounted for 80% of the 
net assets of all firms within that sample. 
The Bolton Committee Report (6/1971) on Small Firms estimated 
that according to their definitions of small firms (e.g. for 
manufacturing, 200 employees; for retailing, £50,000 annual turnover 
or less, etc.) there were 820,000 small firms. Collectively they 
employed about 4.4 million people and accounted for 14% of Gross 
National Product and 18% of the net output of the private sector 
of the economy. "The Times" on 17 April 1980 quoted an estimate of 
4,500,000· employees in the small firm sector with a total turnover 
of £57,000 million which represented 20% of U.K. corporate turnover. 
All this testimony indicates that the majority of firms in the 
United Kingdom are small and that collectively they account for only 
a small part of the wealth creating activities of the corporate 
sector. They have one other Significant drawback which is that 
little published information exists on their activities. There is 
some justification. therefore, for excluding small firms either as 
unincorporated businesses or as registered private companies from 
the sampling frame. It is well known that small ·firms have great 
difficulty in raising capital. Their mortality rate is higher, 
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the Bolton Committee Report (6/1971) estimated that between 1963 and 
1970, 23% of the small firms (using the Bolton definition) in 
manufacturing and construction ceased to exist either by going 
into liquidation, ceasing to trade or being taken over. Although 
there is a great number of acquisitions made in this sector, especially 
by public companies making takeover raids, the reasons for takeover 
are very different. The Bolton Report (Table 2.XI) reports that the 
two most important reasons for acquisitions within the category were: 
Financial Failure 37% 
Succession Problems 24% 
and that a further 14% were attributable to the need for making 
Estate Duty payments. These reasons differ considerably from those 
found in the mainstream literature on acquisitions between publicly 
quoted companies. For example, both Newbould (166/1970) and Singh 
(199/1975) find no significant difference between the profitability 
of acquired and acquiring firms in constrast to the 37% financial 
failures recorded above. Care should be taken, since not all 
private firms are small. The John Lewis Partnership employs total 
net assets of £170 million and the Wellcome Foundation of £273 
million, as recorded in "The Times 1000" (23 /1979) for 1979-80. 
Both are private companies • 
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1.4.1. The Consumer Durable/Non-Durable Goods Sample 
For the reasons related above, but also because of the 
need to have access to publicly available runs of financial 
data over an extended period, it was decided that the 
sampling frame should consist of public companies quoted 
on a United Kingdom Stock Exchange (in 1973 the local 
stock exchanges amalgamated with the London Stock Exchange). 
The Stock Exchange Official Year Book for 1970 was 
sleected and from the "Classification of Securities Section" 
all firms listed under the Category Headings of Consumer 
Durables and Consumer Non-Durables were noted. This 
produced a total of 1,047 firms. Examination of the main 
text of the Year Book demonstrated that the classification 
section excluded all subsidiary firms, foreign firms with 
quotations and companies whose common equity was not 
quoted (i.e. only loan stock was quoted). In order to 
obtain a listing on a Stock ~xchange in 1970 a company 
required the following characteristics: 
a) The securities quoted had to have an initial 
aggregate market value of £250,000 (raised to 
£500,000 in 1973) 
b' Anv individual security must have an initial 
market capitalisation of £100,000 (increased 
to £200,000 in 1973). 
c) 35% of the equity had to be in the hands of the 
general public (reduced subsequently to 25%). 
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By implication, therefore, these amounts represent 
the lower cut-off point of firms in the sample. 
The firms under the main headings Consumer Durables 
and Non-~vrables are sub-divided into various categories 
such as Light Electronics, Leisure, Packaging and Paper, 
etc., according to a scheme prepared by the In~titute 
of Actuaries and published in the Stock Exchange Weekly 
Official Intelligence (which includes details of any 
changes in classification as they occur). This scheme 
is based on the main purposes of the enterprise as stated 
in the annual accounts of each company. The sample was 
sub-divided into 30 categories. A full list of these 
categories and the number of firms in each category is 
to be found in Appendix A. 
The range of companies under the Consumer Durable 
and Non-Durable headings was chosen because it represented 
a wide range of companies involvini manufacturing (light 
electronics, motor components, motor vehicles, paper, 
clothing, etc.). retailing (food, stores. mail order. 
motor distribution) and services (hotels, leisure, publishing 
and printing. etc.) to ensure the sample reflected a wide area 
of industrial/commercial activity. In addition, firms 
not contained in the list in 1970 but which were found 
to have existed on a U.K. Stock Exchange other than London 
and which were entered into the Consumer Goods Durable 
and Non-Durable categories upon the 1973 amalgamation of 
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Stock Exchanges in the United Kingdom. provided they had 
a public quotation in their common equity in 1970. were 
added back to the list. 
The following categories of companies were therefore 
excluded from the sample: 
Banks 
Financial Trusts/Lands 
Insurance 
Investment and Unit Trusts 
Mines 
Oil 
Property 
Rubber 
Shipping 
Tea and Coffee 
Waterworks 
Other Utilities (Railways. Canals, 
Docks, Tramways. Electric Lighting, 
Telegraph. Power Supply, Gas). 
It was con~idered that acquisitions by financial and 
property companies. and companies engaged in commodities 
and utilities would make for extreme heterogeneity in the 
study and would involve an international dimension in 
many instances that would make the research impracticable 
by reason of the time and resources available. 
Also excluded, though not for the reason given above 
in the last paragraph, were other areas contained within 
the commercial/industrial company heading, namely capital 
goods manufacture, heavy engineering, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, office equipment, industrial holding 
companies and certain miscellaneous categories. These 
were not selected because it was felt that the groups of 
companies chosen were an adequate representation of the 
industrial/commercial sector. The holding companies were 
specifically excluded since the target for examination 
was not to be the extremely large firms with conglomerate 
structures. Such firms have been the centre for a great 
deal of attention in the literature because of the emphasis 
on increasing concentration within the economy. These firms 
may well however represent an ext.reme in motivation and 
organisation which will cast little light on the behaviour of 
the average enterprise. 
In 1979 (Stock Exchange Fact Book (22j1979) we find 
that there were 1,973 firms listed in the Commercial and 
Industrial and Breweries/Distillers Groups. There were a 
total of 2,746 companies in all categories. Thus the 
Industrial/CommercialjBreweries group comprised 72% of total 
quoted independent £irms (excluding subsidiaries and 
foreign companies). Thus 1,047 firms would represent 53% 
of the totality of firms in the industrial classification 
and 38% of the totality of all publicly quoted companies. 
Since the Stock Exchange Year Book is an annual 
publication, it is possible to trace certain characteristics 
of companies over a long period of time. The other main 
source of company data, the Extel Statistical Service, 
because of frequent up-dating of reports and the 
destruction of earlier records, did not provide a 
sufficiently lengthy run of information. Moodies Investment 
Handbooks, a favoured source in earlier studies, 
unfortunately discontinued pUblication of its U.K. volumes 
in the mid-1970s and so were not suitable. 
Each company from the 1,047 sample was traced through 
each successive edition of the Stock Exchange Year Book 
from the 1970 volume to the 1978/79 edition, or to the 
point of its earlier demise. A number of firms in the 
1970 list were withdrawn from the analysis, mainly because 
on examination they turned out to be subsidiaries but 
also because 
i) they were reorganised in the periodj 
ii) they failed to produce accounts during one of the 
chosen years (for reasons other than 1iquidation)j 
ili) they changed category over the nine year periodj 
iv) they became public in 1970 and entered the Stock 
Exchange record with no description of the 1970 
accounts. 
This reduced the original sample of 1,047 firms to 953, 
a net loss of 94 firms or 8.9% of the total. Appendix B 
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lists the total of 1,047 firms by name and category. It 
should be noted that the firms' names are those used in 
1970 since many businesses changed their names over the 
period, for example "Di tchburns" which in 1973 became 
"Adda International" only to adopt the title "Comfort 
International" in 1978. This phenomenon of altering 
designations proved to be a constant difficulty. and the 
use of Dun and Bradstreet I s pUblication "Who Owns Whom" 
was invaluable in the task of establishing identities 
( 61 /annual). Appendix C shows the 30 categories. the 
number of firms in each category. the number of companies 
excluded from the sample by category and the fate of the 
remainder in each group between 1970 and 1978. 
From the Stock Exchange Year Books. six variables 
were calculated to represent: 
a) Size of company 
b) Growth of company 
c) Directorial control of company 
d) An Index of Takeover Activity for each group 
e) Index of increase in Shareholder Wealth over 
the period for each company 
f) Rate of Return on net assets for each company. 
A full definition of the calculations is contained in 
Appendix A. and the rationalisation for their use is 
contained in a later chapter. 
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The time period chosen, 1970 to 1978, was selected 
because it contributed to the research record a sample 
over a different time period from those found in other 
major studies. The latest detailed study of mergers was 
Meeks (153/1977) dealing with the years 1948 to 1971, and 
Singh in his further study (199/1975) covered the span 
from 1963 to 1970. It was hoped to sample over a ten year 
period, but the categorisation of firms in the Stock 
Exchange Year Books was radically altered in 1970 making 
comparisons with 1969 difficult; therefore a nine year 
period was accepted. The passage of time between 1970 
and 1978 proved to be particularly apt since it covered 
both a time of high and low merger intensity. 
In determining the value of variables, there is a 
particular problem with respect to the timing of accountS. 
The publication of annual accounts occurs throughout the 
calendar year, although there is a tendency for accounting 
years to end clustering round March, December and September. 
There is also a period of about six months between the 
ending of the accounting year for a firm and the issue 
of those accounts around the time of the Annual General 
Meeting. There had therefore to be a consistent rule for 
the start and end o£ the period with respect to the 
accounting year. In order to qualify as 1970 accounts, 
they had to be published between June 1969 and June 1970, 
and 1978 accounts were those falling between June 1977 
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and June 1978. Therefore if we allow for an average of 
six months between financial year close and issue of 
accounts, the calculations reflect the financial experience 
of the years 1969 to 1977. The data was then placed on 
file on an ICL 1906A Computer at the University of 
Manchester Regional Computing Centre and transferred to 
a CDC 7600 for analysis~ 
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1.4.2. The Comparison Sample; Victims, Predators and Neutrals 
Although the ~tock Exchange Year Books provided an 
excellent supply of continuous data by the nature of the 
source, it was somewhat limited in range. In order to 
explore a wider array of financial characteristics of 
acquiring and acquired firms, a second sample was located. 
This consisted of 50 companies who were taken over in the 
years 1978 and 1979, and 50 companies who were acquirers 
in those years. Additionally, a further 50 examples were 
selected of firms who had not either been taken over or 
acquired any victims in those years and also had been free 
of such actions in the five prior years. The total of 150 
companies are, for convenience, referred to respectively 
as the "victim group", the "predator group" and the "neutral 
group" • 
The purpose of the neutral group was to provide a control 
group which would pr?vid~ the possibili~y of sharp contrasts 
between predators and victims. In no way can the "neutrals" 
be regarded as average firms. It may be reasonably 
normal not to be the subject of a takeover bid carried to 
fruition in a six year period, but it represents a high 
. '. . 
degree of restraint not to acquire tirms of small size 
during such a time span. Nevertheless, it was reasoned that 
a stark contrast might be obtained either with- victims 
and/or predators, andif that contrast failed to materialise, 
it would make such a failure more emphatic in effect and 
increase the probability that the result was more assured. 
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The total 150 businesses which made up the sample 
were all quoted on the U.K. Stock Exchange. Foreign 
firms were excluded. Only companies which were embraced 
by the classification of Industrial and Commercial 
Companies (including Breweries) were accepted; the sample 
is therefore slightly broader in compass than the Consumer 
DurablejNon-Durable sample since it includes Some firms 
in the engineering and capital goods manufacturing category. 
Thus companies involved in finance, property, commodities, 
mines,' oil and overseas trade were barred from entry. 
The list of companies chosen will be found in Appendix D. 
The companies involved in mergers were culled from 
the Annual Review of Takeovers and Mergers in the Investors 
Chronicle (99/1979), which is published in the January 
of each year (commencing in 1979) and which reports on 
all successful bids for quoted companies which became 
conditional during the preceding year. It was hoped to 
limit the sample to one year, 1978, initially, but in order 
to stay within the industrial/commercial classification 
it became necessary to extend the sample over two years. 
The non-acquired/non-acquiring group were taken from the 
Stock Exchange Year Books after checking their absence 
of takeover activity (either as originators or recipients) 
in any form. These "neutral" companies were matched with 
"victims" and "predators" timewise, that is to say the 
proportion of neutrals who were examined for the period 
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of five years prior to 1978 and five years prior to 1979 
were approximately equivalent to the proportion of 
predators and victims taken collectively whose takeover 
incident occurred either in 1978 or 1979. No attempt 
was made to match for specific industry classification 
within the industrial/commercial grouping and visual 
inspection of Appendix D will show that there was a higher 
proportion of Stores and Breweries among the "neutrals" 
whereas manufacturing companies were more frequent in the 
"predator" or "victim" classes. No attempt was made to 
match for any characteristic such as size, since the 
purpose of the comparisons was to reveal the presence or 
absence of differences in these characteristics. There 
was no ordering of "predator" firms into raiders and 
non-raiders as was done by Kuehn (118/1975) on the basis 
of the number of takeovers made in the six years, since 
the aim was to discover the features involved in average 
takeover situations amongst quoted companies, and whether 
raider characteristics were important was left to the 
pure chance of the sample. No elaborate random method 
was devised in taking the sample; the members were enlisted 
in alphabetical order as they became eligible by satisfying 
the criterion outlined. List sampling, as this method 
is called, is known to have certain defects, such as a 
tendency for the letter M to include a large number of 
Scottish companies (because of the "Mac" prefix) but such 
objections were not considered serious. 
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Once the individual companies had been elected, their 
accounts for the five years prior to the merger situation 
but not including the year of acquisition were scrutinised. 
In the case of "neutrals" this was the five years prior 
to 1978 or 1979 (depending on the terminating year fixed 
as previously' described). The acquisition year itself 
was not used since the research was about the nature of 
firms who became predators or victims and not about how 
they fared at the pOint of takeover. An equally valid 
objection is the fact that the accounts pUblished in the 
period immediately following an acquisition often incorporate 
the results of the joint firms, making them useless for 
identification purposes. 
The accounts over five years were obtained by visiting 
the Company Registry Offices in Cardiff, where microfilms 
were made of each relevant set of accounts. Once obtained, 
the set of accounts for each company in each group were 
analysed with respect to the following 14 variables. A 
full description of the definition of these variables 
is to be found in Appendix E. The reasons for the use 
of these particular variables are given in a later chapter. 
a) A measure of Size based on net assets. 
b) A measure of Growth, being the compound growth 
rate of net assets. 
c) A measure of Retention of funds as a ratio to net 
profit after tax. 
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d) A measure of Gross Retention of funds, which is 
formed from adding depreciation to retentions and 
expressing as a ratio to net profits after tax. 
e) A measure of the extent of Directorial Control 
of voting shares. 
f) A measure of Profitability which is a ratio of 
net profit after tax to total shareholder funds. 
g) A measure of Gearing using long term loans as a 
ratio of total shareholder funds. 
h) A measure of the employment of External Funds 
divided by net asset size. 
i) A measure of the Average Valuation Ratio which is 
the market value of the company's equity divided 
by net asset value, averaged over a 5 year span. 
j) A measure of the Change in the Valuation Ratio 
over the five year period. 
k) A measure of the Final Valuation Ratio in the year 
preceding takeover or being acquired. 
1) An index of the change in the Wealth of Shareholders 
over the five year period. 
m) A measure of the Profit Margin defined as trading 
profit to turnover. 
n) A measure of Liquidity being liquid funds divided 
by total shareholder funds. 
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The data produced was then transferred by a terminal 
link from the University of Keele to a permanent file 
stored in an ICL 1906 A computer at the University of 
Manchester Regional Computing Centre and transferred to 
a CDC 7600 computer at U.M.R.C.C. for processing when 
required. 
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1.4. 3. An Analysis of Merger Activity in the Consumer Durable/ 
Non-Durable Sample 
The sample based on predators, victims and neutrals 
has not been selected in reference to any historical context, 
its value lies in the distinguishing of characteristics 
peculiar to firms involved in acquisitions. The sample 
of 1,047 firms in the Consumer Durable/Non-Durable Sample 
and their fate over the years 1970 to 1978 does, however, 
offer an opportunity to reflect on the incidence of merger 
over a period of historical time. An analysis of that 
history will afford an opportunity to judge the extent to 
which that sample conforms to the lessons drawn from the 
earlier part of this chapter dealing with merger activity 
in the United Kingdom in general and also to display some 
additional features not previously commented upon. 
In the form of a histogram, Table 1.19 illustrates 
the number of acquisitions made within the sample over 
the period. It can be seen that the pattern of acquisitions 
reflects the general experience of merger activity in the 
U.K. A peak of takeovers took place in 1972, the pace 
slackened over 1974 and 1975, and then started to accelerate 
again towards the end of the period. The only abnormal 
feature of the figure is the low number of victims reported 
for 1970. This statistic may have been affected by a 
srtat-up effect in the data collection. It will be recalled 
that the firms were selected on the basis of entries 1n 
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the Stock Exchange Year Book in 1970,but where a firm 
quoted on a local Stock Exchange appeared at a date later 
than 1970 but nevertheless proved to have been in 
existence as a public quoted enterprise in 1970, then it 
was added back into the data. However, such a firm which 
was acquired between 1970 and 1973 would not have any chance 
to make an entrance at a later da~ and therefore be lost from 
the account. The chart is set out on the basis of number 
of takeovers without reference to the expenditure on 
acquisitions. Although the data collected would have 
permitted such analysis, it was not thought to be worthwhile. 
This was because the previously stated hypothesis was that 
the value of acquired firms increased during the peaks 
of activity more sharply than the number. Such an 
increase in value presumably derives from a switch from 
the takeover of small private firms to a greater emphasis 
on the takeover of quoted firms, but since the entire 
sample is composed of quoted firms, no light would be shed 
on this transfer by detailing the expenditures involved. 
It has previously been remarked that most takeovers 
involve a publicly quoted company bidding for a small 
private firm. Table 1.20 supplies the evidence with 
respect to the acquiring behaviour o£ firms within the 
sample. 
It can be seen that 953 firms in the sample took 
over a total of 1,597 businesses. Of the firms taken over, 
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TABLE 1.20 
ANALYSIS OF ACQUISITION OF QUOTED, UNQUOTED AND FOREIGN FIR~5 BY CATEGORY OF PREDATOR, 1970-1978 
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF FIRMS 
CATEGORY QUOTED FIRMS UNQUOTED FIRMS FORE I GN FI RMS TOTAL Nm.lBER IN CATEGORY 
TAKEN OVER TAKEN OVER TAKEN OVER OF T AKEOVE RS IN 1970 
Light Electronics 12 48 6 66 35 
Radio and TV Rental 1 6 1 8 4 
Floor Covering 3 12 2 17 22 
Furniture and Bedding 1 16 0 17 31 
Household Appliances 2 9 3 14 18 
Kitchen and Tableware 2 34 0 36 18 
Motor Components 11 83 11 105 41 
Motor Distributors 12 134 5 151 50 
Motor Vehicles 1 11 0 12 18 
Breweries 14 19 1 34 38 
Wines and Spirits 2 11 0 13 17 
Hotels and Caterers 12 73 2 87 36 
Leisure 24 96 11 131 64 
General Food Manufacturing 19 78 7 104 58 
Milling" Flour Confectionery 3 19 3 25 11 
Food Retailing 21 48 2 71 42 
Newspapers and Periodicals 1 7 0 8 12 
Publishing and Printing 6 46 7 59 40 
Packaging and Paper 23 59 3 85 47 
Departmental Stores 10 41 2 53 28 
r 
Furnishing Stores 2 3 0 5 10 
~ 
o 
~ 
TABLE 1.20 (Continued) 
. ANALYSIS OF ACqUISITION OF QUOTED, UNQUOTED AND FOREIGN FIRMS BY CATEGORY OF PREDATOR, 1970-1978 (Continued) 
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF I NUMBER OF TOTAL NUI.lImR NuromER OF FIRMS CATEGORY QUOTED FIRMS UNQUOTED FIRMS I FOREIGN FIRMS IN CATEGORY TAKEN OVEn TAKEN OVER TAKEN OVER OF TAKE OVE RS IN 1970 
I 
Stores: Mail Order 2 5 ! 0 7 9 
.i 
Stores: Mul Uple 16 41 5 62 46 
Clothing 18 138 7 163 92 
Cotton and Synthetic 5 20 0 25 21 
Wool 10 29 0 39 34 
Miscellaneous Textiles 15 70 1 86 56 
Tobacco 8 16 0 24 7 
Footwear 6 52 4 62 35 
Toys and Games 0 25 3 28 13 
, 
. 
TOTALS 262 1,249 86 1,597 953 
- - - - --- ------------ ---- ---~-~ 
262 (16.4%) were quoted companies, 86 (5.3%) were foreign 
and 1,249 (78.2%) were unquoted (and therefore, in the main, 
private undertakings). 
423 of the 953 sample enterprises acquired one or 
more firms, 530 made no such conquest. Thus, slightly less 
than half (44.4% in fact) were involved in takeover, and 
55.6% were not implicated over the nine year period. 
One surprising fact that emerged from closer scrutiny 
was that of the 423 firms involved in acquisitions, 101 
were companies that later failed owing to being taken over 
themselves or by being liquidated. Since the 953 firms 
divide into 598 who continued in existence throughout 
the period and 355 who failed during that time, about twice 
as many continuing firms (54%) participated In making 
acquisitions than the proportion of failed firms so 
engaged (28.4%). However, of the 1,597 firms acquired, 
the 101 failed companies took over 356 and the remaining 
1,241 were possessed by 322 continuing companies. 
Therefore: 
Average number of firms acquired 
by each failed firm 
356 3.5 = --= 101 
Average number of firms acquired 
by each continuing company = 11241 = 3.8. 322 
Since the failed firms by definition did not complete the 
run of 9 years, and if we assume that on average the 
10~ 
failed firms lasted only 50% of the 9 year period, there 
is an implication that firms who were endangered were 
twice as aggressive as continuing companies. At the 
minimum it can be asserted that acquiring behaviour is 
no antidote to the risk of failure. 
Further evidence of the aggression by firms whose 
survival is in doubt lies in the fact that analysis of 
the figures shows that 7% of the continuing companies made 
acquisitions of 5 or more firms, whereas the corresponding 
percentage for failed firms was 8%. Again the observation 
that failed firms did not last over the 9 years indicates 
that in the shortened period available they were more 
intensively engaged. It should be re-emphasised that 
the taken over count includes both quoted and unquoted 
companies as well as foreign firms. The failed firms 
took over 52 quoted businesses as against 210 by the 
continuing group, and 14 foreign companies as compared 
with 72. Since there are 3 continuing companies engaged 
in merger activity for every 1 failing company, and since 
the continuing companies took over 4 times as many quoted 
firms and 5 times as many foreign enterprises, it is clear 
that the balance of activity with failing firms is tilted 
towards the smaller unquoted firm. 
From Table 1.20 we may read that of the 1,597 takeovers 
undertaken by members of the sample between 1970 and 1978, 
about 5% (86) were of foreign firms. This compares with 
W3 
the 6% of acquisitions revealed in Table 1.21. The same 
table shows, however, that in value terms the expenditure 
on foreign acquisitions was about 11.5% of total 
acquisition expenditure. The inward effect (i.e. takeover 
of U.K. companies by foreign companies) was much smaller, 
about 2% by number and 6% by value. Cal cuI ations based on 
the Consumer .Durable/Non-Durable Ssm;>le showed that of the 
·307 takeovers of sample firms, 28 were foreign, namely :-
U.S.A and Canada 16 
Irish Government 1 
E.E.C. Countries 5 
Other Overseas Countries - 6 
Total 28 
This was about 9% of the total. It is possible that 
companies within the Consumer Durable/Non-Durable categories 
were more attractive than other types of firms to foreign 
buyers. 
It is clear, in whatever way one interprets the 
figures, that merger activity in the U.K. economy is 
largely internally generated, and that one may argue the 
causes of such activity without, at the moment, having to 
pay any great amount of attention to the international 
dimension of such activity. 
One serious defect of the data on which Table 1.21 
is based is worth some attention. That is that the count 
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TABIE 1.21 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.K. TAKEOVER ACTIVITY 1969-1979 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Number of 
Companies Acquired 
Wi thin U.K. 
7,692 
Wi thin U.K. bl 
foreign firm 
156 
+ U.K. Overseas bl 
firms 
529 
+ including E.E.C. 
Expendi ture on 
Companies Acquired 
Within U.K. 
£ll,80~.4 million 
Within U.K. by 
foreign firm 
£723.9 million 
+ Overseas bl U.K. 
firms 
£1,540.4 million 
SOURCE: BUSINESS MONITOR M7. 
Average Expendi ture 
per Firm Acquired 
£1.5 million 
£4.6 million 
£2.9 million 
NOTE: See text for certain problems with data interpretation. 
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of foreign firms being acquired by U.K. companies and of 
U.K. enterprises being taken over by foreign firms excludes 
all cases where a subsidiary of a foreign firm acquires 
a U.K. company (which is included in the general figures 
for U.K. acquisitions) , and where a subsidiary of a U.K. 
firm located abroad purchases a foreign firm (which is 
totally misSing from the data). Also, since the Business 
Monitor returns are culled from newspaper reports in the 
British press, there is a greater likelihood of the takeover 
of small overseas and E.E.C. firms not being reported. 
For the latter reason, it is probable that the difference 
in average size of firm being taken over which is shown 
as £2.9 million for foreign firms as against £1.5 million 
for U.K. firms, is more a reflection of data collection 
defects than a substantial piece of information. The same 
objection does not, however, lie against the statistic 
showing that the average size of U.K. company acquired 
by a foreign firm was about £4.6 million. There is no 
reason why the size of firm being taken over by a foreign 
or a U.K. company should suffer from a differential 
threshhold with respect to reports in the British press. 
It is even possible that because of the slight xenophobia 
which affects most European nations, the reverse might 
be true. Therefore, subject to the aforementioned caution 
that subsidiaries of foreign company already located 
within the U.K. making acquisitions are not classified as 
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takeovers by foreign firms, there do seem to be indications 
that foreign acquisitions are substantially larger in size 
than U.K. ones. 
Takeovers have been classified into three major types: 
Horizontal, Vertical and Diversified (or conglomerate). 
In section 1.3.(4) of this chapter, it has been remarked 
that there is an increasing tendency for the number of 
diversified mergers to grow (the same being true if 
expenditure is the measure), although horizontal mergers 
predominate. This contrasts with the situation in the 
U.S.A. where, by 1968, about 80% of all mergers were 
conglomerate in some form (U.S.Federal Trade Commission 
(26/1969). The reason for the difference between the two 
countries is usually attributed to the strength of U.S.A. 
anti-trust legislation which dates from the turn of the 
century, 'as against the British legislation which only 
really started to take root in 1948 with the passage of 
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act of that year, 
it being more likely that horizontal and vertical mergers 
would fall foul of anti-trust legislation than diversified 
mergers. 
Table 1.22 based on the category of predator making 
acquisition within the 1970-1978 sample does not, however, 
bear out this view. Of the 307 takeovers that occurred. 
on average 20.2% were made by firms within category 
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TABLE 1.22 . CONSUMER DURABLE/NON-DURABLE COMPANY SAMPLE (1970-1978) 
PROPORTION OF TAKEOVERS WITH PREDATORS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO THE INDUSTRIAL CATEGORY 
PERCENT OF PERCENT OF PERCENT OF PERCENT OF 
TAKEOVERS TAKEOVERS WITH TAKEOVERS WITH PREDATOR TAKEOVERS CATEGORY I WITHIN CATEGORY PREDATOR EXTERNAL TO WITHIN INDUSTRIAL I INDUSTRIAL EXTERNAL TO 
CATEGORY INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY 
Light Electronics/ Radio ~ TV 50.0% 50.0% Packaging and Paper 30.8% 69.2% 
Radio and TV Rental 0% 100.0% Departmental Stores 33.3% 66.7% 
Floor Coverings 0% 100.0% Furnishing Stores 33.3% 66.7% 
Furniture and Bedding 16.7% 83.3% Stores: Mail Order 33.3% 66.7% 
.... Household Appliances 0% 100.0% Stores: Multiple 27.3% 72.7% 0 
00 Kitchen and Tableware 0% 100.0% Clothing 28.6% 71.4% 
Motor Components 16.7% 83.3% Cotton and Synthetic 0% 100.0% 
Motor Distributors 21.0% 79.0% Wool 66.7% 33.3% 
Motor Vehicles 42.9% 57.1% Miscellaneous Textiles 17.7% 82.3% 
Breweries 25.0% 75.0% Tobacco 0% 100.0% 
Wines and Spirits 28.6% 71.4% Footwear 27.3% 72.7% 
Hotels and Caterers 7.1% 92.9% Toys and Games 0% 100.0% 
Leisure 32.0% 68.0% 
General Food Manufacturing 24.0% 76.0% 
II AVERAGE 20.2% 79.8% 
Milling ~ Flour Confectionery 0% 100.0% 
Food Retailing 33.3% 66.7% II STANDARD DEVIATION 17.4% 17.4% 
Newspaper and Periodicals 0% 100.0% 
Publishing and Printing 10.0% 90.0% II TOTAL NUMBER OF TAKEOVERS ANALYSED = 307. 
on other members of that category, as against 79.8% which 
involved acquisitions by £irms outside of the victim's 
category. The statistics are based on numbers of takeovers 
and not expenditures, although since all the acquisitions 
are of quoted firms, the finding does not suffer £rom the 
confusions that often arisen then the takeovers of large 
numbers of small unquoted firms are accumulated with the 
acquisitions of quoted companies. The conclusion must 
be amended to take into account the £act that 9% of the 
predators were foreign companies and 13% were themselves 
private and unquoted firms (which therefore defy 
classification). Subtracting the percentages, there still 
remains a verdict that 58% of the mergers were either 
diversified or vertical. Since vertical mergers are not 
common, and if we accept the proportion of 8% as the 
maximum for vertical mergers stated in Section 1.3.(4) 
of this chapter, we are still left with the uncomfortable 
conclusion that 50% of mergers were diversified, as 
against 20% horizontal. 
The standard problem of assessing diversification 
is the problem that, depending on how narrowly or widely 
a category is drawn, so the proportion of diversified 
activity rises or falls. Almost all the studies of 
diversification are based on the use of the Standard 
Industrial Classification, whereas the categories of this 
study are based on the schedule organised by the Institute 
of Actuaries. 
Wg. 
(10) 
The standard Industrial Classification, used 
extensively in Government statistics in order to ensure 
uniformity of treatment, divides economic activity into 
27 major sub-divisions called orders. These are very 
wide groupings and hence favour the horizontal classification 
of mergers. If we consider Order III, Food, Drink and 
Tobacco, which bears direct comparison with industrial 
sectors within the 1970-1978 sample, then it can be seen 
to include 5 of the Stock Exchange Listing Groups, namely 
Breweries; Wines and Spirits; General Food 
Manufacture; Milling, Flour, Confectionery; 
Tobacco. 
Any takeovers within these 5 headings would rank as 
diversified for purposes of this study, and horizontal 
if the S.I.C. coding was being employed. Therefore there 
is no necessary conflict with Singh's finding (198/1971) 
that of 488 quoted companies in manufacturing reported 
acquired between 1948 and 1960 almost 60% were horizontal 
( 10) in form. More disturbing is Kuehn's ruling (118/1975) 
that in a sample of 593 takeovers between 1957 and 1969 
less than 8% could be classified as diversified. Kuehn 
used the same Stock Exchange classifications as this study, 
and the disparity in judgements is alarmingly wide. Kuehn 
used a greater number of categories, and one possible 
explanation is that additional categories (mainly in 
Although Singh used the S.I.C. classification in the passage 
from which this is quoted,he divided the Orders into industries 
and so Order III was broken down into Food, Drink and Tobacco 
industries. 
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engineering, capital goods, chemicals, holding companies, 
shipping, oil, pharmaceuticals and office machinery). 
were more prone to within-category merger than the 
Consumer Durable and Non-Durable groups. However, the 
balance of argument must surely be that between 1970 and 
1978 the diversified type of merger did increase in 
importance but the exact extent of the shift must await 
further research. 
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1.4.4. An Analysis of Death Rates and Causes within Categories 
Prior to 1950 the major cause of death of quoted firms 
in the U.K. was liquidation. The support for this statement 
can be found in the study by Hart and Prais (87/1956). 
Singh (198/1971) signalled the arrival of a new situation 
in the period 1954 to 1960, where liquidations accounted 
for the deaths of only 9.5% of his sample, as against 75% 
due to acquisitions. The figures displayed in Table 1.23 
indicate that using the average loss per category, 13% 
of the failures were by liquidation, and the remaining 87% 
arose from takeover. In no category did loss by liquidation 
ever exceed takeover losses. It must be emphasised that 
these figures represent the average of loss by category 
and the losses per category are not weighted by the number 
of firms in each category. Slight differences arise if 
we look at the total losses. If we consider the total 
1,047 firms taken as the sample, 72 were rejected because 
they proved to be subsidiaries. 
975 firms (11): 
Of the remaining 
22 were excluded because of reorganisations 
or loss of quotation 
48 were liquidated 
307 were acquired 
Total 375 
(11) The figure of 953 firms quoted in Table 1.20 consists of 
975 firms less the 22 not included in the sample because of 
reorganisation or loss of quotation. 
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TABLE 1.23 CONSUMER DURABLE/NON-DURABLE COMPANY SAMPLE 
INCIIENCE OF TAKEOVER AND FAILURE IN 30 INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL CATEGORIES (1970-1978) 
PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE 
OF FIRMS PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS OF FIRUS PERCENTAGE 
CATEGORY CONTINUING OF FIRMS FAILING CATEGORY CIDNTINUING OF FIRMS 
THROUGH TAKEN OVER THROUGH THROUGH TAKEN OVER 
PERIOD INSOLVENCY PERIOD 
Light Electronics/ 
Radio/TV 64.7% 29.4% 5.9% Food Retailing 48.7% 46.2% 
Radio and TV Rental 75.0% 25.0% 0% Newspapers & Periodicals 66.7% 33.3% 
Floor Coverings 68.2% 22.7% 9.1% Publishing & Printing 73.0% 27.0% 
FurnitUre & Bedding 72.0% 24.0% 4.0% Packaging and Paper 65.9% 29.5% 
Household Appliances 47.1% 41.2% 11.8% Departmental Stores 56.0% 36.0% 
Ki tchen & Tableware 56.3% 37.5% 6.3% Furnishing Stores 66.7% 33.3% 
Motor Components 44.1% 52.9% 2.9% Stores: Mail Order 50.0% 37.5% 
Motor Distribution 59.2% 38.8% 2.0% Stores: Multiple 68.4% 28.9% 
Motor Vehicles 56.3% 37.5% 6.3% Clothing 62.8% 22.1% 
Breweries 65.7% 34.3% 0% Cotton & Synthetic 25.0% 62.5% 
Wines and Spirits 50.0% 43.8% 6.3% Wool 60.0% 33.3% 
Hotels and Caterers 51. 7% 48.3% 0% Miscellaneous Textiles 60.0% 34.0% 
Leisure 51.8% 44.6% 3.6% Tobacco 60.0% 40.0% 
General Food Footwear 54.3% 31.4% 
Manufacturing 50.0% 48.0% 2.0% Toys & Games 75.0% 16.7% 
-' Milling and Flour 
Confectionery 50.0% 40.0% 10.0% AVERAGE PERCENTAGE 58.5% 36.0% 
A CHI SQUARED TEST OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CATEGORIES SHOWED THE DIFFERENCES WERE SIGNIFICANT AT THE 1% LEVEL. 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE = 953. 
PERCENTAGE 
OF FIRMS 
FAILING 
THROUGH 
INSOLVENCY 
5.1% 
0% 
0% 
4.5% 
8.0% 
0% 
12.5% 
2.6% 
15.1% 
I 
12.5% 
6.7% 
6.0% 
0% 
14.3% 
8.3% 
5.5% 
---
On this basis, 13% of failures were liquidations 
and 82% represent acquisitions. We might reasonably 
suspect that some of the 22 exclusions from the sample 
probably also eventually fell into receivership, but since 
their sUbsequent history was not traced, no such 
deduction can be made. The change in percentages does 
not alter the conclusion that takeover is the predominant 
factor in ending the existence of the life of quoted 
companies. 
Of course, acquired firms may still in the main 
continue to exist ,though under a changed title and new 
managers. Even the phYSical assets of liquidated companies 
are normally bought by competing businesses. So in terms 
of assets employed, these deaths do not represent 
necessarily a loss) to industry as a whole. The figures 
do, however, have a bearing on the issue of increasing 
concentration within U.K. industry. 
It has been argued, by for example Ma (138/1960), 
that the liquidations recorded grossly understate the 
actual score, since many takeovers are possibly only 
alternatives to liquidation. The point has already been 
. 
dealt with in Section 1:3.2 of this chapter where the 
lack of difference between the profit record of acquirers 
and victims found in previous research seems to preclude 
this judgement as a general rule, although the observation 
may be true in speci'fic instances. 
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In order to test further this conclusion, a non-
parametric test (Spearman 1 s Method of Rank Differences) 
was made of the correlation between the proportions of 
takeovers and liquidations within each category. The 
reasoning behind the test was that if takeover and 
liquidation were alternative methods of dealing with 
distress, we would expect to find that some categories 
facing difficult market conditions for their product 
or service would have high values for takeovers and 
liquidations, and the opposite effect would occur for 
industrial groups experiencing prosperous market conditions. 
The correlation found of O.168,with its implied coefficient 
of determination of less than 3%, provides little 
support for the conclusion. 
The birth process was not specifically examined in 
this study. Firms gaining a listing on the Stock Exchange 
in 1970 and after were not incorporated in the analysis 
and no count was kept of their number. The issue was 
not judged to be of importance to the purposes of this 
research, although it is of importance to the question 
of whether market concentration is being increased by 
merger activity. There is a general acknowledgement 
that the number of independent firms with a quotation on 
the U.K. Stock Exchange has declined over the decades which 
commenced in 1960. This decline has been attributed to 
two causes: 
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(a) One of the requirements for a listing on the U.K. 
Stock Exchange is that 25% of the equity capital 
must be in the hands of the public. This normally 
involves an "offer for sale" where shares are 
offered at a fixed price by an issuing house which 
underwrites the offer and therefore accepts the 
risk that the venture may not be successful. This 
is a costly affair. The Committee to Review the 
Functioning of Financial Institutions (8/HMSO/1978) 
estimated that in order to raise £2 million in 
Ordinary Shares the total cost (which includes legal 
fees, printing, fees to Stock Exchange, costs of 
advertising, underwriters' commission and Broker's 
commission) would amount to £152,900, or 7.6% of the 
total. 
(b) The ease with which a company with a Stock Exchange 
quotation may be taken over, despite having a good 
record of profitability, has deterred companies 
from seeking a listing. 
In order to check on this decline in quoted companies, 
a comparison was made between the number of firms in each 
of the main categories of the Stock Exchange Year Books 
for 1970 and 1978/79. The categories covered included 
all sections dealing with companies except for Waterwo?ks 
and Equity Stocks denominated in a foreign currency or 
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a currency of an overseas sterling area. The listings 
were drawn from the Appendice~ showing the "Classification 
of Listed Companies by Actuaries Security Groups" which 
excludes subsidiaries, foreign companies and firms not 
listing their equity shares. From the details disclosed 
in Table 1.24, we can see that the number of listed firms 
suffered an overall decline of 28.6%. The categories 
within which the 1970-1978 sample was framed, namely 
Consumer Goods (Durable and Non-Durable) showed a loss 
of about 21% (based on the weighted average). The matter 
is not, however. quite as simple as this. Between 1970 
and 1978 new firms were admitted to listings (as well as 
a few firms previously quoted on local Stock Exchanges 
who became listed in the Stock Exchange Year Books after 
the amalgamation of Stock Exchanges in 1973). From the 
evidence of Table 1.23 we can note that within the Consumer 
Goods section about 41% of firms were lost to takeover 
and liquidation. Since the net decline was 20%, we may 
reasonably infer that 20% of new quotations were made 
in the period. 
From the Stock Exchange Year Book appendix dealing 
with "Registrations under the Companies Acts since 1862" 
it is possible to calculate that on average 50,500 new 
companies were registered under the Companies Acts in 
England. Scotland and Wales for every year between 1970 
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TABLE 1.24 
CHANGE IN LISTING OF COMPANIES ON THE U.K. STOCK EXCHANGE 1970-1978 
SOURCE: STOCK EXCHANGE YEAR BOOKS FOR 1970 AND 1978/1979. 
NOTE: The figures exclude subsidiaries, foreign firms and firms not 
listing their Equity Shares. 
CATEGORY 
A. CAPITAL GOODS 
Cold Formed, Fastenings and 
Turned Parts 
Bricks and Roof Tiling 
Builders Merchants 
Building Materials 
Cement a.I1d Concrete 
Paint 
Timber 
Contracting and Construction 
Electricals (Electronics and 
Boilermakers 
Founders and Stampers 
Radio) 
Industrial Plant, Engines and 
Compressors 
Mechanical Handling 
Pumps and Valves 
Steel and Chemical Plant 
Wires and Ropes 
Miscellaneous Engineering 
Machine Tools 
FIRMS 
LISTED 
IN 1970 
Not separated 
from other 
engineering 
categories. 
14 
24 
51 
11 
11 
29 
130 
43 
6 
20 
49 
15 
11 
16 
10 
143 
36 
Miscellaneous Engineering Contractors 12 
Heating and Ventilation 15 
Instruments 21 
Metallurgy 26 
Special Steels 16 
Miscellaneous Metal Forming Not separated 
from other 
engineering 
categories. 
TOTAL CAPITAL GOODS 709 
REDUCTION 
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FIRMS 
LISTED 
IN 1978 
8 
9 
17 
36 
8 
11 
19 
99 
34 
2 
25 
34 
15 
9 
12 
8 
91 
25 
13 
4 
12 
21 
17 
7 
536 
OF 24.4% 
LOSS (-) 
OR 
GAIN (+) 
Not applicable 
5 
7 
-
15 
3 
Nil 
- 10 
- 31 
9 
4 
+ 5 
- 15 
Nil 
2 
4 
2 
- 52 
- 11 
+ 1 
- 11 
9 
5 
+ 1 
Not applicable 
-173 
FIRMS FIRMS LOSS (-) 
LISTED LISTED OR 
CATEGORY IN 1970 IN 1978 GA~~~ 
B. CrnSUMER GOODS (DURABLE) 
Electronics and Radio 37 29 - 8 
Radio and TV Rental 5 5 Nil 
Floor Covering 20 16 4 
Furniture and Bedding 27 27 Nil 
Household Appliances 18 11 7 
Kitchen and Ta~leware 18 13 5 
Motor Components 41 29 - 12 
Motor Distributors 49 44 5 
Motor Vehicles 20 15 5 
TOTAL CONSUMER GOODS (DUnABLES) 235 18~ 46 
REDUCTION OF 19.6$ 
c. CONSUMER GOODS (NON-DURABLE) 
Breweries 36 27 9 
Wines and Spiri ts 21 13 8 
Hotels and Caterers 35 23 - 12 
Leisure 62 46 - 16 
General Food Manufacturing 54 41 - 13 
Milling and Flour Con f e c t ion e ry 11 8 3 
Food Retailing 40 29 - 11 
Newspapers 17 12 5 
publishing and Printing 33 30 3 
Packaging and Paper 47 38 9 
Departmental Stores 26 18 8 
Furnishing Stores 11 13 + 2 
Stores: Mail Order 8 7 1 
Stores: Multiple 39 46 + 7 
Clothing 92 75 - 17 
Cotton and Synthetics 19 17 2 
Wool 37 23 - 14 
Miscellaneous Textiles ~ 56 40 - 16 
Tobacco 9 7 2 
Footwear 37 25 - 12 
Toys and Games 11 8 3 
TOTAL CON S UME R GOODS (NON-DURABLE) 701 546 155 
REDUCTION OF 22.1% 
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FIRMS FIRMS LOSS (-) 
LISTED LISTED OR 
CATEGORY IN 1970 IN 1978 GAIN ( +) 
D. OTHER GROUPS 
Plastics and Rubber Fabrication 7 13 + 6 
Drugs an d Ph armacy 17 12 5· 
General Chemicals 32 29 3 
Office Equipment 22 16 6 
Oil 14 16 + 2 
Shipping 38 21 - 17 
Freight and Fuel Handling and 
Manufacture 32 21 - 11 
Industrial Holding Companies 94 108 + 14 
Laundries and Cleaners 16 11 5 
Miscellaneous Categories not 
~eparated in 1970 data 45 38 7 
TOTAL OTHER GROUPS 317 285 - 32 
REDUCTION OF 10.1% 
E. FINANCIAL GROUPS 
Banks 6 6 Nil 
Foreign Banks 15 7 8 
Discount 11 11 Nil 
Hire purchase 11 11 Nil 
Insurance (Life) 10 10 Nil 
Insurance (Composite) 16 9 7 
Insurance (Brokers) 13 13 Nil 
Investment Trusts 292 205 - 87 
Merchant Banks 19 15 4 
Property 129 94 - 35 
Financial Trus ts, etc. 39 65 + 26 
TOTAL FINANCIAL GROUPS 561 446 -115 
REDUCTION OF 20.5% 
F. COMMODITY GROUPS 
Rubbers 97 34 - 63 
Teas 107 25 - 82 
Copper 9 2 7 
Mining Finance 40 9 - 31 
Tin 35 18 - 17 
Diamonds 9 Not listed. Not applicable. 
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FIRMS FIRUS LOSS (-) 
LISTED LISTED OR 
CATEGORY IN 1970 IN 1978 GAIN (+) 
F. ~OMMODlTY GROUPS (Continued) 
Gold 62 3 - 59 
Miscellaneous Mines 24 6 - 18 
Overseas Trade 92 42 - 50 
TOTAL COMMODITY GROUPS 475 139 -336 
REDUCTION OF 70.7% 
OVERALL TOTALS 2,998 2,141 -857 
REDUCTION OF 28.6% 
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and 1978. This is more than adequate to replace the net 
loss revealed in Table 1.24 of 857 quoted firms. Of course, 
most firms registered are private and only a small proportion 
ever seek the right to raise capital from the public at 
large (on the 31st December 1979 the number of companies 
on the registers in Great Britain was 726,677, of which 
16,015 were public and 710,662 private). Even so, if we 
assume that the 2% of registered companies become public, 
as is implied by the 1979 count, then there is a potential 
for about 9,000 new public companies from the 454,500 new 
creations between 1970 and 1978 (accepting that there is 
often a lag of many years between registration and gaining 
status as a public company, and accepting also that not all 
public companies actually'seek a quotation). We can 
therefore agree with the view that there was a decline in 
the number of companies requesting a listing on the U.K. 
Stock Exchange and hence the view that mergers have been 
a significant factor in the growth concentration in the U.K. 
economy since it has already been established that mergers 
are the major source of loss of quoted firms. 
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1.5. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE USE OF ACCOUNTING DATA 
1.5.1. Variations in Accounts 
The data used in this thesis was drawn almost exclusively 
from the published accounts of companies with the major exception 
of the analysis of Stock Exchange share prices required to 
establish market value and the increase or decrease in shareholder's 
wealth. The accounting information was derived directly from 
the accounts in the case of the Predator[Victim/Neutral sample, 
and indirectly in the case of the Durable/Non-Durable Consumer 
Goods firms sample, where various issues of the Stock Exchange 
Official Year Book were consulted, supplemented by analyses in 
the Investors Chronicle and Extel cards. 
There are, however, reservations which must be expressed 
with respect to the interpretation of data derived from published 
accounts. 
One problem arises from the fact that firms have variable 
accounting years. Typically, the accounting year runs from 
December to December, March to March and July to July, although 
any yearly period is open for the firm's choice. This makes for 
difficulty in defining w~at is meant by, say, the accounts of 
Firm X for 1971. Although this fact makes for immense complexity 
when a close study of accounting data is being made, especially 
with respect to changes in legislation governing tax levels, it 
was not considered to be a serious handicap in this study. 
This was for two reasons: (a) because most of the variables 
constructed from the data were averages based on a run of 
several years, and (b) refuge could be sought in the view of 
Marris that the variables under study were to be set at long 
run levels by policy, and although to some extent this is an 
obvious Simplification designed to make the theory more amenable 
to mathematical manipulation, in a sense it plays a vital 
function in the theory since a firm which allowed these variables 
of importance to the theory (such as retention rates, profit 
rates, etc.) to fluctuate wildly, would make it impossible to 
label firms as "profit maximisers" and "growth maximisers". 
It was, however, necessary to make a firm decision as to 
an exact rule with regard to the relationship of the accounting 
year, and the observations entered into the data analysis under 
headings relating to given years. The rule adopted will be 
illustrated with respect to the Consumer DurablejNon-Durable 
sample, though by analogy the rule was also used with reference 
to the Predator/Victim/Neutral sample. 
In order to qualify as accounting information with respect 
to the year 1970, a firm's accounting year had to commence not 
earlier than 1st July 1969 and not later than 30th June 1970. 
In order to be entered in the record of le78, a firm's accounting 
year had to begin not earlier than 1st July 1977 and not later 
than 30th June 1978. It can be seen, therefore, that the year 
1970 in the statistical analysis could include activities that 
began as much as 6 months before 1970 or ended 6 months into 
1971. In the most extreme case under the heading 1970, one could 
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be comparing a !irm whose accounting year ran from 1st July 1969 
to 1st July 1970 with another company which was reporting 
activities generated during the period 30th June 1970 to 
30th June 1971. There would be no escape from this dilemma by 
using the terminology 1969/1970, since this is a two-year period 
and accounts cover only 12 months, so the comparability would 
still present difficulties. Consideration was given to the 
device of adapting accounts to make them fit a calendar year 
framework, but since the accounts would already contain the 
results of timing decisions made by the accountants who prepared 
them under the "accrual" concept regarding receipts and 
expenditures, and no simple method appeared available to "doctor" 
the accounts to make them fit a procrustean framework without 
making the remedy worse than the disease. The use of interim 
accounts which most companies publish half-yearly (a few of the 
larger enterprises, quarterly) was explored, but there are such 
diff~rences in the detail reported that they did not seem to 
offer a prospect of using them to secure conformity, especially 
in view of the fact that there was extreme difficulty in locating 
such accounts 7 to 8 years after their publication. There was, 
for example, no record of them in the microfilm data produced 
(12) by the Company Registry • Therefore, due caution must be 
exercised in making reference to the years reported in the 
thesis. 
(12) There is no statutory provision requiring the production of interim 
reports; however, companies whose securities are listed on the Stock 
Exchange are required to produce them by the listing agreement. 
Interim statements are not audited. 
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There is considerable variation in accounting practice. 
Although the Companies Acts impose an obligation to report a 
great deal of information, and although custom and precedent 
tend to impose broadly similar patterns, the amount of detail 
disclosed and its classification depends ultimately on the 
judgement of t~e Directors of the company as to what is necessary 
to g1ve a "true and fair view" of the affairs of the Company. 
There is also a wide scope in accounting pra~tice for subjective 
judgements to be made on methods of attaching money values to 
assets and liabilities. The opportunities for this are many and 
varied. Although most companies use the straight line (i.e. 
fixed instalment) method of depreciation, there are several 
other acceptable methods such as declining balance, sum of the 
year's digits, the production unit, the annuity and the sinking 
fund methods. Although "goodwill" is normally written off 
immediately against reserves, this practice is not universal. 
There are differences in the treatment of research and development; 
the conservative practice is to write it off as it occurs, but 
it may be off~et against future expenditure. Since 1976 (with 
the introduction of the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 
9/76),- -it has become accepted that the value of stocks and work in 
progress should incorporate fixed overheads, but prior to this 
period it was open to companies to value such goods excluding 
overheads. Even under SSAP 9, there is great latitude open on 
valuing contractual work in progress, depending on whether it 1s 
considered that the profit attributable to the part of the contract 
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completed should be added into the accounts. or whether it is 
considered prudent not to do so because "the outcome cannot be 
assessed with reasonable certainty". 
The examples given of account variation are by no means 
exhaustive (the difference between leasing and outright purchase 
of capital equipment. which is a different legal form of what 
is generally in substance the same activity. has not been mentioned 
for eX2mple). The production of Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice issued by the Accounting Sta~dards Committee. will no 
doubt make for greater uniformity in the future. but the Committee 
was only set up in 1970 and during the period covered by the 
research the SSAPswere being issued (there were 18 statements 
in being by September 1980). so that they would only affect the 
accounts reported towards the end of the sample period. The 
accounting policies of companies with reference to the most 
important sources of variations has been required since November 
1971 (Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No.2), but it 
was judged to be impracticable to seek to adjust accounts in 
the light of this information. 
1.5.2. The Effects of Inflation on Accounting Reports 
Another source of distortion in accounts stems from the 
results of inflation. Historical cost accounting works 
adequately in a period of stable prices. and the scope for 
subject judgement on the value of assets is reasonably circumscribed. 
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The book value of assets, in the absence of iftflation, is a fair 
guide to the value of a business, but this breaks down during 
times of rapidly increasing prices. This occurs because 
depreciation is based on historical cost of assets and aims to 
recover the original amount invested in the assets during its 
probable life, but in inflationary periods this sum is insufficient 
to enable the asset to be replaced, which then threatens the 
ongoing life of the business, since profits will be overstated 
and too liberal a distribution of those profits could actually 
lead to the capital of the business being reduced, as well as 
leading to a taxation charge on profits which is partly a tax 
on the capital of the enterprise. Other disturbing effects on 
accounts published under the historic cost convention in terms 
of inflation are reflected in costs of sales which underestimate 
the expense of stock consumed, thus falsely boosting pro!its' 
and also working capital needs periodic replenishment to enable 
it to meet the needs of the business to finance debtors and 
provide cash for the running of the business, thus making it 
necesRary for a company to invest in additional liquidity. 
i)uring the period over which the samples were taken, 
inflation was exceptionally severe. Between 1968 and 1978 the 
value of the £ was reduced by two-thirds. The year to year 
inflation based on the Index of Retail Prices is displayed 1n 
.Table 1.25. 
128 
TABLE 1.25 
INFLATION RATES 1969-1979 
Percentage Increase in Inflation 
Year over Previous Year 
1969 5.4 
1970 6.4 
1971 9.4 
1972 7.1 
1973 9.2 
1974 16.1 
1975 24.2 
1976 16.5 
1977 15.8 
1978 8.3 
1979 13.4 
1974 = 100 
SOURCE: Index of Retail Prices. Annual Abstract 
of Statistics 1980. 
129 
In practice it is doubtful whether the dire effects of 
capital destruction did in fact occur to the extent suggested 
by the figures since inflation was obviously increasingly 
anticipated during the period (the liquidity crises of 1974 
and 1975 when bank borrowing rose to unprecedented heights 
was probably an exception to this since the inflation rate, 
under the influence of the sharp rise in energy prices, was of 
a magnitude which was not foreseen). Evidence of this is 
provided by Kay and King (105/1980)who, on page 194 of the 
second edition of their book, show how mainstream corporation 
tax was avoided by large companies who; in 1978/1979, in over 
50% of the instances, paId no mainstream corporation tax at all, 
and who in the remainder, rarely exceeded 30% payment levels, 
demonstrating that firms were able to offset the ravages of 
inflation on their cash flow using the reliefs provided by 
Government through accelerated inflation provisions and tax 
relief on stock values. However, the distortion in accounts 
would remain, to cause difficulty in measuring profit rates 
and growth rates. and in comparing those rates between firms, 
Cutler and Westwick, in the March edition of "Accountancy" 
( 55/1973) , using "Current Purchasing Power Accounting" (now 
fallen into disfavour with the accountancy profession and 
replaced by "Curre~t Cost Accounting") demonstrated the differing 
effect on inflation on the earnings per share reported by 
selected companies. and showed that the true (i.e. adjusted for 
change in price levels) E.P.S. values were overestimated for 
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Manufacturing, Banks and Retail businesses but underestimated 
for Breweries and Insurance companies (who have large property 
elements in their portfolios). 
The effects of inflation are particularly serious with 
regard to any investigation of Marris's theory, since the 
valuation ratio which plays an important part in that theory 
depends on a contrast between the book value of net assets and 
the market value of the company, and because the growth rate of 
net assets and the financing of that growth rate from retained 
profits are so central to his narrative. The managerial theory 
of the firm fundamentally rests on the assumption that the firm 
has discretion over its use of funds; if in fact firms were 
seriously threatened by a shortage of funds due to the demands 
of high inflation, then that discretion would have vanished, 
and with it the very phenomena which the research was meant to 
discover. These factors must be taken into account in judging 
the results of the empirical work set out in this and the 
succeeding chapter. 
1.5.3. Stock Market Volatility 
In measuring shareholder wealth in .both the selected samples, 
the increase or decrease in share price depends not only on the 
wealth forecasts incorporated in the price at the start and end 
of the period, but also on general market expectations. If either 
sample period were such that share values were generally low 
at the start of the period and high at the end, then the wealth 
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(or loss) would be reflecting change of expect~tion as well as 
real factors producing prospects of increased or decreased 
dividend flows. The reverse situation would occur if the share 
purchases were made in boom conditions and sold in a depressed 
stock market situation. 
Should a sample of share prices be drawn in either of the 
above circumstances, then the performance of the firm would have 
been confused with changes in the mood of investors between 
optimism and pessimism. A correction to share price data to show 
deviations from some index of market fortunes would then be 
necessary. 
Examination of the Financial Times Industrial Ordinary Index 
over the sample periods showed that in both cases the assumed 
holding period of the shares were from peak to peak of that index. 
In the case of the Consumer Durable/Non-Durable Goods Sample, 
shares were bought in 1969 when the index had an average value 
of around 450 and were sold in 1978 when the level was about 470. 
The period of share purchase for the Comparison Sample (i.e. 1972 
and 1973) found the Ordinary Index averaging 440 and the 1978 
level was as stated above. In the first case between the relevant 
years the index completed a shallow cycle from 1969 to.1972/1973 
and a cycle with a much deeper amplitude from 1972/1973 to the 
last half of 1977 and 1978. The Comparison Sample, of course, 
covered the· same final cycle. It was therefore judged to be 
unnecessary to standardise the share price data to account for 
stock market oscillations. 
1.6. AN EXAMINATION OF THE "CETERIS PARIBUS" CLAUSE 
One of the difficulties associated with economic investigations 
is that the classical conditions for controlled experiment, where all 
variables other than the ones being studied are held constant, do not 
prevail. The ubiquitous "ceteris paribus" clause is then added to 
the argument, as much in the nature of a charm to ward off evil as 
with any hope that in some way special conditions did not prevail to 
cause difficulty in interpreting the findings. 
1.6~1. Dividend Restraint 
A study of the growth motivation of firms is made especially 
difficult because Government has intervened continually since the 
1950s with the intention of aiding and assisting companies to 
grow (if not actually trying to force them to grow) by various 
policies constraining dividend payout. 
Dividend restraint was in operation during the periods in 
which the samples were taken (i.e. fr~m 1970 to 1978) in two 
forms. From 1965 to 1973 a company paid tax at a specified 
rate (at around 40% for most of the period) on all its profits 
whether distributed or retained, but in addition was required 
to deduct income tax at the standard rate on dividends paid. 
Thus undistributed profits were taxed at a lower rate than 
those distributed. From April 1973, discrimination ceased, 
and under the imputation system companies paid a fixed rate of 
tax on all profits but no longer were required to deduct 
dividends. (The requirement to pay advanced corporation tax 
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on dividends paid, introduced a timing difference as to when 
tax became due, but does not alter the situation materially). 
However, the change did not necessarily usher in a new era of 
f~eedom for firms to come to a straignt financial judgement 
on the optimum relationship between the payout of dividends 
and retentions. 
From July 1966·to December 1969 some control of dividend 
payout was in operation. The 1966 restraint required that 
there was to be no increase in dividends over a twelve month 
period; from 1967 to 1968 companies were requested to exercise 
moderation, and from then until 1970 there was an imposition 
of a 3.5% ceiling on dividend increases. For two years 
voluntary restraint was requested of companies, until in 1972 
under the Counter Inflation Act of that year, companies were 
forbidden to declare dividends in excess of the dividends paid 
in the previous year. Later the legislation was amended to 
limit the rise in the sum distributed in any account year 
(initially at 5% and later amended to 12.5%), and this control 
continued in force until 1979. 
The position from 1970 to 1978 was not unique; differential 
rates of tax on dividend payouts had been in force from 1947 
to 1958 and, as pointed out above, from 1965 to 1973. The 
1972 to 1979 measures of dividend restraint do appear to be 
a particularly virulent form of the disease. Whether in fact 
dividends were significantly damped down during the sample 
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(14) 
period is difficult to decide. The increases permissible do 
not appear ungenerous during a time when it is known that 
company profitability, as measured by the replacement cost 
rate of return ~fter deducting stock appreciation, fell heavily 
during these years. It is even probable that the fixing of a 
limit to dividend increases put pressure on companies to make 
an increase which, up to that target, could have been higher 
(13) 
than they thought desirable. 
L6.2. Government In-vestment Allowances 
The fact of Government discrimination against payment of 
dividends is only the reverse side of the coin to the efforts 
that Governments were making in the post-war world to encourage 
growth. The way in which Government has supported the 
retention by means of differential tax on profits retained and 
profits distributed (in favour of the former) has already been 
briefly described. In the period since the war, the Government 
has also increased the availability of retained profits for 
investment by offering a variety of allowances. The purpose 
of these allowances was to permit a faster write down of 
depreciation and hence recovery of the investment funds over 
a shorter passage of time. Prior to the start of the sample 
period in 1970(14~ a system of investment grants were in 
operation with respect to manufacturing industry for.expenditure 
However, the Times (25 March 1980) reported that dividends increased 
markedly after the withdrawal of dividend control in July 1979. Between 
the first and secon!i half of. 1979 dividends rose by 70%. 
Since the system di.d not change until October 1970" because of the 
way in which the accounting period was related to a given year in 
the sample, the first year figures would arise in situations in 
which the investment grant system was still in force. 
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on new plant and equipment (service industries were restricted 
to initial allowances, although a higher rate of 30% was 
introduced in 1966 when the concession began), amounting to 
20% of the total cost initially, rising to 25% in 1967 and 
falling back to 20% in 1969. Initial grants were paid 
irrespective of any tax relief, although th~ part of the cost 
of the asset which was available for tax relief through 
depreciation was reduced by the amount of the grant. In 1970 
a new system of first year allowances was brought into being, 
in which expenditure on plant and machinery was eligible for 
a first year allowance of 60% and a standard rate of write 
down for depreciation purposes of 25%. By March 1972, this 
rate of initial allowance had been raised to 100% (80% between 
September 1971 and March 1972). Capital expenditure on plant 
and machinery in development areas, which had always been 
subject to different and more favourable treatment, was granted 
free depreciation and covered a ,wider range of assets. This 
latter change has remained in force and was current during 
the years covered by the sample. Accelerated depreciation in 
this form obviously increases the funds available to the firm, 
and moreover until such time as the total savings on the 
depreciation costs became eligible ~or tax, represents an 
interest free loan from~the Government. 
Governments have thus created conditions in which firms 
are encouraged to adopt a growth maximisation stance. In the 
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, 
l' j 
first place, by restricting dividend payouts and thus 
(15) 
encouraging retention, and in the second place by funding 
investment with what amounts to tax free loans. Moreover, 
firms, in the manner attributed to the growth maximising 
firill, are persuaded to over-invest (i.e. to invest funds 
beyond the point where the rate of return for an investment 
of the given class of risk is justified), since such investment 
does not have to pay the market rate of return for the use 
of external funds and, in addition, a company which invests 
continuously creates a deferred tax source which may never 
have to be paid until the rate of investment starts to slow 
down. The only requirement to make this magic formula for 
gro~th operationa~ is to ensure that sufficient profits are 
made to permit the tax relief to be earned. In the continuous 
investment case, although over-investment could be taking 
place below its "opportunity cost", this would not be evident 
to the investor in the shares of the company, since a low 
return which would be reported in the accounts without deduction 
of interest for the use of that money, would stand comparison 
with other returns in the market place which would have to 
bear the price of borrowed funds before being entered as 
profit in the accounts. The argument is similar to the one 
to be made against the use of funds by a firm arising from 
retention from profit Which are employed in a manner which 
means that earnings are not recovering t:he!r "opportunity cost"; 
(15) Baumol et a1 (37/1970) suggest that the return on new capital is 
from four to five times higher than on retained profits. 
(16) 
what i~ bejng ~ssp.rted is that if a firm is pursuing such a 
demand-growth pattern then the Government. by its tax~tion 
pol1ci,es. is actively assis ting this process. Thomas (Chapter 8. 
208/1978) reports that following the introduction of corporation 
tax. the proportion of income paid in tax rises to around 16% 
in 1970 but by 1973 had fallen to just over 8% and by 1976 to 5%. 
Meanwhile the ratio of capital allowances to gross trading 
profits S~owG an opposite trend rising from under 40% in the 
period 1966-1970 to over 74% in 1971-1976. 
Prest (176/1975, page 341) says that initial allowances 
amount to "a free gift if insufficient income is earned to 
repay them. a larger gift if the business continues to grow. 
and a growing gift if t~e business grows at an increasing 
rate'.'. 
1.6.3. The Profits Crisis 
Another source of disturbance in the sample period 
running from 1970 to 1978. which ~ay have affected the results 
of the investigation and nullified the "ceteris paribus" 
clause relates to the "prof! t/inflation" crisis of these years. (16) 
If one examines' the rates of return of industrial and 
commercial companies (deducting North Sea Oil profits) expressed 
as gross trading profits less stock appreciation and capital 
consumption at replacement cost as a percentage of net capital 
stock at current replacement cost. i.e. approximating to a 
"real" rate of return; it will be seen that the pre-tax rate 
In a seminar on Profi tabUi ty held on 1st April 1980 (W.E .Martin, 148/1981) 
the dramatic fall in the level of profit share/profitability in the U.K. 
since 1973 was acknowledged. Possible causes of the decline in the 
longer term (dating from about the'mid-1950s) included:-
a) a fall in the marginal productivity of physical capital. 
b) a shi ft in market power from "capitalists" to "labour". 
c) a crowding out by the public sector. 
No consensuS of view was arrived at by the seminar. 
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of return has fallen from an average of about 10% from 1966 
to 1969. to 5.8% from 1970 to 1977 (see Caves and Krause. 
45/1980. Table 16. page 253».(17) There is geheral agreement 
that such rates of return failed to keep abreast of inflation 
during the later period, and in 1974 led to the "liquidity 
crisis" of that year, causing the Government to rush through 
legislation to reduce taxation on stock appreciation and also 
for there to be a heavy reliance on short term loans 
(principally bank overdrafts). As a result, reliance on 
internal sources of funding fell from the 90% which had been 
common during the decade up to 1960, to 80% from 1971 to 1976 
(Thomas, 208/1978, Table 11.1, page 310). It should be noted, 
however, that this fall in the use of internal sources had 
been gradually occurring throughout the 1960s (1961-1965 
internal funds represented 84% of total sources; 1966-1970 
represented 81% of total sources). 
The greater.t~e reliance on external sources of f~ldiug, 
the less strong is the argument :that firms are able to grow 
while earning a low rate of return on funds, since they are 
unable to avoid the scrutiny of the external suppliers of 
such funds. Although such funding. even at 20%, is not 
necessarily large; in a period of economic stringency it is 
probable that the use of such marginal funds were essential 
to the survival of firms, and that therefore they were willing 
to demonstrate to the lenders that their use of f~ndq was 
justifiable. Since Banks were major lenders during this period, 
one would have expected the scrutiny to have been sharp. 
(17) '!be Bank of England estimated a decline in company profitability in the 
manufacturing section from about 18% return on capital in 1960 to 4% 
in 1978. (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2 December 1978). 
138 
The significance of this latter point is that the 
managerial theory of the firm is one that depends fundamentally 
upon the ability to exercise discretion of the management 
team, and this ability must have been to some extent jeopardised 
during the period. 
1.6.4. The Growth of Institutional Shareholding 
It has long been recognised that the structure of 
ownership of equity shares has been changing in the United 
Kingdom over the period from 1960 .to date. Figures by Moyle 
(162/1971) show that the percentage of registered holdings of 
shares held by persons, executors and trustees fell from 61.8% 
in 1957 to 51% in 1963, and down to 44:7% by 1970. A Department 
of Industry survey in 1975 (10/1979) showed that this category 
01: holding had declined to below 40%. At the same time, 
institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, 
investment and unit trusts) increased their ownership of 
ordinary shares of U.K. companies from 19% to 47% by 1978 
(Wilson Committee Report, 8/1980). This change in ownership can 
be attributed to the favourable tax treatment offered by 
successive Governments to pension and life assurance saving. 
It is rather more difficult to disentangle what this 
means for the debate concerning the separation of ownership 
and control. Because of the need of these financial intermediaries 
to safeguard their investments by diversification, they do not, 
individually, hold more than a small percentage of the shares 
of anyone company. In most cases their investment is strictly 
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governed by rules indicating the maximum percentage of the 
total market value they may own of anyone firm and also 
limiting the proportion of their own funds that they may 
commit to the fortunes of a single enterprise. This consideration 
leads to the belief that they contribute to the general 
dispersion of ownership of equity. 
On the other hand. although their expertise may be 
financial and not managerial, they are in a position to employ 
analysts to gain a greater understanding of a company's 
situation than that open to a private investor. Moreover, the 
institutions are relatively few in number, able to communicate 
easily amongst themselves, and possess possibilities of combined 
action which potentially could have a large influence on 
recalcitrant managers. The switch of their funds from Government 
Securities before the 1950s to company securities was partly 
motivated by the need to maintain the value of their funds in 
the face of accelerating inflation, giving them every incentive 
to exercise such powers. Their need to ensure marketability of 
their holdings means that they have, in practice, concentrated 
on the shares of large quoted companies, and have therefore 
narrowed the range of firms in which their interests lie to 
manageable proportions. 
They may be voluntarilY approached by Directors for 
support when some sensitive action is proposed, but one form of 
activity which seems to often lead to their intervention is 
when a contested takeover bid is made. There are numerous 
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examples of this to be found in press reports. Institutional 
objections were decisive in the rejection of the S.Pearson 
offer for the remaining shares in Pearson-Longman that it did 
not own in 1978; they were heavily involved in the Allied 
Breweries takeover of J.Lyons in the same year, and also in 
the Dalgety takeover of Spillers in 1979. Britannic Assurance 
blocked three takeover bids in 1979 for small engineering firms 
in which its maximum holding in anyone never exceeded 11%. 
There is little doubt that the Institutions are being 
encouraged to participate more actively in the affairs of firms. 
The example of successful economies such as Germany and Japan. 
where such intervention is strongly marked, has led to concern 
that they are not taking sufficient responsibility for their 
investments. However. it is probable that their need to disperse 
their investments to reduce risk in their total portfolio will 
mean that they will refuse to enlarge their financial commitments 
to individual companies and that their influence will be largely 
persuasive until a firm reaches a crisis such as possible 
insolvency or merger. 
The ability of the Financial Institutions to switch 
shares from companies earning low returns on the basis of 
informed analysis and the possibility that the analysis will 
cause them to act in concert (not necessarily in collusion) does 
raise serious doubts about whether management.of quoted companies 
can defy their shareholders' wishes and pursue growth at the 
expense of profitability. 
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In examining the results of testing' any economic theory, 
specific circumstances will have occurred. It is a common burden 
of any social science research that the variables of interest cannot 
be isolated for study. Whether the circumstances surround the test 
situation in such a manner as to cast doubt on the findings must 
always be a matter of judgement. Inflation is not an unknown phenomenon 
since the war, but it did reach unprecedented heights during the 
sample period. Government intervention to promote growth has been a 
fairly consistent policy of all shades of political parties over the 
last three decades, but company income paid in taxes fell to its 
lowest level between 1970 and 1978. The changes in the ownership of 
shares may have been gradually shifting over the decades following 
1950, but the economic crisis of the mid-1970s was of exceptional 
severi ty. 
For the present, the "ceteris paribus" condition will be assumed 
to hold over the period while the results of the statistical work 
are reported in subsequent chapters. 
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1.7. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
The chapter set out to fulfil two major tasks. The first of 
these was to describe some general trends in merger activity as 
revealed in official data. The second purpose was to outline the 
details of the two samples on which this research is founded and, 
by a preliminary analysis of certain features, to demonstrate that 
the samples reflected the major characteristics already disclosed 
by the general survey of mergers. By these means it was hoped to 
orientate the reader to the study of the takeover process by 
becoming aware of the factual background and also to inspire 
confidence in the samples selected for analysis. 
In Section 1.1.1. it was shown that the legal form of 
amalgamation was not of significance in determining the actual 
intention of the parties and therefore that the terms "merger" and 
"takeover" would be treated as synonyms, except where the context 
implied that the legal form was at issue. In its strict legal 
definition, "mergers" were found to represent no more than 4 cases 
in every 1,000 acquisitions on average. The Section also covered 
some early merger history, bringing out the international nature 
of the phenomena, the existence of cyclical patterns and the 
evidence for a positive relationship to the business cycle in 
general, and rises and falls in Stock Market prices in particular. 
Section 1.2. discussed the main ~eatures o~ official data 
on takeovers and then demonstrated the fluctuating pattern of 
mergers between.1960 and 1978. Whether measured by number of 
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acquisitions or expenditure on acquisitions, the series reached a 
climax in 1972, falling thereafter and starting to climb again 
from 1976. By deflating the expenditure series, it was possible 
to establish that during a period from about 1967 to 1972 the size 
of victims (which are known to be normally smaller in size than 
the acquiring firms) became larger than average during the total 
period, supporting the opinion that takeovers became a more 
fashionable option for a time, and that as a result, a greater 
number of larger enterprises became involved. 
By means of correlation analysis, the hypothesis that merger 
activity was related to a general business cycle was examined in 
Section 1.3. The results appeared to confirm the supposition.' 
There were some indications that the important influence at work 
was the manner in which rising share prices reduced the investment 
costs of acquiring additional capacity by takeover. The problem of 
whether mergers were heavily implicated in eliminating failing 
firms was also considered. Although the requisite statistically 
significant negative correlation between statistics of compulsory 
liquidations and the totality of acquisitions and mergers was 
confirmed, the hypothesis was not judged to be well founded in the 
light of other research work. In the final sub-section 1.3., types 
of takeover (i.e. horizontal, vertical and diversified), and 
methods of purchase were scrutinized. It was evident that the 
diversified acquisition had been growing in importance, and that 
there was a tendency to reduce the cash content of a bid during 
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periods of high merger acti vi ty and to increase the use of cash when 
frequencies were' falling,' .which suggested further confirmation of 
the significance of high share prices in increasing the attractiveness 
of mergers. 
The consumer Durable/Non-Durable Goods sample and the comparison 
sample (Victims, Predators and Neutrals) were described in Section 
1.4. and the variables to be analysed briefly summarised. Because 
the comparison sample was selected on a "post hoc" basis, the 
burden of exhibiting the effect of merger activity on representative 
industrial/commercial firms fell to the Consumer Durable/Non-Durable 
sample. Examination of the latter sample indicated: 
(i) .that the pattern of fluctuation in merger activity 
corresponded to the behaviour of the total population: 
(il) that 44.4% of the firms engaged in at least one takeover 
between 1970 and 1978: 
(iii) that 78.2% of all takeovers were of unquoted firms; 
(iv) that 41.5% of the sample failed to survive (either 
because of being acquired or becoming insolvent) during 
the period 1970 to 1978; 
(Iv) that 82% of all failures could be ascribed to takeover 
and 13% to insolvency. 
It was also ~ound that victim ~irms, prior to attaining that 
status, were abnormally active acquirers of unquoted firms. The 
extent of involvement by foreign firms in acquiring British 
companies was not large. Further examination of the firms assembled 
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in the Stock Exchange Official Year Books for 1970 and 1978/1979 
lent support to the opinion that the number of quoted companies 
in the United Kingdom has fallen, which has implications for the 
problem of the increasing concentration of market power in the 
hands of a reduced number of enterprises. 
Some of the problems in the use of accounting data were examined 
in Section 1.5., where it was demonstrated that in a study based 
largely on financial statements caution must be exercised due to 
variations in accounting practice and the effects of inflation on 
estimates of cost and profitability. 
Section 1.6. lists certain factors which occurred during the 
period of this study and which may have affected the conclusions 
by reason of the special influence they generated. There were :-
(a) policies of dividend restraint. 
(b) Government intervention to promote growth. 
(c) The decline in profitability of British Industry. 
(d) The growth of Institutional shareholding. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH STRATEGY AND 
MERGER THEORY 
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2.0. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter opens with an account of the present disturbed 
state of the philosophy of social science. All research must 
work within some view of the canons governing methods of 
investigation, defining such matters as what are the criteria 
for the construction of theory and how that theory is to be 
judged as adequate or inadequate for its purposes. 
It goes on to discuss the research strategy adopted within 
the thesis and offers justifying arguments to support the choice 
of strategy. The various ways in which merger activity has been 
examined are set out with the intention of demonstrating that 
working within the framework of the theory of the firm is an 
acceptable approach likely to yield fruitful results. 
2.1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
The beginning of the Social Sciences as a distinct 
discipline of study was founded upon the view that there are 
natural laws governing the working of society. In taking 
this view, the pioneers were much influenced by the enormous 
success achieved by the Newtonian system in dealing with the 
physical laws of nature and hoped to discover analagous 
edicts governing social activity. From the start there were 
doubts about the extent to which the quantitative methods of 
science might be applied in discovering these laws and 
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the problem of whether such laws might not be more clearly 
revealed by moral or personal introspection was canvassed 
from the earliest days onwards. 
It is far from the purpose of this thesis to relate 
the history of method in economic theory. An excellent 
account of the developments in economic methodology can be 
found in Blaug (42/1980). It is of relevance to state that 
the methodology of the Social Sciences is in such turmoil 
at the time of writing that there is no settled conclusion 
as to the manner in which theories can be established and 
disestablished in Economics. 
The issue would not be of great import if the purposes 
of the research were to examine merger activity in a 
"normative" manner. "Normative" as opposed to "positive" 
economics seeks to determine rules and prescriptions which 
will guide practical men of business on how best to undertake 
mergers or defend their companies against takeover approaches 
or avoid involvement in mergers altogether. Although such 
technical studies cannot avoid reference to theories of the 
firm or of the mixed capitalist economy which is the firm's 
environment since the definition of what is successful 
involves evaluation and interpretation. there can be a general 
acceptance on the basis of existing knowledge which will 
, enable these tasks to be competently undertaken. A work such 
as Bean's "Financial Strategy in the Acquisi tion Decision" 
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( 1) (38/1975) is an example of this approach. 
Within the tradition of Positive Economics, it is 
possible to examine such questions as - have mergers been 
successful? - as is done by Meeks in "Disappointing 
Marriage. A Study of the Gains from Merger" (153/1977) or 
other such issues as - have mergers increased in concentration 
in the economy? - as in Hannah and Kay (86/1977) or 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer (27/1975), or - does the market for 
capital work efficiently in penalising firms who do not 
use capital efficiently and rewarding those that do? -
which is the central question in Singh's two studies 
(198/1971 and 199/1975). Each of these studies works within 
existing theoretical frameworks •. 
The research strategy of this thesis has, however, a 
different orientation. It proposes to select a theory of 
mergers from amongst several possible theories, and poses 
the question - does the theory perform its task well? 
It is necessary for that purpose to have some views on what 
a "good" theory is and how the strengths and limitations 
of a theory may be assessed. 
The difference in approach is important because the 
conclusions to be drawn £rom this research depend on the 
difference in aim. The aim is different because of a changing 
viewpoint in the intellectual climate of the times, on the 
ways in which research can contribute to the development of 
(1) For example, a practical businessman faced with a. takeover bid 
would be well advised to consider Newbould's finding (166/1970) 
that an active defence may defeat a bid, but if it does not, leads 
to an enhancement of the value placed by the bidder on the 
acquired firm. 
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(2) 
understanding within a discipline. This development derives 
from what is referred to as the "growth of knowledge" debate. 
In 1962 Kuhn wrote "The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions" (119/1962) which attempted to draw some lessons 
from the history of science to demonstrate the importance of 
the social context in which scientific discovery is carried 
out. His most penetrating insight was to demonstrate that 
the formal logical systems of investigation that were taught 
/ 
as the methods of science were governed by social institutions 
and customs which were as important to the progress and 
development of the science as any rules of a logical nature 
which were employed. He portrayed "normal" science as an 
activity carried out by a scientific community with a 
constellation of beliefs, values and techniques which 
provided a metaphysical environment, the word "metaphysical" 
in this context referring to the way in which concepts are 
organised in order to provide a framework by which the real 
world may be apprehended. From time to time, this orthodox 
theoretical framework (which Kuhn refers to as a "paradigm") (2) 
is overthrown by a new paradigm, as the earlier system finds 
itself unable to function in the face of refutation and an 
increasing number of anomolies. At this pOint a "scientific 
revolution" occurs. Kuhn's work has been criticised on 
three major grounds: 
(a) His description of revolutionary changes does not 
seem in accordance with historical fact since many 
It has been variously noted that the term "paradigm" is loosely 
employed in the works of Kuhn. The definition offered above 
covers the meaning of the term as it is normally employed in the 
11 terature. 
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changes of "paradigm" only occur over long periods of 
time in practice. 
(b) He over-emphasised the incompatibility of succeeding 
"paradigms" by arguing that scientists working wi thin 
one intellectual tradition would find another 
intellectual tradition totally incomprehensible. 
(c) That scientific truth became relativistic reflecting 
its historica~ and social background but providing no 
grounds for a judgement on the progress of science in 
. . 
a rational manner. 
Lakatos sought to restore the sense of progress to 
scientific endeavour by his description of "scientific 
research programmes" (122/1978). These were conceived of as 
clusters of more or less interconnected theorems. The 
purpose of science is not to select between alternative 
hypotheses by means o:f some "cruci al experiment" but to use 
a 'Popperian strategy of falsification" (which is described 
anon) to adapt the programme. I:f this adaptation permits 
the redefined programme to deal with a wider range of novel 
facts as well as retaining control of a large part of its 
original territory, then the programme is considered to be 
"theoretically progressive". I:f, on the other hand, the 
programme in dealing with its anomalies has to build in more 
and more assumptions which restrict the range of the programme, 
then it is said to be "degenerating". Lakatos' theory has 
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been subject to criticism on the grounds that if we are 
comparing not theories but "research programmes", then changes 
in theoretical assumptions within different programmes will 
make them non-comparable and therefore unable to be 
characterised as "progressive" or "degenerative". 
The third crucial development to which we must refer is 
that which' has already been mentioned as a "Popperian strategy 
of falsification". This strategy is ,outlined successively in 
the "Logic of Scientific Discovery" (169/1934) and "Conjectures 
and Refutations" C17l/1963). Popper has sought to find an 
answer to the problem of induction, and in doing so to place 
scientific method on a sound logical footing. The problem 
of induction (which was pointed out long ago by the philosopher 
David Hume in the 18th Century) is that since induction relies 
upon a generalisation based on the accumulations of a finite 
number of specific examples, then there is no way in which 
the generalisation can be logically established to be true. 
To put the matter more simply, no number of cases in which it 
is found that A has the characteristic B can ever establish 
the statement that "all As are Bit. The innovation of Popper 
was to point out that the reverse of this is however logically 
correct, that if we can find an example of an A that has not 
the characteristic B, then we can establish the proposition 
that "all As are not B~I. Therefore, since generalisations 
cannot be established, they should be treated as conjectures, 
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and the purpose of science is to test these conjectures to 
find out if they can be falsified. Any conjectures which 
resists successive attempts at falsification will be 
main tained as the ruling theory aw ai ting the dawn of the day 
when it will succumb to a successful falsification. In this 
way, what has become known as the "hypothetico-deductive method" 
was given apparently secure foundations as an engine for 
scientific progress. 
Unhappily, matters have not proved to be so well ordered. 
Any theory stands within a web of statements concerning 
assumptions and conditions which determine the manner in which 
the theory is supposed to operate. If a theory fails to 
survive some given test, then we do not know whether it is 
the theory itself which has failed or whether it is one or some 
of the auxiliary assumptions and conditions. In practice, 
therefore, it is perfectly possible to adapt any theory in 
order to preserve it against critical defeat by adapting one 
or more of its subsidiary characteristics, what Popper has 
referred to as "immunizing strategies". Popper has tried to 
meet the argument by suggesting that the only adaptations to 
be permitted to a theory under attack are ones which will 
increase its domain of application; amendments which restrict 
its domain will cause increasing loss of generality and so 
diminish its explanatory power. The defence is not, however, 
adequate to deal with the charge that falsification is a 
matter of degree and is therefore not inherently logical in 
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nature, if by "logical" we mean subject to rules of reasoning 
which are independent of their subject matter. 
The work referred to has based itself mainly on the 
problems of method in the physical sciences. Insofar as the 
methods of the Social Sciences are scientific in character, 
then the problems of methodology outlined are present: 
(a) There are no "crucial experiments" in the Social 
Sciences, not just because of the absence of 
laboratory conditions of control, and the mUltivariate 
nature of the data, but also because theories are 
not singular propositions but part of an interconnecting 
matrix of ideas. 
(b) There is no. strictly formal way in which a theorem 
can be overturned. The falsification thesis is a 
good working rule, but only if allied to judgement 
which is qualitative and not quantitative. 
(c) We can expect to find the success of a theory not 
defined in any absolute sense but subject to the 
operational framework of concepts by which reality is 
organised at a moment of time. 
For these reasons it was decided to use a falsification 
strategy of testing a given theory by statistical methods, 
and then by reasoned judgement to seek to establish whether 
the theory had performed well or badly, the usefulness of 
the theory being assessed, in a relative sense, as to how 
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well it could cope with the problems within its range. 
Ultimately, it must be accepted that the purpose of this 
research cannot be to demonstrate that a theory is true or 
refuted, but to produce a verdi ct on the value of the theory 
in solving prob lems which can be used in conjunction with 
other research studies to conclude whether or not the theory 
should be persevered with or discarded. It will be argued in 
the final chapter of this thesis, for example, that whatever 
other evidence may exist for the opinion that managers 
controlling a firm may act against the interests of their 
shareholders in the modern corporation, the findings of the 
analysis do not support the proposition that earnings are 
sacrificed to growth in the managerial firm, and that 
consideration of the body of research on this confirms that 
conclusion. Since the hypothesis is about twenty years old, 
it should probably be abandoned at this point in time as 
lacking any empirical justi fication. despite a great deal of 
research concentrated on this issue. 
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2.2. THE THEORY OF EXPLANATION USED IN THE THESIS 
The hypotheses outlined later in this chapter consist 
of statements concerning the expected behaviour of firms 
in certain circumstances and then predicts what the character-
istics of such firms should be. Statistical metho~ology is 
used to test the relationsh'ip between the assumed nature of 
the firm and the actual characteristics of the firm as 
revealed by the analysis of data. In this manner it uses 
what has become known as the "hypothetico-deductive" method. 
That is to say, a hypothesis is derived on the basis of 
inductive generalisation and also intuition, and this 
hypothesis is tested by seeing how well it deduces the 
consequences that actually occurred from its premises. 
This is a model of explanation that lias had a successful 
tradition of employment in the physical sciences. It avoids, 
so far as this is pOSSible, making normative assumptions, and 
aims to be a "positive" account of the situation. If the 
hypothesis works well, and the environment 1n which firms 
function remains broadly the same, then the explanation 
should be capable of serving in a predictive fashion to 
describe the features of firms similarly engaged in the future. 
This is so because the logical form to which the explanation 
aims is of the nature "if A then B", which is equally as 
valid in the future as in the past if it is established and 
if other conditions remain similar. 
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Hempel 'and Oppenheim, in a famous article (93/1970) 
have given a well-known definition of the situation in these 
words: 
"To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, 
to answer the question "why" rather than only the 
question "what" is one of the foremost objectives of 
all rational enquiry; and especially scientific research 
in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere 
description of its subject matter by providing an 
explanation of the phenomena it investigates. The 
question "why ddes the phenomenon happen?" is construed 
as meaning "according to what general laws, and by 
virtue of what antecedent conditions does the phenomenon 
occur?" • " 
Diagrammatically the process may be shown thus: 
EXPLANANS EXPLANANDUM 
C1 
C2 •••••••••• C n EXPLANATION 
DEDUCTION OF 
Ll L2 •••.•.•••• L PHENOMENON n 
C = Condition necessary or sufficient for the effect 
to take place. 
L = General Laws. 
The essential aim of this system of explanation 1s to 
search our "invariant relationships" and at the same time to 
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(3) 
follow Hume's dictum that necessary connections among events 
cannot be perceived and therefore can have no empirical basis. 
(3) Science reveals only recurring associations. 
The present thesis is worked out in order to conform 
to this model of scientific research. A phenomenon "merger 
activity" is examined. A hypothesis is stated and the 
conditions surrounding the hypothesis are recited. The 
hypothesis is related to the theory of the firm. The 
oligopolistic structure of a mixed-capitalist economy is 
assumed because these are the essential covering conditions 
without which the phenomenon would not take place, or at 
least be transmuted to an unrecognisable form. 
From the hypothesis deductions are made. These deductions 
are tested, and if they appear to hold, then the hypothesis 
is tentatively confirmed. The hypothesis is not "verified" 
or "proved true", since this is not possible, as has been 
pointed out, within the realms of purely scientific endeavour. 
It is not practicable because of the problem of induction. 
We can confirm universal statements of the form "all capitalists 
merge in order to gain increased market power" only by studying 
all capitalists in all merger situations, past,· present and 
future. By enormous effort, we might take the total population 
of past mergers (assuming that the "present" is only a way of 
describing the immediate past), but we have no evidence on 
future mergers, and if our theories will not hold in the 
future, then we have no scientific theories as this is 
The problem of how this approach is modified to take into account 
the "intentional" nature of human behaviour is dealt with later 
in this section. 
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generally understood but only a historical description of 
the past situation. 
The preceding statements represent what is generally 
known as the "received view" which held sway up to the 1950s. 
In fact, the hypothetico-deductive method is still the form 
in which scientific research is cast. However, since the 
growth of knowledge theories have burst upon the scene 
(principally the work of Kuhn, Popper and Lakatos), the whole 
strategic significance of what is being done by the hypothetico-
deductive method has been transformed. 
If one considers." the statistical investigations which 
form a major part of the later chapters of this theSis, it 
will be noted that they follow traditional methodological 
pathways. It is the interpretation of these findings and the 
relation to a theory of mergers embedded in a general theory 
of the firm where the change in research methodology shows 
itself. 
Economics abounds in low level generalisations of the I 
sort - "large firms are not more profitable than small firms, 
but have a more stable record of profits earned", or "there 
is a strong association between growth and profitability in 
firms". But higher level generalisations are necessary, 
otherwise one is faced with a jumble of discordant research 
findings which relate to individual and specific events and 
which do not permit any continuous form of economic reasoning. 
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(4) 
It is for this reason that means must be found of relating 
the generalisations to a theoretical framework, and one of 
the major purposes of this chapter is to find a suitable 
theoretical context in which to deal with merger behaviour. 
Anyone with an interest in the Social Sciences must be 
aware that there is an essential difficulty with the concept 
of "invariant relationships" in studies of human behaviour. 
The principal issue is that of "meaning". The actions of 
individuals are inexplicable unless we take the intention 
behind the action into account. 
One well-argued criticism of the use of the hypothetico-
deducti ve method in the Social Sciences is that of Winch 
"The Idea of A Social Science" (229/1958). Winch, basing 
his thinking on the works of the later Wittgenstein, argues 
that human behaviour is to be understood as "rule following 
behaviour", and not "causally regular behaviour". These rules 
and their underlying "norms tI are the true subject of social 
science. Since rules are developed in a social context. and 
without that context rules could not exist, we can only 
understand actions within society by means of an understanding 
(4) 
of that society itself. 
Winch's argument has led to two major controversies. The first of 
these is that the idea of analysing behaviour by the scientific 
manner of identifying regularities of cause and effect is not an 
effective means of studying human society. This argument is dealt 
with in the text. 
The other dispute which deals with the problem of making cross-
cultural studies when the meaning of terms depends on the social 
context in a given society is not of interest, since in anthropological 
terms the analysis of merger behaviour is related to a single cultural 
context, i.e. that of advanced Western industrial society engaged 
in capitalistic modes of production. 
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(5) 
Regularity of events have no significance; it is the 
meaning of events which is the proper subject of study. Winch 
dismisses the idea of the use of statistical method to 
elucidate meaning on the grounds that no amount of numerical 
data will make the problem of meaning any easier to solve. 
One part of Winch's argument is acceptable, but the 
other part must be challenged. The idea that commands support 
is that the meaning of an action is of vital importance in 
the Social Sciences, but it does not follow that we must 
dismiss all evidence based on the statistical regularities 
of behaviour as evidenced in action. To deny that this is 
possible would be to deny our everyday experience of judging 
the intentions of people from their activity, and it would 
reduce the Significance of activity to something only to be 
discovered by means of language. Activity is in the domain 
of public meaning as much as language, and whereas we might 
be led to understand the thinking of an individual by 
examining the regularity with which he repeats certain ideas, 
we should be no less well informed if we study the constancy 
of the individual's behaviour in order to discover intention. 
It can be seen that Winch deals with "meaning" on the 
basis o£ "methodological individualism" (Le. the view that 
all social activity can be reduced to descriptions of individual 
human behaviour) but this raises the question of "holism". (5) 
The vocabulary which includes words such as "holism" and "social 
facts" is derived from Durkheim (1858-1917). The argument which is 
briefly sketched 1n the text is a very perfunctory treatment of one 
of the central disputes 1n the Social Sciences, i.e. the extent to 
which a social situation be be dealt with on the basis of a functional 
systems analysis as against the need to interpret the behaviour of 
the participants in terms of their own evaluation of the situation. 
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Are these "social facts" which are external to the individual 
and yet exert influences upon his conduct, and are not 
necessarily recognised by the individual. 
"Social facts" (though not normally referred to in 
economic literature as such), are a commonplace of economic 
thought. The typical description of a slump in which each 
individual is ~efending his Qwn interests aggravates the 
severity of the depression. Indeed, Keynes' famous work 
"The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" (108/1936) 
is built on the very theory that depressions are the results 
of unintended human activity. This is not to ignore the 
equally important role played in economic theorising by such 
behavioural ideas as "the rational maximising individual" or 
the "consumer with his ordered list of preferences". (6) 
There is no incompatibility between studying the motivation 
of typical individuals and finding that the interaction 
between those individuals produces unintended consequences. 
From this the conclusion:is drawn that, in order to use 
the hypothetico-deductive method constructively ·in. the studY.of 
~erger behaviour,. it is necessary to take the motives of the 
participants into account. These motivations may produce 
out-turns which were not anticipated, but nevertheless 
behavioural assumptions must be made which.are compatible with 
the roles of the main actors in an amalgamation process. In 
(6) Ryan (182/1970) makes the interesting observation that economics 
has little interest in individuals as such in its working methods, 
but proceeds by assuming "ideal types" to whom are ascribed a 
limited motivational range and then proceeds to work out the effect 
of such motivational roles in the pursuit of their economic aims. 
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practice, this means the managers of the acquired and acquiring 
firms and the shareholders involved. Much of the subsequent 
material of this chapter is devoted to defining the motives 
that underly merger activity and in this way identifying a 
theory which will serve as an adequate explanatory device. 
W4 
2.3. THE CATEGORISATION OF hffiRGER ACTIVITY 
2.3.1. The Relationship of Merger Activity to a Theoretical Framework 
Most research in economics must be carried out by a process 
of using quantitative method in order to search for statistical 
regularity with regard to patterns of behaviour and also 
involves a descriptive and evaluative tale of the significant 
motivational forces underlying that behaviour. The two elements 
are inherent in the nature of the discipline. Economic 
institutions need to be described in order to provide the 
setting for the narrative. Motive can only be analysed in 
terms of the meaning of behaviour, and that involves judgement 
of human nature and of the way in which institutions regulate, 
control, develop and frustrate human desires. 
If one can discern significant statistical relationship 
between activities or attributes, one is still left facing 
the issue of what story should be told about those relationships. 
The same correlations can be described in several different 
ways, depending on the interpretations made. If economic 
reasoning is not to become a mere test of ingenuity, it is 
necessary to relate those interpretations to an existing body 
of theory. The process then becomes two-way. We can understand 
the relationships exposed by the research in the light of 
theory, but if the relationships turn out to be other than 
those predicted, we cast doubt on the theoretical underpinnings. 
Judgement of meaning 1s essential to this process, and since 
the subject matter of economics involves many variables, the 
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essential multivariateness makes for great difficulties in 
assigning significance to the variables. 
It would appear that there can be little dispute that 
the study of takeover cannot be effectively explored if it 
remains at the level of producing a pattern of correlations 
(whether these are significant in a statistical sense or not). 
Even this supposedly simple exercise cannot proceed without 
reference to a larger theory, since it is necessary to select 
variables for examination whose definition reflects the 
nature of "metaphysical" constructs such as the "firm", 
the "market" and the "industry". By "metaphysical" is meant 
the methods of organising data, defining entities within' 
that data, agreeing what are the significant properties of 
those entities and the extent to which they are quantitatively 
measurable in order to provide a workable framework of 
understanding. This involves no more than the acceptance 
that there must be an abstraction from the infinite detail of 
"reality" if serious investigation is to take place. But 
this gives no guidance as'to what theoretical framework 
should in fact be chosen if one wishes to illuminate a 
particular series of motives and actions such as may be found 
in relation to mergers. 
As Popper expresses the matter (172/1972): 
"We have seen that all our theories remain guesses, 
conjectures, hypotheses. Once we have fully accepted 
, 
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this purely logical result. the question arises 
whether there can be purely rational arguments. 
including empirical arguments. for preferring 
some conjectures or hypotheses to others." 
Popper goes on to deal with this problem in terms of 
selecting theories which have withstood falsification and have 
"excess content" (i .e. deal with previously established 
results and also are capable of answering a new range of 
problems). Thus he comes to a definition of "best" theories. 
However useful such guidance may be in respect to the physical 
sciences. it is less helpful in considering the social sciences. 
Theories in the physical sciences deal with a relatively 
static subject matter. Theories in the social sciences relate 
to a subject matter which is constantly changing through time. 
Popper's argument is that scientific understanding is 
progressive because theories come into existence which can 
be seen to be superseding existing ones. but the difficulty 
in the social sciences is that the subject matter is in itself 
variant. For example. the concepts of "monopolistic 
competitors" and "liquidity preference" are progressive in 
this light. but they refer to particular forms of social 
organisation which no doubt will vanish in time and new theories 
will be required to accommodate to the different organisational 
patterns without any implication of progressiveness. 
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Progress in understanding in the social sciences does 
seem a possibility by reason of the invention of new concepts 
of measurement and progress in the social sciences is certainly 
aided by development of technique (for example, the evolution 
of statistical theory since the turn of the century). But its 
progressiveness is reflected more in its ability to keep up 
to date with transformations of the social situation. The 
relevance of, for example, the labour theory of value was 
superseded when the theory ceased to be a useful abstaction 
in relation to the way in which the productive system was 
organised. 
In order to find a "network of theories" to which merger 
activity can be integrated, it is necessary to consider what 
range of theories currently exist. This raises the question 
of how mergers have been dealt with in the current economic 
literature. 
, 
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2.3.2. The Analysis of Merger Activity 
The aim of this section is not to seek in any comprehensive 
way to relate the numerous studies of merger behaviour that 
h ave appeared in the literature. The rather more modest 
in tention is to seek to classify the various attempts to explain 
mergers into some acceptable logical categories. A subsidiary 
target is to elucidate the various motives involved in mergers 
and use this as a main basis of the classification. If this 
task can be carried out successfully, then we shall be in a 
position to consider whether the various approaches justify 
being treated as "research programmes" and therefore justify 
the selection of one of them as being suitable for empirical 
testing using the Popperian falsification strategy, in order 
to produce evidence confirming or disconfirming that theory. 
At the risk of repetition, I will restate that such confirmation 
or disconfirmation can only be a matter of degree and can 
• 
only be taken into account with other research studies in 
assessing whether the theory is "degenerating" or "progressive". 
Machlup's statement in his article "The Problem of 
Verification in Economics (139/1955) summarised the situation 
at a time which predated the "growth of knowledge" thes!l.s: 
"When the economist's prediction is conditional, 
that is based upon specified conditions, but where 
it is not possible to check the fulfilment of all 
the conditions stipulated, the underlying theory 
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cannot be disconfirmed whatever the outcome observed, 
Nor is it possible to disconfirm a theory where 
the prediction is made with a stated probability 
value of less than 100 per cent; for if an event is 
predicted with, say, 70 per cent probability, any 
kind of outcome is consistent with the prediction, 
Only if the same 'case' were to occur hundreds of 
times could we ver~fy the stated probability by 
the frequency of 'hits' and 'misses' • This does not 
mean complete frustration of all attempts to verify 
our economic "theory," "But it does mean that the 
tests of most of our theories will be more nearly 
the character of illustrations than of verifications 
of the kind possible in relation with repeatable 
controlled experiments or with recurring fully-iden"tified 
situations, And this implies that our tests cannot 
be convincing enough to compel acceptance, even when 
a majority of reasonable men in the field should be 
prepared to accept them as conclusive, and to approve 
the theory so tested as 'not disconfirmed' ," 
One problem to be faced in classifying is that any 
individual takeover may involve a mixture of motives, for 
example it may be seen as a way of gaining monopoly power in 
a given market; as permitting economies of scale to be 
achieved; as providing an opportunity for the management to 
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exercise their preferences over those of their 
stockholders; and none of these motives is incompatible 
with a simple desire to maximise profits. Can one theory 
serve all these motives adequately? An answer to this 
dilemma will be suggested, but it will be better 
developed after the attempt has been made to find a 
rational system of cataloguing the motives. 
One way·of trying to elucidate the causes that bring 
mergers about would be to go directly to the reports on 
mergers and to list the reasons offered by the participants 
themselves for seeking to amalgamate two enterprises into 
one legal entity. There is no real shortage of such 
information because the financial press is commenting each 
day on the details of takeovers, both during the bidding 
stage and at their final consummation. 
A consideration of some of the motivation expressed 
in the case of a Dumber of well-known merger proposals 
(well-known because they are described in the reports of 
the Monopolies Commission) will illustrate the types of 
hopes that normally accompany mergers: 
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Date of 
ReEort of 
Monopolies Companies 
Commission involved Benefits Projected 
a) 1966 BMC/pressed 1) Increased manufacture 
(18/i) Steel. specialisation. 
2) Co-ordination of 
production planning. 
3) Export gains (especially 
by Pressed Steel). 
4) Avoid heavy costs to BMC 
of setting up its own 
body production facilities. 
b) 1966 Ross/ 1) Savings from raising 
(l8/ii) Associated trawler efficiency. 
Fisheries. 2) Amalgamation of transport 
facilities. 
c) 1967 GKN/Birfield. 1) Concentrating manufacture 
( 18/iii) in specialised plants. 
2) Gain in export sales. 
d) 1967 BICC/ 1) Increase in exports. 
(18/i v) Pyroterax 2) Better production planning. 
3) Better use of joint 
technical expertise. 
. 4) Lower price of copper 
tubes. 
5) Avoidance of duplication 
of facilities overseas. 
e) 1968 Thorn/ 1) Joint production of 
(lS/v) Radio television sets would 
Rentals offer savings in production 
facili ties. 
2) Savings in accounts, 
administration, servicing 
and distribution associated 
with TV rentals. 
f) 1969 Unilever/ 1) Efficient joint use of 
(18/vi) Allied technology and marketing 
Breweries. resources. 
2) Gain from sharing of 
R and D effort. 
3) Some balance of payments 
advantages. 
g) 
Date of 
Report of 
Monopolies 
Commission 
1972 
(18/vii) 
Companies 
involved 
Beecham/ 
Glaxo 
Benefits Projected 
1) Benefits in overseas 
markets and production 
through joint enterprises 
preventing facility 
duplication. 
2) Gains from sharing 
Rand D activity. 
It should be noted that these are all mergers of 
fairly large firms, the amounts bid varying from 
£307.3 million in the case of Unilever/Allied Breweries, 
to £10 million for British Match Corporation and 
Wilkinson Sword. 
This list cannot be considered as typical since, 
being drawn from the reports of the Monopolies Commission, 
'it refers to amalgamations which would involve the 
acquisition of assets exceeding £5 million (Monopolies 
and Mergers Act 1965) or where one-third of the market for 
one particular type of goods would belong to a single 
company as a result of the acquisition (Monopolies and 
Restrictive Practices Act 1948). This latter share of the 
market criterion was reduced to 25 per cent by the 1973 
Fair Trading Act. Nevertheless, the type of reasons 
offered are of a similar nature to those to be found in 
the press where less weighty firms are implicated. 
173 
If one were to accept the motives expressed in these 
reports, then one would be led to believe that economies in 
production, marketing and research were the dominant aims of 
any merger. There are several reasons for not so doing. 
First, since the reports all derive from Monopolies 
Commission investigations, we know that the prospect of 
monopoly gain must have been a strong possible aim. The reasons 
given therefore may not be the whole truth or may involve 
elements of deception. Secondly, all the gains from merger 
could have been achieved by internal growth and it is necessary 
to explain why external acquisition was preferred to internal 
investment. Thirdly, we do not know why the mergers were 
taking place at the point in time when they did without access 
to further information, since all the firms mentioned were of 
long-standing and the problems that the mergers were attempting 
to solve had been around for a number of years in most 
instances. Finally, it should be noted that the justifications 
are all short term benefits and still leave open what the 
ultimate objectives of the firm might be - the long term 
increase in shareholder wealth, greater security, greater 
diversity, improved stability, adaptation of the risk profiles 
facing the firm, etc. 
Newbould (166/1070) looked at firms who made bids whose 
size ranged from £1 million to £100 million. He, by means of 
a questionnaire, sought to find out the managerial reasons 
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for merging. Of the 38 firms which constituted his sample: 
a) 27% gave market dominance (to acquire increased 
market share or eliminate competition) as the main 
reason for the merger; 
b) 21% suggested a defensive motive (to preserve 
existing market and industrial positions); 
c) 16% represented what Professor Newbould called 
"reinforcement" which he defined as agreed takeovers. 
64% of his collection of firms was accounted for by these 
motives. 
Professor Newbould's study is primarily concerned with 
motivation but arrived at the rather negative conclusion that 
the takeovers rarely were based on explicit, carefully 
considered analysis and undertaken in a haphazard manner, 
and he goes on to suggest that it represented a fashionable 
form of entrepreneurial. activity. 
Kitching, in an article (-112/1967) based on discussions 
with top executives of 22 companies and drawing on their 
experience in acquiring and managing a total of 181 companies 
in the period 1960-1965, discovered that out of 69 acquisitions 
made by 20 of the 22 companies. 19 were failures (i.e. 28%). 
He states: 
"The top executives I interviewed seemed uneasy about 
their companies' acquisition activities. In the use 
of mergers, their company had a fashionable tactic and 
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one which looked good to stockholders - either as a 
strategy for growth or as a defensive move. But the 
executives were uneasy about the relatively high degree 
of risk associated with investment in an acquisition 
compared with an equivalent investment in, say, a new 
plant." 
This appears to sUbstantiate Newbould's view. We 
may be led to believe, on the basis of this testimony, that 
the increasing concentration within markets that has been 
attributed to merger forces derived, like the British Empire, 
from "a fit of absent-mindedness". But this would not be 
adequate to our purpose. If the behaviour was customary and 
a copy of the acts of others, we are still left with questions 
concerning why it was necessary to be "fashionable", why the 
behaviour was "fashionable" at this time rather than any other, 
and also what social pressures were making for such conformity 
in behaviour. 
Enough has been said to illustrate the point that it is 
not sufficient to list the stated public motives of participants 
in mergers, that we need to place the activity in relation 
to a larger theoretical context. 
If we examine the theoretical literature on mergers, the 
following scheme of classification covers the majority of 
explanations offered on the causes of mergers. 
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(7) 
Mergers arise from: 
i) the desire to achieve economies of scale; 
ii) the desire to adapt market structure; 
iii) the application of normal investment criteria in 
selecting opportunities for internal or external 
forms of growth; 
iv) the exercise of managerial discretion. 
These categories require some explanations: 
i) The desire to achieve economies of scale is a notable 
feature of mergers and also the consequent rearrangement 
of factors of production which is likely to lead to a 
greater value to the increased output than the cost of 
. (7) 
additional factors of input. Thus caSes involving 
economies of p~oduction, marketing and research are 
included in this definition. From the point of view of 
an acquiring firm, there will almost always be some 
increase in output arising from the dowry the acquired 
company brings to the amalgamation. From a total market 
viewpoint, however, the output of the joint firms may 
not be increased. We would expect, nevertheless, that 
the claim would be being advanced that this unchanged 
output would be produced at lower unit cost. 
There is some confusion of terminology to be dealt with in 
distinguishing economies of scale (strictly interpreted) and 
economies of size (i.e. of being a larger firm). This will be 
dealt with in a moment. 
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ii) The adaptations of market structure refers to the purpose 
of gaining an increased share in the market and possible 
strengthening of a monopoly position with regard to some 
of the products, or a defensive move to forestall another 
competi tor entering the market by making an acquisi ti on, 
or a protecti ve tactic of purch asing productive capaci ty 
in order to close it down with a view to preserving an 
existing market share. 
iii) Normal investment criteria relate to the consideration of 
whether to increase output or enter a new market by means 
of internal physical investment or by buying additional 
assets by means of an acquisition. This situation must be 
distinguished from the preceding two si tuations in that no 
change in economies of scale is forecast nor is any bene!i t 
assumed from the exercise of monopoly power. Nor is there 
any advantage to be gained from the utilisation of unused 
debt capacity, co-insurance permitting more debt to be raised 
without increase in the interest rate, nor from the purchase 
of tax losses. The only issue to be determined is whether 
it is cheaper to purch ase a bundle of second-hand assets 
contained within a firm or to undertake new investment. 
To be more specific, let us take the example of an oil 
company requiring three more tankers and faced with the 
option of placing new orders for construction or purchasing 
a small shipping company with three bulk carriers engaged in 
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wheat trade. Assume it costs £2 million to purchase a Dew 
tanker or the company can be bought for £4.5 million and 
each ship will cost £0.5 million to convert to its new use. 
On these figures the investment will involve an expenditure 
of £6 million and the merger £5.5 million. In such 
circumstances a merger could be the preferred choice. 
The second-hand assets must have a value specifically 
relating to the acquirer since if there was a general demand 
for such assets ei ther the price of the second-hand assets 
would be bid up or new construction would be discontinued 
until the stock of existing assets had been consumed. A more 
pertinent difficulty with this situation arises from the 
general finding that the acquisition of firms can require 
a premium over existing market value of up to 30% (Newbould 
166/1970). However, compensating factors exist. Existing 
assets can be brought into use immediately and thus change 
the time pattern of expected cash flows; and since such assets 
will already have lost use value through depreciation, their 
.price will reflect a shorter life for the investment which 
may more appropriately match the future time during which 
economic rents may be earned before competition starts to 
reduce returns. 
The particular interest in this reason for merger is 
that there is no assumption of any special factors required 
to induce a takeover. Since merger for this cause would only 
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(8) 
be a substitute for physical investment, it could be 
anticipated that no extraordinary gains would be expected. 
This would conform with the general view that growth by 
mergers is neither more nor less profitable than growth 
by other means. 
iv) Managerial discretion arises from situations in which 
managers are not so constrained by market forces that 
they can do little other than react to them as in the 
model of perfect competition, but instead have sufficient 
control of the situation to permit them choices other 
than those which are "profi t maximising". (8) 
Such choices may bring them into conflict with their 
shareholders, who would (subject '. to certain problems 
relating to the differences between taxes on income and 
taxes on capi tal gains) prefer that every £1 of capital 
should be so used that it wi 11 make a return greater than 
the investor could achieve for himself, or that the 
capital not so employed be distributed among the investors. 
The existence of such "discretion" is one of the most 
important controversies surrounding the present theory 
of the firm. 
"Once an independent decision maker with a well behaved profi t 
function in a perfectly competitive market is given perfect 
information about the situation he faces, there is nothing left 
for him to do, according to neo-classical theory, but to produce 
a unique level of output, or else to go out of business". 
(Blaug, p.l80, 42/1980). 
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The categorisation chosen is not unique, and there are 
other ways of dividing up the theories. A popular taxonomy 
is to relate the activity to horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate forms of merger. Another useful way of considering 
mergers is to divide them between mergers aimed at producing 
"real" effects (i.e. involving acquisition of physical assets) 
and those aimed at producing "financial" effects (i.e. affecting 
the value of the firm or the cost of capital). Each scheme 
suffers from the defect (and in this I include the one proposed 
above) that there are borderline classi fication problems; 
all suffer from the failing (previously alluded to) that a 
merger may consist of a mixture of elements from each 
sub-division. The justification 'of each scheme must be that it 
marshalls the data usefully. The particular scheme selected is 
appropriate to this thesis because it is possible to relate 
then to "research programmes" underlying the theories of merger. 
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2.3.3. Merger Hypotheses not included in this Classification 
(9) 
There are certain merger hypotheses which are not easily 
slotted into the classification proposed. (9) These are: 
a) Diversification Theories 
b) Superior Management Theories 
c) Exploitation Theories. 
2.3.3.(1) Diversification Theories. 
Obviously, the reasons why firms diversify 
should be important in understanding why mergers 
occur. However, this. branch of research has chosen 
a path to deal with the process in ways which are 
less useful than might appear at first sight. 
Building on the Iseminal work of Chandler (46/1942) 
the dominant theme has been the manner in which 
organisational change is necessary in *he evaluation 
of multi-product industry~ It takes the diversification 
as a given factor and then considers· the "structure, 
conduct, performance" effects, whereas our interest 
is in why diversification occurs in the first place. 
A penetrating insight into diversification is 
to be found in Williamson (228/1975). He locates 
the reason for the expansion of firms 1n the 
limitations of human beings in handling complex 
situations and generalised uncertainty. A firm will 
Excluded from consideration is the problem of the welfare losses 
arising from mergers insofar as they create monopoly situations. 
This is a problem of the effects of mergers, not their causation, 
and is therefore outside the scope of this thesis. 
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increase its range of activities when by doing so 
it will enable problems to be solved which the 
"market" cannot deal with. These problems relate 
to imbalances in the information possessed by parties 
to a contract, the difficulties of contracts in 
specifying the total range of conditions likely 
to be encountered, and the tendency of human beings 
to falsify information (or at least conceal it) when 
it is to their advantage to do so. This approach, 
which may be characterised as how institutions 
adapt in the face of uncertainty, proved to be too 
generalised in approach to fit within the categories 
above. 
2.3.3.(2) Superior Management Theories. 
The idea that the benefits arising from 
takeovers derive from a team of superior managers 
acquiring the assets previously held by a team of 
inferior ability lurks in the background of many 
merger explanations. It is brought out explicitly 
by Kitching (112/1967) in statements such as 
"The element critical for success is not 
the potential amount of synergy to be 
released in combining two companies. Rather 
it is the existence or absence of 'managers 
of changes ' - men who can catalyze the 
combination process". 
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It is also to be found in Penrose (167/1959) 
when she talks about the managerial team whose 
abilities limit the rate of expansion, and Marris 
(145/1964) when he refers to "Takeover raiders" 
who "must be able to produce the rudiments of 
high management needed for large scale organisation" • 
• 
Elements of such a view underline the M form of 
organisation advocated by Williamson (227/1971). 
Despite the fact that successful management 
teams have been identified 1n case studies and the 
undoubted truth that able management is a vital 
component in ensuring profitable acquisition, the 
concept has little empirical and therefore testable 
content. A successful management is one that does 
successful things and as such is a tautology. 
2.3.3.(3) Exploitation Theories. 
The exploitation theory relates to the type 
of merger where the aim is not to acquire a firm 
for its income earning potential, but because it 
has undervalued or idle assets. Typically these 
assets consist of property. cash and land. There 
is some mention in the literature about buying firms 
to acquire tax losses in order to set against the 
acquirer's own profits. Under English law, it is 
forbidden to use tax losses or advance corporation 
tax credits unless the trade is continued for at 
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least three years. This would involve taking over 
, 
a loss-making firm and continuing its potentially 
loss-making activities which would not appear to 
be an altogether attractive proposition. 
Such exploitation theories are associated 
with the "asset stripping" operations of entrepreneurs 
such as Sir Charles Clore and Slater Walker. Although 
the realisation of idle resources may be beneficial 
in releasing such assets 'into profitable use by 
others, the situation has often arisen in respect 
of using the sale of assets to maintain a share 
price at a high level in order to justify further 
takeovers, and the speculation has been brought to 
an end when events, such as an economic crisis, has 
reduced the firm involved to making its profits on 
the basis of its income earning opportunities, 
,which have not been able to sustain the exaggerated 
share price. For a racy description of this type 
of takeover, see "Slater Walker" by C.Raw (.180/1977). 
Although such takeover situations do occur, 
they obviously rely upon very specialist techniques 
of image building and the abuse of accounting 
information.' As such, they can only be practised 
by a very few specialist firms and can provide no 
major explanation of merger activity. 
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2.3.4. An Examination of the Merger Categories 
The purpose of considering the categories of merger 
explanation is not to describe exhaustively the explanations but 
to define them, indicate how they are intended to serve as 
explanations, and comment upon their success as explanatory 
devices. Ultimately it is proposed at a later point in the 
chapter to discover in what way they can be described in the 
terminology of "scientific research programmes". By this means 
it is hoped to justify the research carried out and reported in 
this thesis as a contribution to the development of an understanding 
of merger activity. 
2.3.4,(1) Economies of Scale 
The concept of economies of scale derive from 
cost theories underpinning the theory of the firm. 
Such a firm is assumed to be producing a single 
homogenous product under conditions of a received and 
static technologytUid with factor prices given. It 
relates to the long run cost curve and wa~ in its 
original formulation, a property of plant size not of 
the size of firms. Since most quoted companies run 
several plants, not one, this distinction is of some 
importance. Classical economies of scale are assumed 
to be due to one or more of the following factors: 
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(i) specialisation of function; 
(ii) the existence of indivisibilities; 
(iii) the physical laws which relate the 
external dimensions of units to 
their capacity; 
(iv) economies of "massed" resources 
(e.g. less stock of spares have to 
be carried to support a bank of 20 
machines than would obtain if 20 
machines were to be run in separate 
units (Pratten and Dean, 174/1965». 
Most empirical studies have, however, concluded 
that the long run average cost curves are typically 
L - shaped (Smith, 200/1955, and Johnson, 102/1960). 
This does not mean that there are no economies of 
scale. Pratten (175/1971) found that there are technical 
economies in many industries; but-it does indicate 
that once "minimum economic size" has been reached 
(i.e. the turning point in the L) then the scale 
economies tend to level off and thereafter increased 
output is not related to a lowering average cost. 
The case for takeovers with respect to economies 
of scale is that a plant within a company would benefit 
from an increased share of the market, permitting a 
longer production run which would allow the plant to 
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(10) 
grow beyond "minimum economic size". An implication of 
this is that if industry in Britain is merger prone, then 
this argues that it consists of companies with plants 
which have too small a share of the market to allow them 
to reach that size. 
Pratten (op.cit.) concluded that the minimum 
efficient scale of plants is substantial (relative to the 
British economy) in many industries, but Bain (32/1956), 
dealing with U.S.A. firms, reached a contrary conclusion, 
and asserted that in the majority of industries the 
efficient scale accounts for less than 2!% of the total 
industry capacity. These differences may reflect contrasts 
between, the U.K. and American economy. However, a takeover 
aimed at producing plant economies of scale could only 
work where the acquired plant is shut down while its 
market share is retained, since the purpose would be to 
capture market sh are, not to acquire a sub-optimum level 
of physical plant in itself. 
The real issue here is that economies of scale 
of plant must not be confused with economies deriving 
from increasing the size of the firm. For example, a 
firm may be able to reduce its cost of borrowing not by 
reason of its size per se, but because of its ability 
to operate in more securely controlled markets, due to 
the exercise of monopoly powers. (10) Economies of scale 
It is a matter of common observation that larg~ enterprises can raise 
debt at a lower cost than smaller businesses because of the security 
of the return. However, there is controversy in the literature as to 
whether the use of debt benefits the shareholder by increasing the 
value of the equity. Modigliani and Miller (159/1958) using perfect 
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Note (10) continued ... 
market assumpti ons in a world wi thout taxes, bankruptcy and transacti on 
costs, argued that the'amount of leverage is irrelevant since the cost 
of increasing debt financing serves to decrease the value of the equi ty. 
This is because of the increasing finanCial risk faced by shareholders 
as more debt is employed, and the absence of any gain in the capital 
value of the firm since the operating ·income would be discounted by the 
market at an interest rate related only to the business risk of the 
cash flow which would be unchanged by modifications of the debt/equity 
raU o. In their later article Modi gli ani and Mi ller (161/1963) conceded 
that the fact that corporation tax could be offset against debt would 
increase the capital value of the firm. However, if value increases 
with debt as it is emp loyed in larger amounts (Modigli ani and Mi ller 
assumed a constant cost of debt), their reasoning led to the view that 
firms should be financed totally with debt in order to gain the maximum 
increase in the capital value of the firm. At that level the return on 
debt should equal the return on equity because the bond holders would 
be bearing the same risk as a fi rm financed wi th 100% equi ty and 
therefore shareholders still fail to make convincing gains in their own 
right. 
Mi ller, in his Presi dential Address to the Annual Meeting of the 
American Finance Association (156/1977), suggested that if there are tax 
benefi ts to borrowing and as a consequence debt is cheaper than equity, 
then financial managers would react by increaSing borrowing until at 
the margin the cost of borrowing is equal to the cost of equity. thus 
claiming that at the margin there is little net advantage to corporate 
borrowing despite the existence of a tax shield. 
If, nevertheless, bankruptcy costs are positive (and the size 'of 
these costs is still a matter of controversy), then size by increasing 
the security of returns may permit debt to be raised at lower cost and 
so confer advantage on the shareholder. 
Paradoxically, it is difficult to justify the proposition that the 
creation of a larger business unit by merger will produce gains to the 
equi ty holders described in the las t paragraph. The argument that the 
merger of two companies with imperfectly correlated earnings reduces risk 
and thereby increases the value of the firm has been made by Lintner 
(136/1971) and Lewellen (132/1971) using what has been termed the 
"co-insurance effect". Their argument is that since the earnings of each 
of the firms involved in amalgamation guarantee the earnings of the other 
against the probability of default, then the reduction in risk will permit 
more debt to be raised at a given interest rate compared to the pre-merger 
situation. 
In the absence of bankruptcy and transaction costs the co-insurance 
effect can only redistribute rather than increase the wealth of shareholders 
and bondholders. Since risk has been lowered and the total value of the 
firm unchanged, the existing debt holders will see the value of their 
securities increase and the share value consequently reduced as, in effect, 
the shareholder is providing the insurance cover which has made the debt 
safer. (Higgins and Schall, 95/1975). The conglomerate (produced by 
the merger) may attempt to exploit new debt capacity by issuing new debt 
but whether the effect is to increase shareholder weal th depends on 
balancing the value of the incremental tax subsidy on debt against the 
189 
Note (10) continued ... 
initial diminution in equity value due to merger. If bankruptcy costs 
are introduced at a positive level, then the total value of the firm 
can increase. Shareholders may register positive gains. But note 
Warner's conclusion (Warner, 217/1977) that the costs of bankruptcy 
may amount ot less than 1% of the value of the operating assets, 
suggesting that co-insurance effects provide little substantial 
incentive to merge. 
The argument that si ze (with inves tment di versi ty implied) can 
produce shareholder advantage by lowering the cost of debt, whereas 
this effect cannot be secured by merger depends on the difference 
between the two situations. In the case of merger we are considering 
an immediate situation which is dominated by the existing debt already 
issued. In the long run that existing debt will have been retired and 
new debt substituted on terms more favourable to the shareholder. 
190 
are possible with respect to an increase in the typical 
multi-product multi-plant's magnitude, as is true also 
with a growth in an industry producing external 
economies of scale. With the exception of the physical 
dimension factor, they are due to the same indivisibilities, 
specialisation of functions and economy of massed 
resources to be found in the economies of scale related 
to a single plant. 
For example, a superior management team may have 
the excess capacity to use its ability over a wider 
range of products, a marketing team may be able to 
handle a greater number of items within the same area 
without increasing the number of calls to be made, a 
large crane may serve two factories, a computer with 
the addition of a small extra amount of memory could 
handle a payroll for 1,000 workers almost as easily 
as it could deal with 500 wage claims. Since in a 
merger no extra capacity is created, these effects 
will only be secured if either: 
a) the facility_involved is under-utilised so 
that its use can be extended without additional 
cost, or 
b) the facility is duplicated within two firms 
and it is possible to shut down one of them, 
or at least close one unit, and add some lesser 
~1 
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(11) 
increment to the remaining unit to allow it to perform 
the same amount of work (i.e. exploit the economies of 
scale inherent in an existing factor of production). 
These arguments for benefiting from indivisibilities seem 
reasonably convincing in the merger situation. The justification 
of acquisitions built on specialisation of function presents 
more di ffi cuI ty. As a fi rID grows in si ze, it may be able to 
develop a research department, permi t a marketin g di rector to 
be appointed, establish a personnel function where none 
previously existed, develop a dealer network or purchase 
specialised machinery. But these initiatives depend upon an 
increase in output to achieve their effect. This is not 
guaranteed in a takeover which redistributes control over an 
existing stock of human and physical assets. (11) On the face 
value_of these developments, we might expect them to introduce 
a new dynamic into the firm's operations, but the evidence 
on the success of mergers does not lead in this direction. 
The most recent British studies on the success of mergers have 
found no evidence to support the case for a positive beneficial 
effect. See Utton (214/1974), Meeks (153/1977), Cowling et al 
(54/1980), Newbould (166/1970) and Singh (198/1971). 
The di fficul ty is that capi tal inves tment creates new real assets, 
whereas without any physical change in the composition of assets, 
a merger is simply a financial transaction. J.R.Franks. in an 
unpublished doctoral thesis (75 /1980) addressed this problem 
specifically. His conclusions were that new technology could 
create the need for a revision of existing economies of scale, and 
that assymetry in the possession of information permit·ted acquirers 
to make gains based on "inside information". 'Ibis was particularly 
true of firms that had already built up an equity stake in the 
victim prior to the success ful merger bid. 
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(13) 
The effect of "massed economies" appear, on the 
other hand, to offer a potential merger bel'efit. 
Examples of such economies are :-
Reduced inventory in a multi-product 
stockholding system. 
Reduction in advertising cost. 
Reductions in the cost of raising funds. 
Reductions in the cost of capital (because 
of the greater security arising irom size 
and/or diversity of operation). (12)(13) 
There are, however, a number of other cos t 
advantages to size which depend not upon scale effects 
but upon the exercise of market "power". A firm which, 
through its command of a sizeable share of a given 
market, gains partial monopoly power, may be able for 
a time (and depending on the strength of "barriers to 
entry") earn above normal levels of profit. It may also 
be able to use its size to persuade suppliers to lower 
their prices. However, we are moving from the economies 
of scale category to the next category of analysis 
where the exercise of monopoly power is the central 
issue. 
To this list might be added the supposition of Williamson (227/1971) 
that a large multi-divisional firm is able to act as a mini-capital 
market transferring funds without transaction costs between divisions 
and a much closer monitoring of profitability. 
I f there are no tangib Ie gains to merger other than are-arrangement 
of the method of financing the firm, it is difficult to.justify a claim 
that the value of the equity will have increased. If the re-earnings 
of the two firms are imperfectly correlated, the variability of 
earnings may be reduced, thus reducing shareholder risk. However, 
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Note (13) continued ..• 
investors can individually attain the same reduction in risk as 
occurred wi th the merger by purch as in g equal proporti ons of the debt 
and equity of the two firms (Galai and Masulis, 77/1976). Merger 
involves additional costs such as the payment of a premi um to induce 
merger and the expenses involved in assimilating the organisations 
of the.two firms. Taking into account the inability to disengage if 
the amalgamation is unsuccessful, it would seem that the individual 
investor can achieve the same result at lower cost. Azzi (31 /1978) 
states that "any return distribution from a portfolio containing the 
debt and equi ty of a conglomerate could have been acquired through 
a portfolio containing some combination of the securities of the 
separate corporati ons". 
The abili ty to increase the debt ratio of the merged companies 
based on the greater securi ty of imperfectly correl ated earnings has 
been considered a few pages earlier where it was argued that the 
existing debt hoI ders would benefi t at the e>"'Pense of the shareholders 
in the newly-formed enterprise • 
. Thus mergers neither offer immediate gain to shareholders by 
lowering risk levels nor can these gains be secured by any short term 
adaptation of the combination of long term funds, unless positive 
bankruptcy costs can be shown to outweigh the abili ty of exis ting 
debt to capture gains from risk decrease. In the long term (when 
debt levels have been renegotiated) the risk reduction will be 
beneficial to shareholders however, since they can now secure the 
advantages of a lower cost of capital. Much may have happened before 
the long term arri ves, so that the gain is less on incentive to merger 
but rather an attribute of size. 
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2.3.4.(2) The Desire to Adapt Market Structure 
A merger will necessarily create a firm of larger 
size than hitherto. This larger size may turn the 
\ 
firm from being a "price-taker" to being a "price-maker". 
If the union confers market power on the enlarged 
enterprise, then it is able to affect the elasticity 
of demand for its products, either by manipulating 
output or price or both output and price. By this 
means the price of a product can be set at the point 
where marginal-revenue equals marginal cost (and 
marginal cost is not equal to average cost as in the 
long run case for perfect competition), and a monopoly 
profit is earned, calculated as the difference between 
the firm's average cost and the price multiplied 
by the total output. Whether or not abnormal profits 
can be retained depends upon the strength of barriers 
to entry within the industry. 
Since a merger neither creates new resources nor 
new sources of market demand, it is difficult to make 
the case for increased profitability from the 
combination without reference to "synergy" (i.e. an 
economy of scale becomes operative) or the possibility 
that the new firm will be able to increase its market 
share or develop new markets in the future. Monopoly 
profits, if available, offer however an instant source 
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of gain. The existence of barriers to entry is crucial 
since if these are low then firms would be encouraged 
to enter the industry (given the incentive that 
products are highly priced and therefore offer an 
abnormally high level of reward) until profits are 
bid down to the competitive level. 
Without further action on the part of the 
amalgamated firm, some barriers to entry are immediately 
established if a sufficient share of the market is 
captured. For example, if we assume that the supply 
curve is upward sloping, then the costs to a new 
entrant to the industry of inducing further supply 
will be higher than for established firms initially. 
The same will be true if supply inputs are controlled 
by long term contracts. Again, the enlarged firm 
with a market share firmly under its control can raise 
its capital at lower rates than a potential entrant, 
especially since size in itself will permit diversity 
of product, and hence via the route of reduced 
covariance between earnings from different products, 
a greater stability to its returns. A further 
immediate barrier exists since a new entrant will have 
to develop its own research and marketing facilities 
from the beginning, and since such ventures are risky, 
will face an increased cost of capital over that of 
sitting tenants. 
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It is easy to see, therefore, why this explanation 
has an attraction. The argument, to this point, 
has been presented in terms of a merger taking place 
within an industry. Where takeover crosses industrial 
boundaries, different reasoning applies. Horizontal 
mergers offer the advantages claimed above and will 
be particularly effective in static markets where an 
over-supply causes profitless competition to take 
place, and can be remedied by shutting down capacity, 
and where there is obviously little incentive for new 
firms to seek entry. Vertical takeovers are directly 
aimed at either controlling supply or outlets for 
production, and so implicitly erect barriers. Both 
types of acquiring behaviour can also result in new 
efforts to impede entry by advertising or collusive 
price behaviour, or by adopting a strategy of "limit 
pricing" (i.e. set prices which, while not yielding 
full monopoly profits, nevertheless ensure some of 
the, above-normal return, at the same time being low 
enough to discourage entrants). Of course, there are 
few industries in which one firm can gain an absolute 
monopoly position, but if there are only a few firms 
controlling a large share of the output, then the 
same sort of effect is possible if tacit or actual 
collusion exists. Sawyer, on the basis of the Census 
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of Production returns for 1975, calculated that of 
the 118 industries for which it was possible to 
calculate the share of the largest 5 firms for 
employment and net output (the total of industries 
covered by the Census was 155), these largest 5 firms 
employed on average in each industry 48.8% of the 
labour force and produced 50.6% of the net output 
(186/1981). 
Conglomerate takeovers, however, do not increase 
the size· of a firm within a given industry, nor do they 
provide control of a greater share of the market. 
They can nevertheless deploy resources in a manner 
which can possibly provide opportunities for benefiting 
from monopoly or, more probably, oligopoly situations. 
This can be achieved in. three possible ways by: 
a) Reciprocity - the diversified firm may be 
able to use its buying power to induce smaller 
specialist producers to purchase its own 
products or it may be able to make market 
sharing agreements with fellow conglomerates 
or it can possibly reach collusive accord 
with large firms in an existing market. 
b) Cross-subsidisation - using its wealth and 
the stability of its position in some markets, 
the conglomerate is able to indulge in short 
~8 
run price competition to drive weaker 
competitors out of existence. The very 
existence of such wealth may enable it 
to deter entry to the market because of the 
possibility that a price war would erupt 
and destroy the profits of the new firms. 
c) Financial strength - by using its financial 
power. heavy promotional expenditure may 
be employed or heavy capital investment 
or research expenditure, to build a commanding 
position in a trade at a pace which the 
indigenous firms are unable to match. 
The question of the possible monopoly 
consequences of conglomerate acquisitions has been a 
particular concern of U.S.A. Anti-Trust legislation 
because of the large proportion of such types of 
acquisition in that nation. The Federal Trade 
Commission reported that the proportion of mining and 
manufacturing mergers that were conglomerate in form 
increased from 63% in the period 1948-1964 to 80$ 
from 1965 to 1976 (14/1977) by number; by value the 
rise was from 59% to 81%. The much lower proportion 
of U.K. diversifying mergers (17% by number, 24% by 
value for industrial, commercial and financial mergers 
between 1965 and 1973 (Gribbin, 25/1974», has not 
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prevented similar worries arising in the U.K. 
The issue is presented in the literature in 
terms of the growth of dominant firms. Prais (173/1976) 
has demonstrated that the share of the hundred largest 
enterprises in manufacturing net output in the United 
Kingdom has grown from a 16% share in 1909, via 27% 
in 1953, to 40% by 1970. This aggregate concentration 
was much greater than that to be found in the 
individual trades (Armstrong and Silberston, '30/1965; 
Shepherd, 192/1966; Sawyer ,184/1971) • 
Market concentration ratios suffer from a number 
of well known defects; they do not measure any increase 
of import penetration, the product classification may 
be imperfect, and the influence of technical progress 
and the growth of new substitutes may be reducing 
the power of the dominant firms; nevertheless there 
is sufficient substance to the evidence to make a 
convincing case that a number of dominant firm 
situations have arisen in the U.K. economy. 
The dominant firms being large and normally 
diversified have often actively been involved in 
mergers. In the individual trades, the finding has 
been that internal growth was more important as a 
source of concentration prior to the 1950s (Hart and 
Pr.ais, 87/1956), but since that date mergers have had 
a substantial effect on concentration growth. (Utton, 
213/1971) . 
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2.3.4.(3) Normal Investment Criteria 
One of the most important decisions facing a 
firm is the investment of its capital funds. Capital 
outlays are mainly large in size. and the decision. 
once having been taken. is often irreversible and puts 
the finance invested at risk for long periods. It 
is the most essential function of an industrial or 
commercial company. since the very purpose of embracing 
limited liability status is to ensure that sufficient 
capital sums can be amassed in order that the firm 
may produce a product or a service in a manner which 
will yield sufficient return to compensate the 
providers of the funds for yielding up its use over 
a period of time. There is a very adequate and 
successful range of principles available which offer 
guidance on investment within the neo-classical theory 
of the firm, and mergers can be seen as a way in 
which .. investment is undertaken according to these 
principles. If one accepts this viewpoint. that 
acquisitions are normal investment decisions made in 
the light of profit-maximising criteria. then the only 
issue left to be explored is the explanation of why 
"external" purchase of assets is preferred to growth 
by internal means. 
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Because capital investment involves a time 
dimension, not only with respect to the outlay of 
funds but also with respect to the measurement of 
profitability, the assessment of profit-maximisation 
is carried out in relation to the welfare of the 
owners of the current shares. Welfare is calculated 
in terms of the price at which the shares sell. Thus 
a profitable merger is defined as one which raises 
the value of these shares more than would have 
occurred if no merger had taken place. Internal 
investment is justified by the same criteria, that is 
that it should increase present share prices relative 
to what they would have been if no investment had 
taken place. 
Such a yardstick depends on a theory of how share 
prices are determined. The argument is that the 
returns arising from an investment will express 
themselves as either 
a) a stream of dividends extending to infinity, 
or 
b) a stream of dividends over some finite span 
of time, followed by the sale of the shares 
at that time. 
discounted by a cost of capital (which is a measure 
of the price of capital to the firm which incorporates 
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EQUATION 2.1 
within itself a judgement of the riskiness of these 
flows). 
For an extensive discussion of the issues 
involved in this definition, see "The Profitability 
of Growth by Mergers" by Alberts (29/1966). 
In the circumstances, a firm will bid for another 
firm if the value which the potential acquirer places 
on the victim is greater than the value placed on it 
by the current owners. If we express the capital 
value of a firm as : 
N 
.V = ~ 
t=1 
(1 - r) P
t 
(1 + k) t 
v = Capital Value of firm expressed as 
the discounted value of expected 
earnings. 
r = Retention ratio 
Expected profits at time t (including 
the value of the shares sold at the 
end of period N) 
k = Discount rate which is also the cost 
of capital (adjusted for uncertainty) 
to the firm 
t = time period extending from period 1 to 
the end of period N. 
Then the value of the firm to its current owners may 
be expressed as V(o) and the value of the firm to the 
potential acquiring firm as V(a) then a merger will take 
place ~nly if 
V (0) • 
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It should be noted that the formulation of this 
mathematical model of valuation assumes that all 
investment is financed by retained earnings. In order 
that this simplification may be considered reasonable, 
it is necessary to accept that investment using 
retained earnings is equivalent in terms of shareholder 
returns to the payment of dividends required for 
investment and the raising of new capital to replace 
the dividends paid out. This has been generally 
accepted as a reasonable approximation in financial 
literature since the argument was first advanced by 
Modigliani and Miller (.160/1961). despite some obvious 
difficulties with respect to transaction costs and 
the differing tax treatment of dividends (which are 
income) and capital gains. 
In order to explain merger activity. it is 
therefore necessary to discover reasons why a valuation 
discrepancy should arise between th,e owners of a firm 
and its potential acquirers. The theory assumes the 
existence of a capital market which evaluates with 
reasonable efficiency the price of shares quoted on 
the Stock Exchange. It has little relevance to 
private firms whose shares are not traded and therefore 
neither provide the information on the value of the 
firm nor offer opportunity to buy its shares in a 
takeover raid. 
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The question of the efficiency of the U.K. capital 
market is an empirical issue. Efficiency can be defined 
in this context as the assumption that in the market, 
prices reflect all relevant information. The market 
value of a firm should therefore reflect the present 
value of all existing assets with respect to their 
earning capacity, plus the present value of future 
growth opportunities. Most of the studies of this 
hypothesis have been American in origin, but the 
studies done on the U.K. capital market do not seem 
to have diverged form the view that capital markets 
in the U.K. and U.S.A. are reasonably efficient. The 
standard manner of testing efficiency derives from 
a division of efficiency into the three possible forms 
that efficiency might take, (see Fama, 66/1965), which 
are empirically possible to examine. These are: 
a) Weak-Form Efficiency - that current prices 
reflect all existing information to be 
derived from statistics of past price 
changes and trading volume. 
b) Semi-Strong Form Efficiency - that current 
prices not only reflect historical price changes 
but all publicly available knowledge relevant 
to establishing a price for a company's shares. 
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c) Strong-Form Efficiency - that equity prices 
reflect all relevant information, both publicly 
available and also that known to company 
insiders. 
Confirmation of the weak-form test is to be 
found in Kendall (106/1953) for various U.K. indices 
dealing with shares and commodities. Franks ,Broyles 
and Hecht (7.3/1977) were able to show that market 
prices were able to anticipate mergers with a lead of 
at least three months. which appears to indicate that 
the market was able to deduce from available 
information the probability of a merger occurring with 
the resultant increase in share price of the potential 
victim in anticipation of the premium normally 
required in order to ensure the acceptance of the 
offer. 
The testing of strong-form efficiency 1s 
obviously difficult, since the trading based on insider 
information is difficult to detect as it is forbidden 
by the takeover code and, in the case of Directors 
who owe a "fiduciary duty" to their company, is a 
breach of common law. (During 1981 an amendment.to 
the Company's Act made it also a criminal offence). 
American studies have shown that insiders can benefit 
from privileged information (Lorie and Neiderhoffer 
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(14) 
(137/1968). and Jaffe (100/1974». but that "mutual 
funds" (an American investment company which uses 
its capital to invest in the securities of other 
companies) on average did not perform better than 
the market index (see for example Jensen '(101/1968). 
On the evidence available. the discrepancy of 
valuation of a company does not seem to be due to any 
serious distortions of information generally available; 
therefore other reasons must be found for divergence 
in expectation concerning a company's prospects. (14) 
If one considers Equation 2.1, the only factors 
which are open to conflict of opinion are in the flow 
of expected profits and the discount factor k. 
However. one proposal by Gort (82/1969) relates the 
valuation discrepancy to timing differences between 
the prospects of firms at different stages in the 
business cycle. All these explanations are discussed 
in the following sub-sections. 
One criticism of the above judgement is that although the share 
price appears to reflect available information efficiently, this 
information (mainly derived from accounts) may be of poor quality 
and therefore may not lead to an efficient allocation of resources. 
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(a) Differing Profit Expectations 
The findings on the "Efficient Market 
Hypothes is" that share prices reflect the market's 
estimate of a company's fortunes, does not rule 
out the possibility that the managers of an 
acquiring firm may have knowledge of market and 
product developments not generally foreseen by 
the market. This is highly probable in the case 
of horizontal and vertical mergers (though less 
so in the case of diversifying takeovers). It 
is noticeable that many companies, on receiving 
an unwelcome bid, make efforts to revise the 
profit forecast and revalue existing assets, as 
occurred for example in the ICI bid in 1961 for 
Courtaulds. It has been suggested that many 
takeovers occurring between 1950 and 1965 were 
based on the failure of the managers of acquired 
firms to take inflation into account by by 
revaluing property and other assets. However, 
since the advent of Clore and Slater Walker, the 
publicity given to asset stripping and the 
general realisation of the devastating effects 
of inflation, this is hardly likely to be still 
a common case. 
But why· should the victim's management 
team have not taken up the . opportunity 
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themselves? Two possibilities present themselves. 
In the first situation, the management is just 
plainly inept and we have the concept of mergers 
as a control mechanism which aids the beneficial 
distribution of capital by ensuring that it falls 
into the hands of those best able to use it 
(see H.G.Manne, 141/1965~ and Hindley, 96/1970). 
The other possible explanation does not conflict 
with the "market for corporate control" hypothesis, 
but adds a further reason for the victim company's 
failure to exploit opportunities. This is that 
the management have chosen to pursue growth at 
the expense of profitability, as propounded by 
Marris (145/1964). This reason for discrepancy 
in valuation may be summarised as the "better 
management" hypothesis. 
The arguments for gain from merger by reason 
of economies of scale or adaptation of market 
structure have already been recited. These gains 
are equally applicable as the target for a normal 
investment decision. They may well transform 
the level of expected profitability. It cannot 
be held against.the existing management that they 
have not fully exploited all economies of scale. 
This may be true with respect to plant economies 
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of scale, but not those related to the size of 
the firm, which depend on the restructuring of 
control of existing assets. Monopoly profits 
are only available to a large firm with a 
sUbstantial market share, and therefore their 
attainment is not open to an individual firm 
without such market power except by the route of 
slow internal growth. 
b) Differing Discount Factors 
In assessing the value of a flow of net cash 
returns to an investment, account must be taken 
of the timing of these returns and the riskiness 
of the returns in determining the discount factor 
to be used. The investment must cover at least 
the cost of the capital employed, and possibly 
show a surplus over this amount. 
There 1s a great number of theoretical 
problems involved in specifying the cost of 
capital generated by Modigliani and Miller's 
seminal article (159/1958) which revolves round 
the problem of how to assess the impact of 
additional gearing (1.e. use of debt) on the costs 
of equity finance ariSing from the transfer of 
risk between the two major components of capital 
as the level of debt rises. This argument will 
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not be pursued because it does not affect the issues 
currently under review in any major way. There are 
also various ways in which risk is taken into account, 
either through the "certainty equivalent method" 
which defines the profits flow in terms of values 
which would make the investor indifferent between 
receiving the flow as forecast or a certain sum, or by 
adjusting the risk premium. '!be risk premium may be 
adjusted either with reference to the total variance 
of the risky returns or by use of the "capital asset 
(15 ) 
pri dng" model which employs the "market securi ty 
line" to assess the increase or reduction in "systematic 
risk" (i .e. that risk which cannot be diversified away). 
In order to avoid entanglement in a wide range 
of theoretical issues, it is necessary to assume that 
the firms involved have determined a cost of capital 
and incorporated it in some form of risk adjustment. 
If we can accept this, we can then seek to establish 
why the discount factor should differ between an 
acquiring firm and the company which it proposes to 
capture. 
In perfect and complete markets a different 
discount rate to be used in valuing an income stream 
In this text the capital asset pricing model generally attributed 
to Professor Sharpe (190/1964) and Lintner (134/1965) will be used. 
Other versions of the model exist, for example that developed by 
F .Black ( 40/1972) . 
211 
. (16) 
cannot exist. It is the fundamental purpose of a 
capi tal market to bring together individuals wi th 
different time preferences governing present and 
future consumption and by borrowing and lending permi t 
each to achieve the desired end; in the process a 
market rate of interest is established which clears 
the market (16). It is only by locating a source of 
capital market imperfection that a difference in the 
valuation of the same stream of income can occur. 
Examples of such imperfections do exist but would 
normally be limited to small, privately beld companies. 
For instance, take the case of a small company 
whose owners are approaching retirement and need to 
sell the company in order to acquire present income. 
The assets the company possesses are related to a 
specific trade and there are few possible purchasers 
of such assets. They may be driven, therefore, to 
discount future earnings at a mucb higher rate than a 
corporation with a potentially infinite life expectancy. 
In another situation a company with splendid 
growth prospects may be small and, because of recent 
foundation, unable to demonstrate its ability to 
"Through the alterations in the income stream provided by loans or 
sales, the marginal degree of impatience for all individuals in 
the market are brought into equality with each other and with the 
market rate of interest." (I.Fisher - "The Theory of Interest" 
(Page 32, 71/1930). 
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employ funds efficiently. As a result, 1t may have to 
rely for finance on bank lending and trade credit,. 
Because of potential discrepancies between assets 
invested over the long term and short term liabilities, 
it may value immediate returns over more distant ones. 
Such circumstances may e>..-plain the many takeovers 
by large companies of small private firms, but there is 
no reason to believe that quoted companies suffer from 
. these imperfections. 
Mueller (163/1969) has produced another 
explanation of why the discount rate of an acquirer 
may be lower than that of the acquired firm. He 
envisages that managers may follow a growth maximisation 
policy whiCh is not in the interests of their 
shareholders and are ahle to do so because of the 
existence of retained funds. In assessing the return 
required from this source the stockholder will compare 
the yield from employment of these funds within the 
firm as against the investments available elsewhere 
within the capital market and require a return 
equivalent to the market rate for a given risk level. 
Managers. however. will see Ii ttle benefit to their 
growth ambitions in external investment in securities 
of other firms since they will not contribute to the 
expansion of the size of the firm. They will therefore 
heavily discount such returns and apply a lower discount 
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rate to physical investment in taking over the 
assets of another company than the stockholders of 
that company may consider appropriate. It is doubtful 
if the market will for any period of time sustain two 
investment rates; once the policy is understood 
shareholders of the growth maximising firm will sell 
their holdings and purchase the higher market rate 
of return available to them. 
But the discount rate not only reflects the time 
prefe,rence for return but also the risk of that return. 
It may be thought that investors in a Company A who 
have a higher risk aversion than the'market as a whole 
might supply the situation of differing discount rates 
for which we are searching, but this is not the case. 
Assume that the circumstance exists in which the 
marginal investor in Company A has a greater aversion 
to risk than is common and therefore seeks to apply a 
higher than normal discount rate to a g~ven stream of 
earnings. Other inves tors will perceive that the 
shares of Company A for a given earning potential are 
undervalued; they will therefore sell their existing 
holdings and buy shares in A from their current 
possessors. This process will continue tintil such 
time as the discount rate applied by A's shareholders 
is brought into conformity with the market rate. 
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However, although the argument that different 
levels of risk aversion can survive in the market has 
been refuted, there are conditions under which takeover 
will alter the risk level of an acquired firm because 
diversity of the investment set of the enlarged firm 
can produce a lower variation in earnings. The effect 
would be to reduce financial risk and could permit 
the acquiring firm to discount the earnings of the 
potential victim at a lower rate. 
Two circumstances in which a merger may reap 
advantage from the reduction in earnings variability 
are :-
(i) Borrowing costs decline with the 
size of the firm. 
This is due to the fact that mergers between 
companies whose income streams are not 
perfectly correlated reduce the probability 
of bankruptcy and hence the risk of lending 
debt to the firm. This proposition can be 
found in Lewellen (132/1971) and Lintner (136/1971) 
who therefore suggest that "large firms can 
refinance the debt of small independent firms 
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at lower economic cost resulting in a 
genuine capital gain through merger." 
Evidence of this process is demonstrated 
by Weston and Mansinghka (219/1971). 
Their article deals with a defensive theory 
of conglomerate mergers in which firms 
making low returns use takeovers in order 
to raise their performance, but the essential 
mechanism for this achievement is that the 
acquiring companies use large amounts of 
debts. 
(ii) The Pooling ot Imperfectly Correlated 
Income Streams will produce a Superior 
Risk/Return Asset. 
The reasoning here is that building on the 
work fo Markowitz (143/1952) and defining 
risk in terms of the variability of returns, 
it is possible to construct an effective 
measure of the amount of risk associated 
with each level of return. This permits 
greater precision in selecting investments 
to add to the existing portfolio of assets 
of a firm, since imperfectly correlated 
returns will produce lower variance and 
hence reduced risk. Additionally, as well 
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EQUATION 2.2 
as gaining the benefit of mean-variance 
efficient portfolios, if we make the 
fundamental assumption of the capital asset 
pricing model (see Sharpe. 191/1971 and 
Lintner, 134/1965) that the capital market 
as a whole had adopted a mean-variance 
efficient portfolio approach, then we can 
select investments on the basis of the 
Sharpe-Lintner model: 
Expected Return. 
Risk free rate of return (i.e. 
return on short term treasury 
bills, et.) 
Expected Return on the Market 
Portfolio (i.e. that Portfolio 
which in equilibrium contains 
all the risky assets in the 
securities market and whose risk 
is therefore by definition equal 
to the risk of the market as a 
whole). 
= The Beta coefficient measuring 
systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable 
risk) for the investment relative 
to the risk of the market as a 
whole. 
The argument for increased return here is 
twofold. First that by writing imperfectly 
correlated cash flows there will be 
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diversification benefits that will lower 
the risk, and secondly that since large 
diversified firms can use the capital asset 
pricing model to estimate accurately that 
proportion of the risk remaining after 
diversification, they will be able to assess 
that risk more precisely than a small 
undiversified firm which will not have 
calculated its risk and therefore will 
have to deal with the totality of variance 
with respect to its returns. Obviously 
the reasoning is as applicable to 
conglomerate firms as it is to large multi-
product firms, since the portfolio may 
consist of subsidiary companies in the one 
case and individual products in the other. 
Levy and Sarnat (130/1970) have 
pointed out that the case for risk pooling 
is flawed since it can equally be achieved 
by the portfolio diversification of individual 
stockholders. Therefore if individual 
investors have been following the precepts 
of the capital asset pricing model, they 
will already hold their preferred risk-return 
portfolio which is superior in terms of 
the investor's utility function to any that 
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(17) 
a firm might devise. We therefore have to 
assume some form of market imperfection 
to justify mergers; two which immediately 
spring to mind are 
(1) that corporate and personal 
leverage may not be good substitutes 
because individuals are not protected 
by limited liability, their costs of 
borrowing may differ from those of 
firms ,or in using share holdings 
as collateral for personal borrowing 
they may not be able to meet margin 
(17) 
calls, and 
(it) that individual investors may lack 
the expertise of managers in terms 
of information available to them and 
, (18) 
the evaluation of that information. 
Financial intermediaries may apply "home-made" leverage on behalf 
of individual investors and thus ensure the efficiency of the 
arbitrage process, despite the inadequacies of individual investors 
stated in the text. 
(18) The modern theory of investment decision making based on "efficient 
capi tal markets" and portfolio analysis has focussed attention on the 
value of accounting information. It has been variously pointed out 
that accounting information has not been adequately related to modern 
theories of decision making (Lev, 129/1974), that accounting reports 
are required by several different classes of user and may therefore 
need different forms of analysis (Tweedie, 211/1975)·, and that 
increasing regulations of accounting standards has produced standardised 
rituals which take account of neither user needs nor research findings 
(Lee, 126/1977). On the question of whether changes in accounting 
techniques (including financial manipulation) affect stock prices, the 
published research seems to indicate that investors are able to 
recognise economic reall ty despite differences in reporting modes 
(for example, Ball, 33/1972). 
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c) Merger Activity as an Aspect of Bargaining 
Behaviour 
The idea of a bargain is that a temporary 
advantage can be exploited. The price 
arrived at is therefore the product of a 
temporary disequilibrium. Bargains can arise 
from acquisitions only where there are 
differing expectations on the income earning 
potential of a firm. If there is no such 
mis-match of expectation, then the share 
price of the victim will correctly discount 
the expected flow of dividends (or its 
equivalent in terms of increased capital 
gain from a rise in the value of a firm) 
and no bargain can exist. The managers of 
the acquiring firm must have more favourable 
expectations than the present holders of 
the shares because if the shareholders of 
the acquiring firm had the favourable 
expectations and therefore the view that 
the acquiree's shares were undervalued, then 
it is open to them to make a gain by buying 
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the shares themselves. The weight of, 
evidence, as already stated, is that apart 
from those in possession of "inside 
information" (Lorie and Neiderhoffer, 137/1968, 
and Jaffe, 100/1947) "efficient capital 
markets" which are defined as markets in which 
prices reflect all relevant information, 
preclude mos t windfall gains. See for 
example, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(65/1969) in their study of the effect of 
scrip dividends on the value of shares. 
There is evidence to show that the 
shareholders of an acquired firm benefit 
from over-evaluation of their holding by 
the purchase price offered during a bid 
(Newbould, 166/1970 and Franks, Broyles and 
Hecht, 73/1977), but this can hardly be 
advanced as a reason for acquisition. 
The article by Gort (82/1969) on 
"An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers" 
has been mel:ltioned previouSly in an 
earlier chapter. His view that "mergers 
stem from valuation differences, they are 
akin to other purchases and sales of income 
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producing assets, including most transactions 
in real estate and securities generally" is the 
classic statement of the "bargain" explanation. 
He relates this to the fluctuation in share 
values that occur to movements in security 
prices and to changes in technology. He then 
goes on to show that whereas the changes in 
technology may provide the motive, since these 
changes will be incorporated in the price of 
the share if the present value of anticipated 
earnings is correctly assessed,there can be no 
more than average gain in making an acquisition 
unless prices are rising rapidly. (He does not 
deal with the collary that value discrepancies 
should also occur during a period of sharp price 
decline and yet it has been shown that mergers 
decrease sharply during such periods). 
The fundamental argument of Gort's article 
is about why, at a particular time, external 
growth is favoured over internal growth. Its 
basic assumption is that normal investment criteria 
is sufficient explanation for all other aspects 
of merger activity. 
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(d) The Exercise of Managerial Discretion 
The traditional theory of the firm performs 
very badly with respect to the arguments for 
merger. If we consider the characteristics 
of perfect competition, some of the reasons for 
this become explicit. Using the characteristics 
to be found in Cohen and Cyert (49/1975), these 
are found to be: 
i) Homogenous Product 
. ii) Perfect Knowledge 
iii) Profit Maximisation 
iv) Atomistic Competition 
v) Free Entry and Exit of Resources. 
It is also static in nature, distinguishing only 
between short term equilibrium and long term 
equilibrium. 
Since atomistic competition is the stated 
environment, there are no gains~to be made from 
the securing of market power. Since perfect 
knowledge prevails, we must assume that any 
economies of scale have been fully realised. 
If a firm possesses an asset such as for example 
a research laboratory which could benefit two 
firms in amalgamation, then the victim firm 
will sell at a price which will reflect that 
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asset, and so there can be no more than a normal 
profit (i.e. defined as that return to the 
capital employed which will ensure that the 
marginal unit of capital is compensated for its 
investment in the firm) can be earned. There 
are no benefits to diversification since the 
individual investor can select his own portfolio 
and achieve -the same effects without the need 
for firms to join together. The cost of capital 
will be a constant, since funds are freely 
available to the point where they will earn their 
marginal reward. As there is no risk, the use 
of debt and equity becomes pointless, and only 
one form of security will exist. 
The fact that the theory of perfect 
competition was failing as an explanatory and 
predictive device with respect to the theory of 
the firm was evident in other areas of business 
activity, such as priCing, output and industrial 
structure, and has led to several attempts to 
reformulate that theory. What they all have in 
common is the view that the firm is not a totally 
reactive decision making unit (reactive in the 
sense of constrained by its environment so that 
the only options open to it are those imposed 
by that environment), but that a firm has 
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discretion to choose several courses of action 
in order to move towards a number of related or 
competing goals other than that of profit 
maximisation. The two main paths of development 
have been towards "behavioural" theories of the 
firm (see for example Cyert and March, 56/1963) 
and "managerial" theories (such as proposed by 
J.H. Wi lliamson(223/1966), Baumol (35/1959) and 
Marris (145/1964». The "behavioural" theories 
are concerned with the decision making sequence 
within firms; the "managerial" theories assume 
, 
that there is a divergence of viewpoint between 
the managers and shareholders within a firm and 
that the aims of the firm are more likely to 
reflect the utility function of those managers. 
The managerial theories obviously relate to 
quoted firms and not private companies. The 
behavioural theories are dealing with large 
organisations of sufficient size for there to 
be a conflict of goals. 
The behavioural theories being concerned 
with the strife of conflicting objectives in 
organisation has cast little light on takeovers. 
Baumol's theory, which has sales expansion as the 
managerial targe~, and.O.E.Williamson's model (224/1964) 
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which aims at increasing the "preferred" expenditure 
of managers on salaries, power, prestige and 
security, do not give specific attention to 
mergers. Only Marris, who chooses for the 
managerial utility function a balance between 
the security of the managers in their jobs and 
growth of the firm, has produced a well articulated 
theory of takeovers. By the Marris theory, 
managers who see acquisitions as an obvious and 
quick way to expand a firm's size are willing to 
sacrifice some profits and consequent present 
value of a firm's stock in order to achieve sales 
or asset growth. Although Marris places his 
theory in a dynamic setting of the multi-product 
growth firm, his view on why takeovers occur is 
that which has been described as due to the 
normal investment criterion. A firm will be taken 
over when the value placed upon it by the' 
acquirer exceeds the value of the company to be 
taken over, as expressed by the capital market 
on the price of its shares. What Marris does is 
to advance a further reason why the expected 
profits may differ between the two parties, which 
is that the victim company has depressed its 
anticipated profits by seeking growth in turnover 
or net assets at the expense of profitability. 
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2.4. MOTIVATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF MERGER ACTIVITY 
2.4.1. The Success of the Classification Scheme 
The merger classification scheme of the preceding section 
was not chosen because of some inherent logic in the classification 
system but because a reading of the literature indicated that 
this was a reflection of the major patterns of explanation adopted. 
It is clear that the classifications are not mutually exclusive 
and do not even approach success at implementing that principle. 
It is obvious that a merger which aims at securing a monopoly 
position in a market is in no way incompatible with a desire to 
maximise profits, since the excess returns from monopoly 
would serve this end well. Nor are the managerial theories 
adequately distinguished from what I have labelled "adaptation 
of market structure" theories. The need for "organisational 
slack" can only be adequately realised in an environment 
which permits excess funds to be accumulated, and this is a far 
cry fro~ the binding constraints of competitive theory. 
In an article by Solow (203/1971) in which it is argued 
that there is great difficulty in distinguishing between various 
theories of the firm, an extremely perceptive comment is made 
to the effect that the "growth" theories of the firm are normally 
couched in terms of "rate of growth" rather than "growth" itself. 
But if firms wish to maximise the rate of growth, then this is 
not compatible with achieving large size, because size, with its 
/ 
concomitant difficulties of co-ordination and the strain it 
places upon managerial talent, does not aid the chances of 
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(19) 
achieving fast growth. Firms who sought fast "rates of growth" 
would presumably be constantly divesting themselves of assets 
in order to maintain the lean dimensions of the optimum growth 
rate, and this does not apeear to be the case. (19) One is 
easily led to the conclusion that what is really being sought 
is the security of large size which is buttressed by barriers 
to entry, access to capital at reduced rates, and other 
advantages which size confers. 
If one considers the classifications closely, it appears 
that the first category "Economies of Scale" is about technical 
ways in which either profit is maximised or market power secured. 
The other categories, "Adaptation of Market Structure", "Normal 
Investment Criteria" and the "Exercise of Managerial Discretion", 
while not devoid of technical instruction of how given ends might 
be achieved, are principally about motives that lie behind 
takeover activity. 
The "Adaptation·of Market Structure" is concerned with the 
motive of achieving monopoly positions in a market. The "Normal 
Investment Criteria" is dealt with in terms of neo-classical 
motives of maximising profitability. The final grouping, the 
"Exercise of Managerial Discretion" supposes that the interests 
of the stockholders and managers are not coincident, and that 
therefore such firms will reflect the managerial dominance that 
is believed to exist in the separation of ownership from control. 
If the distinguishing feature of a Social Science is that the 
The evidence to be found in Singh and Whittington (197/1968) and 
Hymer and Pashigian (98/1962) that there is some tendency for large 
firms to have an average growth rate higher than that of smaller 
companies does not refute this conclusion since it is also known 
that the variability of growth diminishes with size, that is to say, 
that smaller firms have both higher and lower growth rates. 
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activity must be interpreted in the light of the meaning of 
that activity, then the use of "motive" as a classifying factor 
may produce sharper and better defined groupings than will 
occur if one seeks to classify, as is common in the literature, 
on the basis of technical means of achieving gain by way of 
takeovers. 
It is possible to consider the analysis of merger activity 
from another vantage point and, as it turns out, this change of 
analysis strengthens the conclusions already reached. 
Instead of addressing attention to the theoretical literature, 
one can examine the research concerned with testing the data 
in order to discover the important themes that have been subject 
to attempts at verification. There is no simple way of defining 
the importance of various topics in empiric research. A simple 
count of articles on each type of topic is not satisfactory, 
since the quality of work must also be important. It must 
therefore be an act of judgement to define the major problems 
of the assessment of merger theories as falling into the 
following three classes: 
a) Have mergers been profitable? 
b) Have mergers increased market concentration? 
c) Have mergers (as a means of diversification) assured 
the security of the management of a firm (by means of 
reduction and stabilisation of risk) while permitting 
them to indulge their desires for growth or increased 
size? 
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It takes little imagination to turn each of these questions 
into a form which emphasises the predictions that would follow 
from an explanation of a theory based on the motives involved. 
Thus : 
a) If the motivation of the firm in undertaking mergers is to 
increase the profitability of the firm, then, assuming 
that shareholders and managers are rational and capable of 
learning from their own and others' experience, we would 
expect to find that most mergers have increased the return 
on the joint assets of the firms involved or, in an 
equivalent criterion, raised the market value of the jOint 
firms. 
b) If the motivation of the firm is to secure a position in 
a market such that, in conjunction with other major firms 
within an oligopolistic market, It is able to reap a 
share of monopoly profits, then, assuming that managers 
are rational and capable of learning from the past 
experience of themselves and others, we would expect to 
find that high levels of merger activity In a market would 
have led to a situation where a large share of that market 
lles in the hands of three or four firms, and we would 
also expect to discover that the increase in merger activity 
that has been noted with respect to the U.K. economy since 
the 1950s would have led to an overall rise in concentration 
in markets taken as a whole. 
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c) If the interests of managers and shareholders of a firm 
diverge, we would expect that managers would be motivated 
to increase their power and prestige within the firm and 
also to be wary with respect to the security of their 
position. Mergers, by definition, increase the size of 
an acquiring firm, but we would not expect managers to do 
so at the expense of the security of their jobs. It could 
therefore be predicted that managers would seek to increase 
the size of the assets under their control, but to do so 
in ways that would not' increase the risk attaching to the 
returns on those assets. 
The classes cover the most significant areas of current 
research into the explanations of merger activity. One large 
body of research is omitted by this analysis, i.e. that related 
to the implications of merger activity for social welfare. This 
takes as a starting point the assumption that mergers are aimed 
at monopoly advantage and then searches for measures of whether 
the social gain to the economy derived from the cost reductions 
stemming from economies of scale, etc., outweigh the loss of 
consumer surplus. The most famous exposition of this theme is 
to be found in O.E.Williamson's "Economies as an Anti-Trust 
Defense" (225/1968) and is a central concern of studies relating 
to the workings of anti-monopoly policy in the U.K. and the 
U.S.A. But these enquiries are not concerned with explaining 
why mergers occur (except perhaps tangentially) and so are 
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outside the scope of the classification system that has been 
outlined. 
If motive was unambiguously reflected in behaviour, and 
behaviour a sure guide to motive, then one would have the greatest 
confidence in asserting that the three categories of explanation 
would act as a main summary of the types of explanation to be 
found in the research literature, and a starting point for anyone 
wishing to advance understanding of mergers and contribute to 
the development of the subject. The behaviour of firms and 
managers is, however, open to a variety of interpretations and 
the same activity of takeover can often be accepted as evidence 
for profit maximisation, as a move to gain market power or as 
an exercise of managerial discretion at the expense of a firm's 
shareholders. Had Kuhn, Popper and Lakatos not produced 
their seminal works, then the next move in a research strategy 
would have been to find a "crucial experiment" which would allow 
differentiation of motive. This is the move attempted by Reid 
(181/1968) when he sought to discover by analysing 430 mergers 
consummated between 1951 and 1961, whether they performed better 
in relation to increase 1n sales or increase in shareholder 
wealth, as against 48 firms who made no takeovers within the 
same time span. On the basis that, if merging firms scored more 
highly on increase in sales (and in fact heavy merger activity 
was shown in his study to have this effect), and if non-merging 
companies served their shareholders' interests more nearly, 
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then one could determine whether managerial interest was the 
dominant motive in acquiring behaviour. Radice (178/1971) 
prepared a "crucial experiment" in which profit rates and growth 
rates were compared for owner controlled and managerially 
controlled firms, taking as his sample 89 British firms in 
food, electrical engineering and the textile industry, over 
the years 1957 to 1967. His hypothesis was that there could be 
no conflict of interest between owners and managers in owner 
controlled firms, and therefore behavioural differences would 
reflect motivational differences. (Differences were found but 
unfortunately they were the converse to what the theory predicted). 
The hard fact is that the "growth of knowledge" thesis denies 
the existence of "crucial experiments" in the way that term 
is normally employed (not, of course, that significant experiments 
do not occur), which is to say that a conflict of theories is 
resolved in a single experimental stroke. The cruel dilemma 
posed for research by the "mature falsification hypothesis" 'is 
that theories are never overthrown by a Single act but instead 
crumble away as anomalies mount and the research programme 
degenerates. Therefore the problem posed for research work is 
how best to assist in this process of testing and "crumbling". 
One further difficulty of theory development must also be 
faced. An assumption runs through the previous paragraphs that 
motive may be difficult to interpret as expressed in behaviour, 
but that motive itself is unambiguous. It is perfectly possible 
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that the aim of a merger may involve motives of profit 
maximisation, monopoly creation and the service of managerial 
interests in ways that even the performers of the action 
themselves could not unscramble. 
Since the last paragraph has rendered what, hopefully, 
was a satisfactory argument into an unsatisfying one, it is 
time to recapitulate that argument and summarise the steps in 
that argument. The aim of this chapter is to justify explicitly 
the research strategy that was adopted, and to show the manner 
in which the research carried out could potentially assist in 
the development of a theory of merger behaviour. Working within 
the "growth of knowledge" paradigm, an attempt has been made 
to assess the existing state of merger theory. In order to do 
this, a classification of the present state of the theory has 
been developed. The problems of classification were shown to 
be difficult and imprecise. In order to improve that 
classification, it has been argued that if one takes "meaning" 
into account, and the assumption has been that one cannot carry 
out research in the Social Sciences without taking meaning into 
account, then the classification can be refined into a form which 
exhibits the desirable characteristic of permitting the existing 
theories to be more clearly distinguished. Although it must 
remain a matter of judgement, the description of theories on 
the basis of differing motivational drives appears to serve 
that purpose. However, it transpires that the clarity deriving 
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from explaining activity in terms of a single motive, although 
useful as a means of organising data, is probably not a realistic 
-
way of characterising the activity. The behaviour to be found 
in the real world is more varied and untidy than can be 
encompassed by such simplifying assumptions. What is in fact 
raised is the problem of how much a theory must have descriptive 
reality as well as a good record of prediction. Before turning 
to deal with this problem, the predictive performance of the 
motivational division of theories will be assessed. 
2.4.2. Merger Theories as Predictive Devices 
Whatever the difficulties involved in establishing a 
theory, whether it is a psychological act of serendipity or by 
using induction for a task which in strict logic, it is unable 
to perform; there is common ground in the Physical and Social 
Sciences in that a theory should produce a deductive test that 
will permit a prediction to be confirmed or disconfirmed. 
There may be room for dispute as to whether a successful 
prediction confirms a theory or whether a successful prediction 
fails to disconfirm it, but there is no controversy concerning 
the fact that without any predictive consequences a theory 
cannot be other than a speculation. The motivational theories 
of merger have been subject to a good deal of verification and 
therefore it is possible to make an assessment as to how well 
each theory has functioned as an explanatory instrument. 
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2.4.2.(1) An Assessment of the Profit-Maximisation Theory 
Writing in 1970, Hogarty (97/1970) drew the following 
conclusions about the profitability of mergers: 
"What can fifty years of research tell us about the 
profitability of mergers? Undoubtedly the most 
significant result of this research has been that 
no-one who has undertaken a major empirical study 
of mergers has concluded that mergers are profitable, 
i.e. profitable in the sense of being 'more profitable' 
than alternative forms of investment. A host of 
researchers, working at different points of time and 
utilising different analytical techniques and data, 
have but one major difference: wether mergers have a 
neutral or negative impact on profi tabUi ty." 
Tbe article is American in origin, but Meeks (153/1977) 
in examining 233 U.K. acquisitions in the period 1964-1972, found 
that in contrasting the three years prior to merger with a 
number of years following, merger profitabilIty showed a mild 
but definite decline. 
A survey to be found in Utton (214/1974) of 13 studies of 
the impact of acquisitions on profitability comes to the verdict 
that acquisitions worsened the profit situation of the acquiring 
firms; six studies found no difference between acquiring firms 
and non-acquirers, and in 2 cases only was an improvement in 
profitability found. In the study that followed this summary. 
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Utton compared 39 acquisition intensive firms and 39 firms that 
grew mainly by internal means, and found that the average rate 
of profit for the non-acquiring group was significantly higher. 
There are a number of methodological problems of a technical 
nature in comparing profitability after acquisition, but other 
studies using other techniques have not disturbed the conclusion 
of Hogarty advanced above. 
Newbould (166/1970), using interview techniques, reported 
that among 38 public companies making acquisitions in 1967 and 
1968, no beneficial effects of any kind arose. The investigation 
by Firth (70/1979) used the effect on shareholder value as the 
criterion, and calculated that of the acquisitions taking place 
in the United Kingdom between 1972 and 1974, in four-fifths of 
the cases the shareholders of the acquiring firm suffered a loss 
by reason of the takeover bid. 
Apart from the problems associated with measurement in the 
studies quoted, and the consequent matter of validity, there are 
several standard defences to the conclusion that since mergers 
are not a proven way to achieve profitability, they can have 
little to do with motives of profit maximisation. 
One of these is the Weston and Mansinghka argument (219/1971) 
that mergers are defensive in intention and designed to improve 
the profitability of the acquiring firm. The bulk of stUdies 
(Singh, 198/1971; Singh, 199/1975; Kuehn,118/1975) have generally 
found no difference between acquirer and acquired in terms of 
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profitability, which appears to refute, though not decisively, 
the Weston and Mansinghka proposition. Conn (50/1973) also 
refutes the Weston and Mansinghka argument. Melicher and Rush 
(155/1974) found that for the period 1960-1969, conglomerate 
firms did acquire enterprises characterised by relatively higher 
levels of operating profitability, but they also reported that 
firms acquired by conglomerates were no more profitable than 
firms acquired by non-conglomerates. But in an earlier paper 
(154/1973) they had examined the performance of a group of 
firms that had subsequently become conglomerates during the 19609 
and found little difference between their subsequent performance 
and that of firms that did not become conglomerates. Obviously 
the American studies quoted are dealing with the performance of 
conglomerate mergers, but in the contexto! the argument, and on 
the basis of the American evidence that conglomerate mergers 
have become the standard form of amalgamation in the U.S.A., 
I am interpreting conglomerate to be the equivalent of a firm 
which has engaged in frequent merger activity. 
The second manner in which distortions can arise to disrupt 
the conclusion is dealt with in Meeks (153/1977). He points out 
that profitability of industry in general may differ from year 
to year. It is very probable that since mergers occur in 
conditions of stock market rise, the subsequent period may be 
one of economic decline. He also notes (and this finding has 
been consistently present in most of the studies - see for 
example Newbould (166/1970», that a premium over current 
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market value is paid for the acquisition and this premium will 
raise the net asset value of the firm and so depress the 
subsequent rate of return in the early years following takeover. 
Meeks. in his comprehensive study. adjusts his data for both 
factors by using profitability as a percentage of average 
profitability within the industry during a given year. and also 
by reducing the asset valuations by a factor representing 
"pure goodwill". i.e. the goodwill arising only as a market 
premium to encourage the acceptance of the bid. His general 
conclusion is unaffected and remains that: 
"The significant finding was that in all the seven 
post-merger years which were observed on average 
profitability showed a decline from the pre-merger 
level." 
The final counter-argument is the simplest. and yet to my 
mind the most persuasive. Hogarty. in the statement quoted at 
the beginning of this section •. asserts that "mergers are no 
more profitable than alternative forms of investment". By this 
we may assume that the evidence shows that some mergers achieve 
above average returns. some below average. and some attain the 
average. We would expect this to happen with profit maximising 
firms working in the real world. There seems to be some 
understanding that mergers must justify themselves by making 
super-normal returns. and I know of no warrant for such 
presumption. Meeks (153/1977) makes the outstanding case for 
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refutation of this since he finds that in all seven years of 
merger there is a decline in profitability compared with the 
average three years pre-merger performance, but since his 
acquiring firms show a 20% higher profitability than the 
victims during those three years and after the merger, when 
outlier values are omitted, the decline in profitability is 
never more than 11%, we would not be making a wild judgement 
to assert that we are witnessing a profit performance that lies 
(20) 
around the industry average. 
We can summarise the conclusion about merger profitability 
to be found in the literature by quoting the verdict of Hay and 
Morris (91/1979): 
"There is little evidence that mergers lead to 
substantial real or pecuniary advantages." 
2.4.2. (2) An Assessment of the Monopoly Creation Motive 
It has already been pointed out in Chapter 1 that there has 
been a growth in aggregate concentration for the economy as a 
whole, and also some growth of concentration, although less 
marked, at the industry level. There are a number of studies 
(Aaronovitch and Sawyer - 28/1975; Hart, Utton and Walshe -
88./1973; Hannah and Kay - 86/1977; Utton - 213/1971) which 
estimate the contribution of mergers to the growth of concentration 
as between 41% and 133% for varying periods during the 1950s 
(20) In this connection, Chip1in and Lees (47/1976) conclusion is of 
interest: "There is somu evidence that mergers have led to a 
worsened performance but on balance it seems that mergers are 
about neutral in terms of profit performance and in general the 
rate of return from mergers 1s about the same as that from 
investment in any other assets.". 
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and 1960s. (The extreme figure of 133% represents a situation 
in which concentration would have fallen had not merger activity 
borne it up) . The wide dispersion of estimates occurs because 
of the extremely complicated problems involved in measuring 
concentration. Leaving aside the accuracy of the mensuration, 
it is clear that mergers have played a considerable part in 
the growth of industrial concentration. Therefore the suspicion 
must arise that the motive of attaining monopoly powers within 
a market probably played a considerable part in this development. 
The proposition has the merit that it reflects the 
oligopolistic nature of most industrial sectors. It has the 
demerit that the capture of monopoly positions is only jusfified 
from the point of view of the shareholder (the managerial 
interest being different) if it results in profitable activity. 
Weiss (221/1971) has surveyed the predominantly U.S. studies 
and found that 31 out of 32 studies show a weak but positive 
relationship between concentration and profitability. This 
conclusion is echoed by work done by Shepherd (193/1972) for 
British industry between 1958 and 1963, which found a small 
positive association between concentration and margins, as was 
confirmed by Khalilzadah-Shirazi (109/1974). The weak 
correlations may arise because of the difficulties involved in 
defining concentration and in using published accounts for 
profitability measurement. But the evidence previously reviewed 
in the preceding section on the absence,. of prof! tabUi ty in the 
case of individual mergers presumably applies also to this case. 
241 
2.4.2. (3) 
One possibili ty is that the increase in the size of 
firm through merger, if associated with market power, may 
bring about an increase in costs. This could be because of the 
various forms of technical inefficiencies identified under 
the title of "X efficiency" by Leibenstein (127/1966), or the 
costs of maintaining barriers of entry by means such as heavy 
advertising, maintaining limit pricing, etc., or because 
profi t is absorbed by managerial interests in creating highly 
staffed enterprises with large management salaries, as is 
argued by O.E.Williamson (224/1964) under the title of 
"organisational slack". 
An Assessment of the Managerial Security plus Growth Motive 
Mergers, by their very nature, increase the size of the 
firm which is acquiring, whether size is measured by net assets, 
number of employees or turnover. It is well known that the 
larger the firm the less chance of it being taken over itself 
(Singh - 198/1971; Kuehn - 118/1975). Mergers also, by their 
very nature, involve growth, so that the interesting problem 
in this respect is why external growth was chosen over 
internal growth. But do individual mergers by themselves 
increase the securi ty of management by reducing the riskiness 
of the return? 
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Capital asset pricing theory denies that the reduction 
of variability in earnings brought about by diversification 
is of any value in itself to investors. However, by the 
judicious selection of takeover opportunities, it is possible 
to modify the relationship between the expected return to an 
amalgamated firm and the returns to the "market portfolio" 
in such a way as to lower systematic risk. This will not of 
itself produce benefit to the firm since the capital asset 
pricing model assumes that the systematic risk of the 
earnings of the acquired firm will have already been correctly 
evaluated by the market and therefore included in the purchase 
price. The cost of capital will, therefore, only be reduced 
if some market imperfection intervenes, such as a lack of 
foresight in assessing future cash flows or the presence of 
heavy costs to bankruptcy (which risk will be reduced by a 
diminution in total variability of earnings). There is 
therefore a general theoretical presumption in the literature 
against diversification reducing costs of capital and so 
facilitating an incTease in profitability in a given market, 
or greater ease in producing "organisational slack". Risk is 
measured in the literature in two ways: either by total 
variability of return, or by the p coefficient. Capital asset 
pricing theory divides the total risk (measured by variability 
of cash flow) into systematic and non-systematic risk. 
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Non-systematic risk is unique to a firm, measuring individual 
characteristics of the firm such as the quality of its 
management, etc. Such risk can be diversified away by 
combining the securities of the firm in a portfolio which 
contains assets whose earning variability are imperfectly 
correlated. Systematic risk is defined as that part of the 
total variability of returns that is correlated with the 
variability of the overall stock market (and therefore by 
inference with the fortunes of the economy as a whole). Since 
systematic risk cannot be diversified away, in order for a 
merger to be judged as risk-reducing, the value of the p coefficient 
of the combined firms must be seen to diminish. Since p coefficients 
can be added using the proportionate values of the firm as weights, 
this is possible. 
Obviously, horizontal and vertical mergers do little to 
increase diversification, and therefore the studies of risk 
reduction have been related to conglomerate types of merger. 
The case against the reduction of risk by means, of mergers 
has already been referred to; the argument is contained in Levy 
and Sarnat (130/1970). Investors are able to ~iversify their own 
portfolios. They can do it more efficiently than a firm since 
they can design a portfolio with risk-return characteristics 
that exactly meet their requirements, rather than accept the 
level of risk-return chosen for them by an acquiring firm. There 
is no need for firms to seek to reduce risk by diversifying, 
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since, in the circumstances assumed by capital market theory, 
it will already have been done; all that a firm can, in effect, 
do is reduce the range of risk-return options available in the 
capital market, and so possibly deny the investor the exact 
portfolio that he or she may require. Lintner (136/1971) has 
argued that investors as individuals have insufficient resources 
to allow them to diversify their portfolios, although Evans and 
Archer (63/1968) have, on the other hand, demonstrated that the 
bulk of gains from diversification can be achieved with a 
portfoliO of approximately ten stocks. ,This argument against 
diversification and its benefits is not applicable if the 
dominant power in firms is managerial and the management team are 
able to act with limited reference to the desires of the 
shareholders. 
When one considers the evidence available, almost all of it 
seems to point in the same direction - that mergers are not an 
efficien t way of causing a reduction in risk. Smith and Schreiner 
(201/1969) compared the investment performance of 19 conglomerates 
(tre ating its acti vi ties in the same way as a portfolio of 
securities) and 8 mutual funds (the American equivalent of unit 
trusts in the U.K.) and found that on average the mutual funds 
tended to out-perform the conglomerates in reducing risk through 
diversification. This study was followed by that of Weston, Smith 
and Shrieves (220/1972) which indicated that the 13 coefficient. 
for a sample of conglomerate firms was double that of a sample of 
mutual funds. Melicher and Rush (154/1973) found that p coefficient 
for conglomerate firms was significantly higher than that of 
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non-conglomerates. Josehnk and Nielson (104/1974) discovered 
that acquisitions had an insignificant effect on the p coefficients 
of conglomerates. Lev and Mandelker (128/1972) took a sample of 
large firms (69 in total) who were making acquisitions between 
1952 and 1963, and reported that there was no significant difference 
between the changes in the p coefficients for these acquiring 
firms as compared with a control group matched by industry size 
and time period. 
There is therefore little support for the viewpoint that 
mergers reduce systematic"risk, certainly of conglomerate firms, 
and by extension, other large firms. Capital market theory 
concentrates on systematic risk since to the individual investor 
with a well-stocked portfolio, this is the only form of risk which 
will affect the value of the investment. Managers who choose, 
and are able, to ignore the welfare of their shareholders, can 
benefit from a reduction in the total variability of cash flow. 
The consequent diminution in risk provides security against 
insolvency and so is a positive contribution to their utility 
function. This could explain merger activity which would be 
difficult to justify on criteria of increasing shareholder wealth. 
But it is easy to demonstrate situations where total variability 
decreases but systematic variability is augmented. A dominant 
management group may therefore be increasing security by lowering 
the total variability of earnings and diminishing their s'ecurity 
by ignoring the effect on their stockholders' share values, thus 
providing an incentive to such shareholders to sell their shares 
to a predator company interested in making a takeover bid. 
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2.4.3. An Evaluation of the Success of the Motivational Theories 
It has been argued that an effective way to analyse the 
research findings on merger activity is by means of a classification 
based on assumptions concerning motive. Although this produces 
a sensible classificatory system, the theories are not very 
successful as theories. If mergers are of only average profitability 
(as compared with other investment decisions) and do not reduce 
risk (in the mean-variance of cash flow sense), then the predictions 
concerning the maximisation of profit and the increase in 
managerial security are not substantiated. Even the aim of 
achieving market power seems empty if it does not create an 
increase in profit performance. We can, of course, accept the 
conclusion that motive is often frustrated in the real world, and 
thus report the intention. We can accept that an average return 
and an average level of risk is what one would expect from normal 
investment decisions in practice, but why then should mergers, 
with their disruption to the customary life of a firm and the 
strain and risk they impose on managers, be preferred to the 
tranquilli ty of growth by internal means? Mergers do, however, 
produce a quickening in the pace of growth, and they do produce 
size which offers security for managers, and a stable pattern of 
earnings. These are gains for managers, not for stockholders. 
The examination of the success of the theories in terms of the 
empirical research results appears to lead in the direction of 
assuming a divergence of interest between managers and investors, 
and a justification of mergers by reason of the way in which size 
and growth best serve the interests of the managerial group. 
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The Central Dilemmas of Merger Theory 
In completing this survey of merger literature. it might be 
worthwhile to set out in more or less schematic form the two dilemmas 
that haunt all merger Ii terature and indi.cate the direction in which 
answers have been sought. The literature is too vast to include 
references, but useful summaries can be found in Copeland and Weston 
(53/1979), Tinic and West (209/1979) and Franks and Broyles (74/1979). 
a) 
b) 
First Dilemma 
A merger, unlike internal investment, creates no new 
physical assets but is effected by a change of ownership. How, 
therefore. can additional wealth be created for shareholders? 
Answers can be classified into the following forms :-
Models 
Real 
Effects. 
Financial 
Effects. 
Necessary Condition 
Existing assets are 
used more efficiently 
ei ther in their 
original use or by 
change of use or in 
combination with 
other assets. 
Conferring a benefit 
on the owners of the 
equi ty by making 
advantageous use of 
debt or by exploiting 
size in order to reduce 
the expenses in 
raising capital. 
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Method of Achievement 
i) New economies of scale. 
ii) Exploitation of monopoly 
power. 
iii) Replacement of 
inefficient management. 
i) Reduction in the cost 
of issuing and raising 
capi tal. 
11) Reduction in default 
risk (the co-insurance 
effect) • 
i11) Purchase of unused debt 
capacity or taxation 
relief. 
Se can d Di lemma 
Assuming that mergers can produce an increase in 
shareholder wealth, why, in perfect competitive capital 
markets, are these increases in wealth not sold at a price 
reflecting the present value of these potential reweards 
by chareholders in acquired firms, thus producing zero 
financial gains for the acquiring firm? 
Answers follow the following patterns :-
a) Information is imperfectly distributed between 
acquirers and acquired firms. 
b) There are institutional limits on the ability 
of firms and individual investors to borrow and 
lend. 
c) Specific assets can only be sold in segmented 
and 11mi ted markets. 
d) The markets for management expertise are imperfect. 
A further approach is to deny the basic assumption that 
mergers are designed to increase shareholder wealth, thus avoiding 
the first dilemma and transforming the second dilemma into the 
question of how the managers of assets that are being inefficiently 
used (and whose asset price will reflect the present value of such 
inefficient cash flow) can themselves survive in a competitive 
market. 
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2.5. CHOOSING A RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
The interesting comment to be made on the preceding section 
is not that the motivational theories are not well confirmed, but 
the final conclusion that the available evidence seems to lead 
to a view of mergers which derive from the nature of a specific 
. model --of the-, firm, thetis agrowth--orientated managerial model. 
The problem of merger activity involving not a separate 
independent motivational assumption can be accommodated in the 
larger entity. It is, of course, what we would expect if we 
accept the arguments of Lakatos (121/1970) as he states: 
"One of the crucial features of sophisticated 
falsificationism is that it replaces the concept of 
theory as the basic concept of the logic of discovery 
by the concept of a series of theories. It is a 
succession of theories and not one given theory which 
is appraised as scientific or pseudo-scientific. But 
the members of such series of theories are usually 
connected by a remarkable continuity which welds them 
into a research programme. This continuity - reminiscent 
of Kuhnian 'normal science' plays a vital role in the 
history of science; the main problems of the logic 
of discovery cannot be satisfactorily discussed except 
in the framework of a methodology of research programmes." 
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If we wish then to understand and explain merger activity 
other than by making generalised statements based on the 
specific circumstances of the particular sample under study 
(which may reflect the accidents of sampling more than the 
testing of a substantive theory), then it is necessary to relate 
the research to an ongoing research programme. The question 
then resolves into identifying the existence of one or more 
research programme which contains predictions on merger activity. 
The purpose of a research study under this methodological 
imperative would then be to disconfirm or fail to disconfirm 
(using falsification strategies) the particular predictions of 
one such programme, and then to assess the effect on the programme 
as a whole. 
Lakatos describes such a research programme as consisting 
of methodological rules which tell us what paths of research to 
avoid (negative heuristics) and what paths to pursue (positive 
heuristics). 
"All scientific research programmes may be characterised 
by their 'hard core'. The negative heuristic of the 
programme forbids us to direct the 'modus tollens' at 
this hard core. Instead, we must use our ingenuity 
to articUlate or even invent 'auxiliary hypotheses' 
which form a protective belt around this core, and we 
must redirect the 'modus tollens' to these. It is this 
protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to 
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bear the brunt of tests and gets adjusted and 
re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend 
the-thus-hardened core. A research programme is 
successful if all this leads to a progressive problem-
shift;' unsuccessful if it leads to a degenerating 
problemshift. " 
By "progressive" and "degenerating" problemshifts, Lakatos 
means whether the hypothesis leads or fails to lead to the 
discovery of new phenomena. There are two major research 
prograJ11Rles which· currently: fi t this speci fication: 
a) the Neo-classical Theory of Perfect Competition, 
which contains auxiliary hypotheses about the firm; 
b) the Structure-Conduct-Performance Theory, which 
contains hypotheses of an auxiliary nature concerning 
market structure. 
Latsis (123/1976) has identified the hard core postulates 
of the perfectly competitive model as: 
a) Profit maximisation 
b) Independence of decisions 
c) Complete relevant knowledge 
linked with the additional assumptions: 
d) the seller deals in a perfectly homogenous commodity 
e) the number of sellers is very large 
f) the existing sellers may freely leave the market and 
new sellers may enter. 
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If, however, we accept the Lakatos view that the "hard" 
core and assumptions are adjusting to new information and attempts 
at verification (or more properly falsification), it is difficult 
to believe that the current theory of the firm fails to accept 
uncertainty as a relevant factor and the ideal of a perfectly 
homogenous commodity has been converted into the multi-product 
firm situation. 
The "hard core" of the structure-conduct-performance 
programme has not been defined in the literature, but its 
postulates would probably have the following form: 
a) The structure of a market determines the conduct of a 
firm within that market and this relates to the 
performance achieved. 
b) Firms within a market react to the activities of other 
firms. 
c) The competitive process requires constant vigilance 
from all firms within a market. 
It is further assumed that markets are oligopolistic, and 
that products are subject to a life cycle of growth and decay. 
Only the last of the postulates (e) might arouse controversy, 
but it is hard to explain the preoccupation with such matters 
as "limit pricing" and "barriers to entry" without admi tting the 
existence of such an assumption. 
It might be further remarked that the neo-classical research 
programme deals with the firm at the micro-economic level and 
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the structure-conduct-performance programme has markets and 
industries for its sUbject matter. The divide between the two 
programmes is similar to that between macro-economics and 
micro-economics in general economic theory, in that although 
logically the two programmes should relate, in practice they 
tend to be separated. and it is difficult to find an over-arching 
theory to bind both halves of the same reality together. 
Both research programmes contain predictions about merger 
activity. Both programmes would be described as "progressive", 
and the choice between them is a matter of judgement. In 
carrying out this research, the theory of the firm was selected 
as the subject. set as it is within the larger neo-classical 
research programme. The selection was based on the direction in 
which the evidence on merger activity, which has been related 
in Section 2.3~. was leading, and also to the belief that the 
motivational theory of the firm is much richer in content. 
The structure-conduct-performance model takes as given that the 
quoted firms are all striving for some form of monopolistic 
advantage and then sets out to evaluate the consequences of this 
assumption. The theory of the firm, on the other hand, has a much 
more tolerant attitude to the possible range of intentions 
underlying human behaviour. Since the proposition argued in 
this chapter, that merger behaviour is best studied in terms of 
motivation. the theory of the firm allows greater scope for the 
analysis of that motivation. 
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The next chapter outlines that theory and its predictions 
concerning mergers, and describes the statistical investigation 
that was carried out". 
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2.6. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
The argument of this chapter can be summarised concisely 
in the following steps:-
a) To gain an understanding of merger behaviour, one 
requires a theory; that is to say, a coherent 
explanation which will satisfactorily relate the 
known facts. 
b) Are there, then, any ways in which we can recognise 
the value of a theory, especially one in the Social 
Sciences? 
c) What is the range of existing theories on merger 
behaviour? 
d) Does any of the existing theories commend itself for 
further exploration? 
The problem of how to evaluate the success of a theory in 
the natural sciences has been the subject of much controversy over 
the past decade. In describing the features of the dispute in 
Section 2.1., a brief analysis of the contributions of Kuhn, Popper 
and Lakatos to this debate is made. Ultimately, the definition 
of Lakatos that a good theory is one which "explains existing 
facts and is capable of predicting novel facts" is adopted, as also 
is his emphasis that a theory can only be developed in contrast 
with a competing explanation since no theory can, in itself, 
ever be conclusively confirmed, and therefore judgement of the 
worth of a theory is always that it functions as an explanatory 
structure more efficiently than an alternative structure. 
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The greater part of this literature concerning "the growth 
of knowledge" concerned the natural sciences. The Social Sciences 
possess a number of features which need examination in order to 
ensure that the approach of Lakatos will survive the transfer to 
another ethos. 
Two principal difficulties of theory construction in the 
Social Sciences are identified. The first of these is the changing 
nature of the subject matter, which suggests that progress in the 
Social Sciences is more likely to be progress in the development 
of analytical methods rather than progress in terms of finding 
inviolable laws governing human nature. The second relates to 
the "meaning of actions" insofar as they represent intended 
behaviour. 
There are two major perspectives on this issue. One, largely 
favoured in Sociology, is to assume that there may be social forces 
at work which are not entirely understood by the participants 
(Structural-functionalism). The other, which has been the typical 
approach in Economics (apart from the Marxist and Institutionalist 
theories), is that of "methodological individualism", the view 
that the ~utcome of activity can be explained by reference to the 
actors involved. (It is pointed out that although some economic 
theorising refers to the unintended consequences of participants' 
actions, this does not amount to a "functionalist" argument by 
itself). The traditions of the economic discipline therefore 
support the view that a good theory will have a motivational 
structure as part of its explanatory design. These matters 
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are covered in Sections 2.2. and 2.3. 
The various categories of merger explanation are then 
examined. This not only provides a review of the existing state 
of merger theories (Section 2.3.) and also an opportunity to 
analyse the current success of the theories (Section 2.4.), but 
leads to a classification of explanations of merger behaviour on 
the basis of the motivational assumptions. 
Leaving aside the welfare issues and also those studies 
dealing with technicalities of how mergers are accomplished, there 
appear· to be three motivational criteria being used in order to 
gain an understanding of takeovers:-
a) The profit-maximising motive, which has been the 
prevailing orthodoxy and implies that merger activity 
is a species of normal investment behaviour in that the 
activity is a means of increasing ca~acity in a way 
that will earn the highest rate of return over 
alternative methods. 
b) The motive of seeking market power which underlies the 
"structure-conduct-performance" paradigm in Industrial 
Economics. 
c) The motive of seeking the interests of the managerial 
class who direct the activities of the firm. 
It is finally proposed to use the managerial theory of the 
firm as the framework for the understanding of merger activity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
AND MERGER ACTIVITY 
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3.0. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapter 1 has analysed a temporal pattern of merger activity 
over a longer period (1960 to 1978) than the actual periods from 
which merger activity was sampled in this research study, that is 
1970 to 1978 in the case of the Consumer Durable/Non-Durable 
sample, and the 5 years prior to 1977 or 1978 in the instance of 
the Comparison Sample of Predators, Victims and Neutrals. The 
nature of the two samples were described, and it was demonstrated 
that in the case of the Consumer Durable/Non-Durable firms the 
experience over time of that sample conformed to the general 
experience of merger activity to be drawn from the statistical 
record. Certain conclusions on the general pattern of activity 
were inferred, of which the most important were: 
a) that the pattern of acquisitions appeared to have 
cyclical characteristics; 
b) that these cyclical characteristics seemed to have 
some relationship to the business cycle with its 
fluctuations from prosperity to depression; 
, ,-
c) that a reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts 
that merger situations were more frequent at a time 
when share prices were rising, and that share exchanges 
represented a larger proportion of the offer terms than cash 
at this time, was that since these factors probably implied 
a reduced cost of capital, and an ease in raising funds, 
that external investment (i.e. acquisitions) would be 
favoured by these circumstances over internal means 
of growth. 
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In the second Chapter, an attempt was made to produce a 
sensible classification of research explanations of why takeovers 
occurred. These classifications were then recast in a form which 
allowed meaning and motivation to become the dominant principle of 
categorisation. The "growth of knowledge" paradigm was employed 
to argue that to produce a convincing explanation of the behaviour 
of firms who sought to acquire other companies, it was necessary 
to relate the explanations to ongoing research programmes. The 
two principal research programmes were identified as! 
a) At a macro level (i.e. that of industries and markets -
the two are not synonymo~s though overlapping(1», the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm which aims to 
explain the oligopolistic forms of industrial/market 
organisation. 
b) At a micro level, the theory of the firm which seeks to 
account for patterns of behaviour in terms of certain 
plausible axioms of motivation underlying the behaviour. 
Since the two research programmes, although possessing common 
elements (the most obvious of which is that if firms are assumed to 
be committed to achieve positions of market power, then the 
obvious result would be oligopolostic markets), have yet to be 
related by a general overall theory, the theories are assumed to be 
distinct. As a result, the question of which research programme 
to pursue was taken as being a matter of judgement. Since, it was 
(1) The difference between the two concepts derives from the methods 
of analysiS employed. Industries are analysed in terms of the 
production function, and markets in relation to the sale of 
homogenous products and services. 
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argued, the structure-conduct-performance research programme 
assumes as an axiom that merger behaviour is motivated by the 
quest for market power, whereas the theory of the firm treats the 
issue as one to be determined, the latter research programme was 
selected for study as the one most likely to promote a better 
understanding of merger behaviour. The explanation of merger 
activity analysed within this thesis is therefore that related 
to the theory of the firm. 
The first part of this present chapter seeks to define the 
research' programme concerning the theory of the firm, to form a 
jusgement on the current state of research with respect.to that 
programme. The next step is to determine the manner in which 
merger activity relates to alternative views about the nature of 
the firm and then to describe the hypotheses which were developed 
to test the conflicting theories about the firm. 
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3.1. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RESEARCH PROGRA1Th£ CONCERNING THE 
TIlEORY OF THE FI RM 
3.1.1. The Firm in Neo-classical Theory 
The neo-classical theory of the firm was developed in 
the decades following 1870 on the basis of the marginal 
utility analysis which was ushered in at that time by thinkers 
such as Jevons, Menger and Walras, and found its most 
traditional expression in Marshall's "Principles of Economics" 
which was first published in 1890. Prior to this period, 
economists had been concerned with the growth and distribution 
of the wealth of a nation and the discovery of laws governing 
that growth and distribution; although there were included 
theories of production and hypotheses concerning the fixing 
of prices, there is little that we would recognise as a theory 
of the firm. That is to say, a theory which analyses the 
decision making processes of an individual enterprise. The 
neo-classical theory provided an analytical process for 
explaining the decisions of firms via the equalising of 
marginal values. Although monopoly situations had been 
identified as a restraint on trade based on a "fixed 
non-reproducable factor of production" by Adam Smith and 
Ricardo, and the downward sloping demand curve facing a 
monopolist proposed by Cournot as early as 1838, the theory 
of the firm was conceived in partial equilibrium terms on the 
basis of perfect competition and perfect knowledge. The 
surprising thing with respect to this characterisation of 
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the firm was that although it provided a logical structure 
of reasoning to demonstrate how the firm behaved in the 
short and long term, in the end the typical firm had only 
one decision facing it - whether to continue to produce or 
not. Latsis (123/1976) describes the decision making as 
follows: 
"In equilibrium then each seller is faced with the 
following choice: either to sell ~(o) (the output 
at which price is equal to minimum average cost 
and therefore zero profits) or go bankrupt. 
\fuether he maximises profits or is content simply 
with satisfactory profits, whether he is an optimist 
or a pessimist, a risky or a cautious personality, 
will make no difference to his decision. There is 
only one policy he can adopt if he wants to remain 
in business. Indeed the assumption that firms 
maximise profits is very often defended on the 
grounds that this is the best thing to do. There 
seems to be a persistent failure to notice that the 
behaviour of the seller under perfect competition 
is over-determined and that a weaker assumption 
could do the same job; namely, the assumption that 
the firm avoids bankruptcy." (Page 24, 123/1976). 
In fact, firms scarcely exist within this paradigm 
(in the Kuhnian sense) except as representative units 
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contained within industries and markets. 
3.1.2. The Revolution in the Theory o~ the Firm 
The particular perspective on the firm outlined 
above was swept away in the 1920s and 1930s under the 
impact o~ a number o~ attacks. The most important of 
these was the demonstration of P.Sraffa (204/1926) that 
the condition necessary to ensure static partial 
equilibrium that unit cost ~d output are independent, is 
. 
incompatible with· competitive behaviour. The problem of 
increasing and decreasing returns proved to be the 
critical issue. If a firm is subject to increasing 
returns, what is to stop it from expanding indefinitely 
and destroying perfect competition by becoming a 
monopolist? If an industry is subject to diminishing 
returns, so that increasing costs react on the prices 
of the products of other industries, and thus reduce 
demand for the product of the industry under review, 
how can one analyse its price and output behaviour in 
terms of partial equilibrium analYSis in which it is 
assumed that the factors affecting supply and demand 
are independent? Only by ignoring the interactions 
between industries can we specify the demand and supply 
~actors for a particular industry, but such an analysis 
amounts to a demand ~or the complexities of a theory 
o~ general equilibrium. 
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This exhibition of logical inconsistency occurred 
at a time when doubts were being cast on the model 
from a number of sources on the basis of empirical work. 
The principal charges of "lack of reality" on the theory 
of the firm occuring at this time were: 
a) The findings by Hall and Hitch (83/1939), 
that businessmen set prices not by marginalist 
rules but taking into account the full costs 
of producing and marketing the product. 
b) The Berle and Means (39/1932) thesis, that the 
modern corporation is one in which the ownership 
of its shares is widely distributed so that 
the shareholders are, as a body, unable to 
bring sufficient influence to bear to prevent, 
the managers running the company according to 
managerial rather than shareholder objectives. 
This proposition carried with it the implication 
that profit maximisation might not be the 
primary motive of the management team. 
c) The demonstration that, far from working under 
the regime of cost curves with the shape of 
inverted parabolas, most companies appeared to 
be subject to constant returns to scale over a 
wide range of production levels. This line of 
enquiry raised the spectre of a firm that could 
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grow to unlimited size with all its monopolistic 
consequences. 
d) The mounting evidence that many firms were 
multi-product and not the generators of a single 
homogenous article of service. This meant that 
firms might operate in several markets and not 
one, as the theory demanded. 
e) The realisation that most industries/markets 
were oligopolistic. The neo-classical theory 
could handle the "price-accepting" firm of 
perfect competition, or the single firm that held 
monopoly power over an entire market, but had 
no way of dealing with situations where the 
interactions of several companies possessing large 
shares of a given market existed. 
If we accept the Kuhnian view of "revolutions in 
(2) knowledge" ,then such an upturn occurred with the 
simultaneous publication in 1933 of the works of Joan 
Robinson "The Economics of Imperfect Competition" and 
Edward Chamberlain's "Theory of Monopolistic Competition". 
The theory of imperfect competition denied the 
relevance of perfect competition in studying firms and 
industries and focussed its attention on the firm which, 
by producing a differentiated product, permitted the 
(2) The general opinion that revolutions are less revolutionary than in 
Kuhn's argument is reconfirmed, in this instance, by the fact that 
Marshall, .in 1890 in his "Principles of Economics" was making reference 
to the problems of economies of scale for his theory. 
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firm to maintain some control over its price and output. 
It is generally accepted in the literature (see for 
example the summary of the situation in Blaug (pages 
398 to 403, 41/1962) that the theory transformation 
was empty of empiric consequences, but had several 
major impacts: 
a) It brought into being the concept of the 
firm with some discretionary control over its 
future. 
b) It changed the focus of research from that of 
the "representative firm" in its industrial 
context to that of the individual firm. It 
therefore ushered in attempts to reformulate a 
theory of the individual firm in an uncertain 
environment which has continued without rest 
since the 1930s and which still awaits final 
resolution. 
c) Paradoxically, while the theory of imperfect 
competition in itself emphasised the fortunes 
of the single enterprise, by its emphasis on 
such factors as selling costs, degrees of 
monopoly within a market and the problems of 
entry, it created a new paradigm for the study 
of industries, the "structure-conduct-performance" 
research programme. 
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The decades following the 1930s in which the 
doctrines of imperfect competition were elaborated and 
subject to critical inspection created a watershed in 
the study of industrial economics. The pathways split 
apart. On the one hand, a reformulated paradigm of 
industrial and market behaviour was born; on the other 
hand the study of the individual firm became paramount. 
Two research programmes existed where only one had 
preceded. The Marshallian system had aChieved its 
triumphs by so constraining the operations of a firm 
as to deprive it of discretionary options. The new 
system vanquished these constraints, destroying even 
the partial equilibrium context in which firms were 
supposed to exist and abandoning the traditional 
distinction between short run and long run analysis 
(which depended on a concept of equilibrium to be 
meaningful). In its place was brought in the major 
problem of uncertainty and greater realism in the 
recognition of the oligopolistic environment of 
industries and markets. It seems probable that the 
two research programmes (the revised theory of the 
firm and the structure-conduct-performance paradigm) 
will only unite. when a theory of constrained oligopoly 
is developed. By this I mean a.theory which successfully 
sets limited to the behavioural possibilities of the 
participants and therefore allows a determinate outcome 
to be forecast. 
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3.1.3. Behavioural and Managerial Theories of the Fir~ 
The reformulation of the theory of the firm 
has taken two major directions; the first of these was 
to look inwards and reveal the internal workings of 
the firm; the other was to reconsider what the objectives 
of the firm might be other than the profit maximisation 
enjoined by neo-classical theory. 
The behavioural theory of the firm seeks to 
replace the traditional normative approach to the analysis 
of firm's behaviour with a much more positive. approach; 
i.e. more firmly based on empirical measures of reality. 
Classical economic theory is normative in the sense. 
of postulating how a firm should behave if it is to 
maximise profits. Behavioural theorists seek to relate 
the working of a company to the needs and goals of 
the individuals who comprise that company. The economics 
of the firm has been described as treating the firm 
as a "black box", which is a term taken from systems 
theory. The "black box" argument is that where an 
institution (such as a fi'rm) has very complex internal 
workings, then it should be treated as a collection of 
rules for transforming input into output without any 
attempt to discover what elaborate processes actually 
take place within the institution. Behaviourist 
theorists reject this approach and set out to analyse 
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the way in which firms decide upon their objectives, 
which are assumed to be multiple rather than single. 
The existence of multiple objectives presupposes that 
there will be conflict with respect to these objectives 
which must be resolved by some sort of bargaining process. 
A seminal work illustrating this approach is that of 
Cyert and March (56/1963). The perspective suffers 
from the general probles of "reductionism", that is to 
say, it proposes to explain the workings of an economic 
institution in terms of individual behaviour and 
interaction. Although there seems no theoretical 
objection to the procedure, in practice the labyrinthine 
intricacies of such an undertaking are formidable. 
As a theory, it offers little prospect of service to 
the purpose of this thesis, which is concerned wi th 
merger activity as an external factor in the strategic 
development of the firm seen as a decision unit, which 
is assumed for the purpose of the theory to be unanimous 
in purpose. 
The other revision of the theory of the firm which 
establishes new goals for the enterprise appears' in a 
number of guises. These guises reflect the various 
objective functions which are proposed for the firm; 
they include: 
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a) Revenue (or Sales) Maximisation (Baumol, 35/1959 
and 36/1962); 
b) Growth Maximisation (J.H.Williamson, 223/1966; 
Marris, ~44/1963 and .145/1964); 
c) General Utility Maximisation (O.E.Williamson, 
224/1964) • 
'O.E.V/illiamson's model is the most difficult to classify, 
because although he refers to a utility function 
composed of such factors as salary, status, power and 
prestige, he is basically dealing with the presumed 
ability of managers to pursue their own interests so 
long as acceptable profits are earned. The focus of 
this model is the way in which preferences for staff 
and emoluments are related to output and priCing 
decisions, but since his trade-off relationships 
(between, say, profit and staff numbers) are concerned 
with the internal organisation of the firm, he casts 
little light on the relationship of the firm to the 
market. 
There is therefore a great deal of common ground 
with behaviour theory; however in later works (O.E. 
Williamson, 226/1970 and 228/1975) he builds on his 
views on "discretionary behaviour" to argue that a 
. distinctive form of enterprise might be nec'essary to 
reconcile in an efficient manner the conflicting aims 
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within a firm; this form of enterprise he names as the 
"M form", its purpose being to use a central control 
of finance and policy to enforce profit maximising 
behaviour within a multi-divisional type of corporation. 
Thus Williamson manages to restore profit-maximising 
behaviour to the firm, but not as the result of external 
constraints as with the partial-equilibrium neo-classical 
model, but by reason of internal considerations. 
There are some other notable contributions to a 
reformulation of the theory of the firm which, for 
completeness, should be noted, but they are probably 
better viewed as 'supplementing the developments noted 
above rather than being attempts at comprehensive 
theories in their own right. These are: 
a) "Satisficing theory" which argues that maximisation 
is not a credible description of the firm's. 
behaviour in an uncertain world, that managers 
seek therefore "satisfactory" rather than "optimum" 
solutions. The theory is to be found in the work 
of H.A.Simon (195/1959)~3) 
b) "X-inefficiency", the idea of which originated 
with Leibenstein (127/1966) which focuses on the 
(3) It has been suggested that Simon'S theory of satisficing behaviour is 
compatible with any outcome and that therefore the hypothesis is not 
testable, but the theory contains the very important insight that owing 
to limitations of human ability and the costs of searching for information, 
the managers of a firm must tackle problems sequentially, and since in 
practice the point of optimum performance is not known to the managers 
(because it would require knowledge of counterfactual Situations) this 
is a more realistic description of how managers actually behave. 
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cost inefficiency which arises in the presence 
of monopoly power. 
c) "The technostructure" which argues that the 
technological and managerial revolutions have 
produced a group of professional managers whose 
object is to secure the independence of the 
organisation, its maximum rate of growth (since 
then the technostructure can itself expand 
offering more jobs, promotion and better 
compensation) and the production of things 
demanding technical ingenuity~ The argument 
is due to Galbraith (79/1967), but is more 
concerned with defending the inevitability of 
oligopoly than in seeking to demonstrate the 
specific way in which the firm works under this 
system. It is also a theory which is, by definition, 
limited to the large corporation and has no 
contributions to make to an insight into the life 
of small and medium-sized companies. 
Despite the diversity of genre, there are certain 
basic features Which underlie to a greater or lesser 
extent all these proposals for a revision of firm 
theory (this is as true of the behavioural as of the 
changed objective function type). These are: 
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a) they assume that firms exist in an uncertain 
environment; 
b) there is an acceptance of the Serle and Means 
thesis (39/1932) that there is separation between 
the ownership and control of the publicly quoted 
company since shareholders individually are so 
dispersed and unco-ordinated that they are unable 
to compete with the management team, which has 
responsibility for day-to-day decisions, in 
dominating the affairs of a company. As a 
corollary of this, managers are able to substitute 
their own aims which may have more to do with 
their own status and ambitions than with the 
growth in wealth of their shareholders; 
c) there is an agreement that there is some minimum 
level of profitability which must be attained 
in order to satisfy stockholders. 
Where there is disagreement is in the extent to 
which managers are able to avoid the imperative to 
maximise profits. The issue is not a trivial one, if 
the maximisation of profits can be introduced back into 
the argument, then deterministic models of the firm 
can be built; not, it is true, with the characteristics 
of the neo-classical model, which allowed the firm to 
be integrated into a market structure since the problems 
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of uncertainty and ologopolistic interdependence would 
still remain unresolved, but at least permitting a 
description of the internal features of the individual 
enterprise. If, on the other hand, firms have discretion 
once having surpassed the minimum profit level to 
follow their own devices, then the constraints on 
action again become uncertain and attempts to describe 
the firm in terms of maximising and optimising will be 
lost. 
Unless, that is, an equally binding objective can 
be found; hence the proposals for Sales Revenue 
Maximisation, Growth Maximisation or General Utility 
Maximisation. The difficulty with all these proposals 
is that they imply a discretion by managers to achieve 
other objectives which lack the compelling simplicity 
of the profit maximisation demand. This has then become 
the fundamental issue in the reformulated theory of 
the firm - do managers maximise profits or after meeting 
some minimum profit constraint do they have 'discretion 
to seek other objectives? These other objectives seem 
to open a wide panorama of possibilities, but this is 
not necessarily so. It has been pointed out (Sawyer, 
185/1979) that Baumol's sales revenue maximisation 
hypothesis must not be interpreted literally in terms 
of sales, since otherwise we would find firms crowding 
into markets (such as retail distribution) where'the 
2W 
sales to profit ratio is high and that therefore 
sales have to be read as a proxy for size. Solow 
(203/1971) has made the point in reference to Marris's 
growth maximising model, that the growth orientated 
firm would choose a small size in order to maximise 
growth rate; this would imply a tendency for firms 
to disinvest, which is not a notable feature of 
industrial life. 'We are then led to the belief that 
size is the ultimate objective of the growth orientated 
firm. Williamson's (224/1964) theory of managerial 
preference for increasing staff numbers and management 
emoluments appears to be a size-related concept. We 
would not be doing an injustice to these theories if 
it were stated that size (whether measured in terms of 
gross or net assets) is the ultimate purpose. The 
difference is that we are comparing a process, i.e. 
"profi t maximisation", with a rather indeterminate 
final state of bigness which may be achieved either by 
short run means as in the Sales Revenue Maximisation 
hypothesis, or in the long run terms of the Maximisation 
of Growth hypothesis. 
One advantage of the reformulated theories of the 
firm 1s that they reflect the industrial environment 
of the latter decades of the 20th Century more 
realistically. They take into account the paramount 
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position of managers in the quoted firm; they reveal 
the dominance of the large multi-product firm possessing 
some variety of market power; they accept that other 
forms of competition exist other than that of price, 
especially that related to advertising and other forms 
of market expenditure; they assume that most markets 
are ologopolistic and lack the free entry and full 
information of the neo-classical competitive model. 
The problem is whether such realism has been purchased 
at the price of a reduction in analytical potential. 
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3.2. THE REVISED THEORY OF THE FIRM AND lffiRGER ACTIVITY 
3.2.1. The Suitability of Managerial Theories to relate to 1~rger Activity 
In accepting the Lakatos theory of the growth of knowledge via 
research programes, one must also accede to the argument that no 
isolated theory can be tested adequately without taking into account 
the network of theories and the "hard core" beliefs to which any 
theory is related. The reason why one predictive confirmation or 
refutation serves no useful purpose is that most scientific 
endeavour is riddled with anomalies and it is not possible to deal 
with such anomalies unless one can contrast the success of different 
theories in dealing with them. It is only by relating the success 
or failure of a specific test to the programme as a whole that the 
possibility of successfully interpreting that test and its result 
can be achieved. Therefore to carry out a test of the causes of 
mergers, it is necessary to identify the way mergers are related 
to a larger body of theory. The body of theory singled out for 
attention is that concerning the reformulated theory of the firm. 
The hard core belief underlying the alternative programme is that 
of profit maximisation as the principal aim of the firm. This 
is not the profit maximisation axiom to be discovered within the 
neo-classical theory of the firm since this depended on perfect 
competition and perfect knowledge and a theory of market 
equilibrium, for its mode of operation. The new theory of profit 
maximisation accepts uncertainty, the oligopolistic framework and 
the independence of the firm within its market or markets but 
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(4) 
nevertheless maintains that the profit maximising motive still 
provides the most significant explanation of the action of firms.(4) 
The attack on the profit maximising thesis cannot be direct 
since the state of mind of many managers over a vast variety of 
market circumstances is not directly open to test. Behavioural 
theories have sought to demonstrate the existence of "organisational 
slack" which is incompatible with profit maximisation; others 
such as growth theorists have sought to support the view that 
managers seek other objectives than profit maximisation. 
Since the behavioural theorists are concerned with internal 
activities, they have little to say concerning the implications 
of their beliefs with respect to merger activity. The managerial 
theorists are a more important body concerning the activities of 
the firm in its relationship to output, product development and 
rivalry with other companies. Unfortunately, with the exception 
of MarriS, they suffer from a major defect in relating these 
theories to takeover practice. They deal with immediate short 
term situations where the important questions are the output level, 
price to be charged, amount to be spent on advertising and other 
such matters; none of which are of immediate relevance to takeover 
situations which involve investment and therefore can only be 
assessed against a theory which takes investment behaviour into 
account. An example drawn from Hawkins (89/1970) criticism of 
Baumol's Sales Revenue Maximisation model will make this clear. 
This presumably is what would be described by Lakatos as a "degenerating" 
programme. It has dropped its requirements £or partial equilibrium, 
perfect knowledge and total absence of influence over the market. The 
most important attempt to restate the theory is by way of the concept 
of "workable competition" but it is generally conceded that the 
reformulation is too imprecise for use in prediction. 
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Hawkins points out that if we presume that Baumol's theory 
is applied to a multi-product firm and the number of products is 
not assumed constant, then the sales revenue maximiser starts to 
look like a profit maximiser. (Baumol clearly implies that the 
number of products is fixed, in Chapter 1 of his "Business Behaviour, 
Value and Growth" (35/1959). The reasoning goes as follows. 
If the firm were to be producing many products, then it would make 
no sense to produce its sales maximising output for each separate 
product when it could equally bring output to the level of profit 
maximisation for Product A and then switch to develop Product B to 
the profitmaximlsatlon level, after which it would move to' Product C. 
As each product reached the level of profit maximising output, then 
other products could be introduced. The firm would only then 
become a sales maximiser if, having exhausted all products which 
would yield profit maximums, it continued to develop products to 
a point where the last product introduced showed zero profitability 
and then was outputted in a manner which added to sales but 
detracted from the profitability of the total firm. The obvious 
inference to be made from Hawkins' criticism is that in any long 
run situation, Baumol's work only makes sense if we assume he is 
proposing a theory of over-investment (defined as investing to 
an extent where the investment fails to cover its costs). This 
is very close to the growth theorists' proposal that new products 
are developed which yield low return on investment which are 
insufficient to justify the employment of shareholders' funds. 
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The criticism is not fair to Baumol, who was only dealing with the 
short term circumstance, but nevertheless it clearly illustrates 
why Baumol's theory is not useful for casting light on the process 
of takeover. 
It is therefore proposed to use the work of Marris as the 
source of hypotheses on the merger situation. 
3.2.2. An Outline of Marris's Growth Theory of the Firm 
Marris's model of the managerial growth firm (Marris 1963, 
1964, 146/147/1971) has so far, despite numerous analyses, failed 
to reach a form where econometric investigation of it would be 
possible. There are a number of reasons for this. 
In the first place, he relied upon a steady state theory of 
growth in which such variables as the retention ratio, valuation 
ratio (to be explained more fully below), gearing, liquidity 
ratiO, capital/output ratio, etc. would remain constant over a 
long (undefined) period. Once having chosen the level of these 
financial variables in the light of their effect on growth rate, 
profitability levels and the risks to the security of the 
management team, then these levels are held. But his theory 
relies heavily upon a cost of growth function which relates the 
rate of growth of demand for the firm's output to the rate of 
demand-growth-creating expenditures. It is assumed that a constant 
rate of such expenditure will produce a constant rate of demand 
growth and a higher rate of expenditure will produce a higher 
rate of growth, although the increase in growth will be less than 
in proportion to the increase in expenditure. However, although 
there will be diminishing returns at any moment of time, through 
time each given rate of demand-growth-creating expenditure will 
produce a corresponding given rate of demand growth which will 
continue permanently. This is an essential characteristic of 
"steady state growth models" and it requires the assumption that 
the exogenuous environment determining the properties of the 
cost of growth function should remain constant. Marris defends 
the contention by distinguishing between short term situation in 
which the constancy of the environment remains steady and a 
"super-environment" which determines the rate at which firm can 
alter its immediate environment but which itself is not subject 
to modification by the firm. But as Wood (230/1971) has pointed 
out, what determines the form of the cost of growth function is 
the existence and behaviour of other firms who are also competing 
for sources of demand. It is therefore highly unlikely that the 
"super-environment" will remain unchanged for any length of time 
in the face of steady-state growth by a number of firms. Devine 
($7/1974) is even more forceful 1n his conclusion: 
"Steady state growth by all firms is logically incompatible 
with the assumptions required to enable steady-state growth 
by anyone firm. This is because the properties of the 
cost of growth function of the individual firm depend 
on the existence and behaviour of other firms and in a 
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system made up of firms following a steady-state permanent 
growth path, these properties will be endogenuous and not 
exogenuous. Thus, the structure of steady-state growth 
models is flawed by an internal logical contradiction. 
The point is greatly strengthened when the relatively 
small number of giant oligopolists dominating most sectors 
of industry is recalled. For it now becomes unlikely that 
each firm will determine the scale of its demand-growth-
creating acti vi ty independent of what its rivals are doing." 
Secondly. the theory is one of diversification (in order to 
promote growth). But the constant capital/output ratio that i~ 
kept at an unchanged level is hardly compatible with entry into 
several diverse new markets. If this capital/output ratio, 
however, becomes subject to change, then the rate of return to 
. . . 
capital (which ~!arr1s refers ·to as the profit rate) will also 
become variable, and this will upset the level of security 
calculation which is based on a constant retention ratio. 
The diversification rate depends upon the rate of new product 
creation and marketing. This relates to expenditures on research 
development and advertising, which are not clearly identified 
in the accounts of firms, s'o that the data for determining this 
rate is not available generally. 
Finally. the actual levels of growth in relation to 
profitability depend upon the efficiency of the firm. Different 
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firms with differing growth/profitability ratios will occupy 
different positions on the curve relating profitability to growth, 
which will make it impossible in practice to decide whether a 
firm has pushed past the level of maximum profitability (in a 
given period) to the point where the growth rate is still 
compatible with the supply of capital to finance that growth, or 
whether its inefficiency in converting profit into growth has 
caused its growth rate to be reduced. 
Nevertheless, although a determinate analysis is not possible, 
there are some general propositions to be derived from Marris's 
theory which are operationally testable. Marris's general model 
will therefore be briefly described, its relationship to takeover 
theory detailed, and the implications in terms of testable hypothesis 
stated. 
Marris begins by assuming that the management team may have 
a different utility function from that of shareholders by reason 
of the aforementioned division between ownership and control. The 
objective function of the management team is selected as being 
that of "balanced growth maximisation". The firm is assumed to 
be multi-product and to have the ability to determine to some 
extent the rate of growth of demand for its products, especially 
by the process of· diversification (i.e. introducing new products 
into its range) and therefore it will seek to maximise the rate 
of growth of demand subject to the necessity to ensure that 
sufficient capital is made available to finance the growth process 
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(5) 
(hence the use of the "balanced growth proposi tion") • 
Marris gives his reasons for selecting growth maximisation 
as the central aim of the firm "because, as already previously 
alluded to,· managers seek salary, power and status which 
are all correlated with size and which are achieved by encouraging 
fast rates of growth. He also assumes that management mobility 
between firms is low and therefore managers will see the growth 
of their own organisation as a better route to satisfaction of 
their preference function than by attempting to move to other 
organisations. 
It has already been mentioned that the Marris model assumes 
a constant ratio between growth and the financial variables 
supporting that growth. His argument for any given growth rate 
is therefore one that postulates that once the decision variables 
governing the growth of demand and the supply of finance have 
been determined, then the balanced rate of growth will be 
sustainable over time (until such time as" the "super-environment" (5) 
which is outside the firm's control by definition, changes). 
The Marris system is subject to three major constraints. 
The first two relate to the balance between the rate of growth of 
demand and the supply of finance to support that growth. The 
third, which is more pertinent to our purposes, relates to the 
relationship between the performance of the firm and its effect 
on the stock market's valuation of the company. 
MarriS defines the super-environment (page 13, 1971) as "a loose 
collection of general circumstances governing limits on the firm's 
environment-changing capacity". Popper would describe th~s as an 
"ad hoc" adjustment to the theory. We can assume that nothing changes 
until it is changed and the time of change is indeterminate. Therefore 
any attempt to refute the theory can be met by the argument that the 
"super-environmen t" changed. 
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a) Demand Growth Constraint 
If the firm is to achieve a continuous and steady rate of 
growth, then it would not be possible to do this with a stable 
product range since it would require adding more and more 
customers, by marketing methods, and this would come up against 
the diminishing returns derived from seeking customers with 
a reducing marginal preference for the products, as well as 
increasing the competitive struggle for customers in the 
existing markets. It is therefore necessary to diversify 
into new products and new markets ("differentiated diversification") 
and expanding of sales into existing markets ("imitative 
di versification"). Whatever method of expansion is chosen 
after an initial beneficial effect on the profit rate (because 
some growth has an invigorating effect on managers and there 
will be some immediately profitable opportunities available 
once a static production status is abandoned), the rate of 
profit will start to decline. In the case of new products, 
because managerial effort will be limited and not expandable 
over a short time sequence (an idea derived from Penrose 
(167/1959» ; therefore, as the growth rate rises the 
number of failures of new products will rise as a proportion 
of products being introduced. Imitative products will run 
into difficulties because of the arousal of competition from 
existing producers who will see their market share threatened. 
In both cases it may be necessary to spend large sums on 
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advertising, to maintain expensive product development and 
marketing units and to hold prices down, all of which will 
have an adverse effect on profit marsins, which will 
additionally depress profit rates. 
b) Finance Constraint 
In order to support the growth in investment assets to 
handle the increase in demand, the firm will require a 
growing source of funds. These can either come from internal 
.Dr external sources. The external sources would include the 
issue of new shares (which is normally carried out by making 
a rights issue), the sale of debentures, or borrowing from 
banks and other financial institutions. The internal source 
is retention from existing profits. In order to make his 
analytical task more tractable, and relying on the Modigliani 
and Miller theorem (160/1961) that the methods of retention 
and the issue of new shares (under certain specific 
circumstances which include the assumption of perfect capital 
markets) are irrelevant to the valuation of a company since 
they have identical effects, Marris assumes that. apart from 
the inclusion of some debt. the retention of profits is the 
main source of funds. However. the firm will put itself at 
risk i~ the profit rate falls (owing to too high a growth 
rate) while retentions are high (by this means depriving 
the shareholders of a return on their funds comparable to 
that which can be garnered elsewhere in the capital market). 
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The firm will also decrease its chances of survival if it 
increases its leverage ratio (i.e. value of debt to total 
assets) excessively, or permits its ratio of liquid to total 
assets to attain too high (excessive liquidity) or too low 
a level (inadequate liquidity). The risk referred to here 
is that of insolvency (if the firm cannot meet its debts 
which can arise through adopting too high a debt gearing 
ratio or possessing insufficient liquid funds to meet current 
costs), and of takeover (because an excessive retention ratio 
coupled with low profitability will depress its share 
valuation, thus tempting bidsi ·also excesslye liquidity will 
represent a store of idle funds which will also tempt 
acquiring firms). The constraint on financial supply is 
therefore dependent on the decisions of the management team. 
Marris proposes that insecurity as a function is inversely 
related to the liquidity ratio and positively related to 
the leverage and retention ratios. A low liquidity ratio 
coupled with a high leverage and retention ratio would make 
for low security of the jobs of the management team and 
vice-versa. 
c) Valuation Constraint 
The previous constraints imply that the demand growth 
function must equal the capital supply function at the point 
of sustainable growth. If we assume, as Marris does, that 
the growth of capital depends entirely upon a fixed value 
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EQUATION 3.1. 
EQUATION 3.2. 
of retentions from a changing rate of profit, 
g = rp (Supply of Capital Equation) 
where g = growth rate 
r = retention rate, assumed to be fixed by policy 
decisions at the start of the period and 
maintained at a constant value 
p = profit rate. 
It is further assumed that maximum gearing and minimum 
liquidity are maintained at constraint levels for reasons of 
security of the.managers. 
Then we can plot growth rate against profit rate as a 
linear relationship. 
If we also assume that the profit rate varies with 
growth rate in such a way as to form an inverted U-shaped 
curve, because of the general argument that profitability will 
increase at low rates of growth, the curve will come to a 
maximum point and then decline, 
p = peg) (Demand Growth Equation) 
where p = profit rate which is a function of growth 
g = growth rate, 
then it is possible to represent the relationship between 
the demand growth function and the supply of capital 
function on a two dimensional diagram. 
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PROFIT 
RATE 
P 
FIGURE 3.1. 
SUPPLY OF 
CAPITAL 
DEMAND GROWTH CURVE 
GROWTH 
RArE 
SOURCE: Radice (16~/1971) adapting a diagram of Marris (page 252, 
131/1967) • 
P = the point of maximum profit 
G = the point of maximum sustainable growth. 
The illustration clearly demonstrates: 
1) That a profit maximising firm will have a,lower growth rate 
and that a growth maximising firm will have a lower profit 
rate .. 
2) That the supply of capital line will pivot depending upon the 
retention ratio chosen. If the retention ratio is very high, 
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then the growth rate will increase •. The capital supply 
curve will cut the demand growth curve at a point where 
the profit rate is low. If the retention ratio is low 
(i.e. there is a large payout of dividends) then the supply 
of capital line will rise steeply and cut the demand growth 
curve at a point nearer (or even through) the intersection 
with maximum profits but at a place where the growth 
co-ordinate is low. 
There is, however, another way of considering the behaviour 
of the Marris type firm which takes into account the risk of 
takeover in a specific manner. A firm which does not observe 
the profit-growth constraint faces two possible dangers. If the 
supply of capital grows at a rate in excess of its asset growth 
rate, then its capital employed in relation to output will become 
excessive (in the model Marris assumes that the capital/output 
ratio is a constant), and the firm will have excess liquid funds 
which in themselves will be a temptation to predator firms and 
will also cause the return on capital to fall, provoking risks 
of takeover. On the other hand. if the capital fund growth rate 
is below that of the asset growth rate. then ·the firm will run 
into the hazards of liquidity crises and possibly failure 
through insolvency. There is every reason. therefore. to suppose 
that managers will seek to solve the technical problem of 
equating the rate of growth of capital supply with the growth 
rate of assets. 
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If, however, managers seek to grow at the expense of profit, 
then in order to maintain the rate of expansion they will 
require to increase the supply of funds and (using retentions as 
a proxy for the provision of external funds) they will reduce the 
payment of dividends to shareholders and retain more of the 
profits earned. Excessive growth will, however, lower the 
rate of profit as illustrated by the demand growth function. 
Marris assumes that the share price of a firm is valued in 
the stock market as the present value of the stream of dividends. 
EQUATION 3.3. Po E (Present value of dividend stream) 
t = 0 
where Po = present value of share 
, 
d
t 
= expected dividend at time t 
i = discount rate which is the return required on funds 
in the capital market for investments of the degree 
of risk faced. 
The formula can be adapted to take into account the sale 
of the share at time t + I, but since the price realised will 
reflect the present value of the share at that time (l.e. the 
present value of the dividend flow to infinity) discounted by 
t + 1 the factor (1 + 1) . to bring the value of the transaction to 
its present value at time zero, no essential difference is involved. 
The problem of tax differentials between income and capital gains 
is ignored in this simplified model. Since the dividends 
themselves earn dividends at the constant growth rate for a 
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Marris type firm the equation would become: 
EQUATION 3.4 ~ t 
L do (1 + g) (Present value of dividends Po = 
t~~ (1 + i)t growing at a constant rate) 
where do = the dividends at start of period 
g = constant growth rate of dividends 
i = discount rate as in 3.3. 
If however the firm retains funds which it cannot employ in 
a way which the capital market evaluates as providing an ad~quate 
return, then the share price, and hence the market value, of the 
firm will decline. However, at the same time the asset value of 
the firm will be increasing at the given growth rate. The result 
will be that the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
the book value of the firm will decline. This ratio, which Marris 
calls the valuation ratio, will fall and signal to the stock market 
that assets are being unprofitably employed and provide an 
incentive for other firms in the market to take over the offending 
company. Marris's theory of takeover consists of the proposition 
that a firm will be acquired if its actual valuation ratio falls 
below the subjective valuation ratio put upon it by a potential 
bidder. The lower a firm's valuation ratio, the easier it will 
be for a successful acquirer'to improve its performance in relation 
to its assets and therefore the more likely it is to be taken 
over. Management, with its imperative to grow, must make a 
decision concerning the rate of growth and the consequent valuation 
ratio that it is prepared to accept in the knowledge that below 
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(6) 
some unspecified minimum valuation ratio it will invite 
acquisition. The point at which a takeover offer is triggered 
by a declining valuation ratio is not known to any degree of 
accuracy because of three factors: 
a) the costs of takeover which include the raising of 
funds, the premium necessary to secure control over 
current market value of the company, and the expenses 
of reorganisation; 
b) the "time-horizon" of the predator, if it discounts 
returns at a lower rate than the present holders of 
the shares (perhaps because it is a large firm anxious 
to secure a sound investment production profile 'in the 
future rather than immediate cash flow), then its 
subjective valuation of the firm will be higher than 
(6) 
that of the present stockholders; 
c) the degree to which the acquiring firm believes by more 
efficient management and the dovetailing of the 
operations of the acquired firm with its ongoing 
production strategy, it can earn a higher return from 
the existing assets. 
Since the valuation ratio incorporates the dimension of 
profitability, it is possible (using an adaptation of Marris's 
model due to Radice (178/1971) to produce a two-dimensional 
diagram of the tradeoff function between growth and profitability. 
The predator here refers to the management of that firm. If the stock-
holders in the acquiring firm felt that a 'lower discount rate was appropriate 
wi th respect to the proposed victim. then the victim's shares would be 
undervalued and the stockholders would sell shares in their own company 
in order to purchase the undervalued'sha'res of the victim. 
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EQUATION 3.5 
EQUATION 3.6 
EQUATION 3.7 
If we assume: Po = initial value of profits 
K 
o 
= initial book value of the firm 
Po 
Ko being a constant capital output ratio 
r = fixed retention rate 
g = constant growth rate 
i = discount rate 
then: 
II) (l-r)Po{l+g)t Valuation Ratio MARKET VALUE L = = BOOK VALUE Ko t =0 
If we assume a constant rate of Po profit - = '11'0 Ko 
and take the constant values outside the summation sign 
II) t (1+g) (l-r) '11'0 L (1+i)t 
t=O 
x 
1 
(1+1)t 
The part of the equation ~ (l+g)t 
t::.O (l+i)t 
can be simplified using 
the formula for the summation of a geometic series to: 
{ 1+i } 
I-g 
If we further assume that the net investment r'll' is equivalent 
to the growth rate .r1\' = g then the valuation ratio can be 
written on the basis of these s1mplicat10ns as: 
Valuation Ratio = 
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('II' - g)(l + i) 
(i - g) 
VALUATION 
RATIO 
The shape of this function is as sketched in Figure 3.2. 
FIGURE 3.2. 
o 
GROWTH RATE 
SOURCE: Radice (17~/1971) page 548. 
VALUATION 
CURVE 
N.B. For explanation of letters used in diagram, see text. 
Figure 3.2. further shows an indifference curve reflecting the 
trade-off between security (represented by the valuation ratio) 
and growth which would produce a typical point such a M representing 
the actual value which the management of the firm will adopt. 
The point 0 shows that the owners of the firm are totally indifferent 
to the amount of growth providing that the valuation ratio is at 
a maximum. 
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EQUATION 3.8 
EQUATION 3.9 
The point P represents the position of maximum profit rate 
in a given period; it is below the growth rate represented by 
maximum valuation since some profitable growth is favoured by 
the market which sees by this means a faster increase in future 
dividends being earned. This fact is proved by Sawyer (185/1979). 
More formally, the utility function of managers is derived 
both from security and growth: 
U = f (v, g) 
m 
Whereas the utility of owne~'s is a function only of the valuation 
ratio 
v = 
g = 
U = f (v). 
o 
valuation ratio 
growth rate. 
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3.3. TAKEOVER HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1. Profit Maximising and Growth Maximising Theories 
as Contrasting Explanations 
It has been argued that a research strategy which considers 
hypotheses on takeovers in isolation of a wider theoretical 
framework is not able to do its task successfully. There are 
a number of reasons for this. In the first place, it is proposed 
that scientific knowledge grows by means of "conjecture and 
refutation" to adopt the Popperian terminology. What this 
means is that all programmes of scientific study are at best 
provisional. They only hold sway until such moment arises 
that they are refuted and replaced by another provisional system 
which will have tenure only up to the point of time when it 
fails to stand up to critical testing •. It is necessary to work 
in terms of programmes which Lakatos (121/1970) defines as an 
inter-connecting web of theories possessing a "hard core" of 
irrefutable theorems (because they are "metaphysical" 
conjectures concerning how the real world is organised) and a 
protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which are open to 
testing. The hard core beside providing the central metaphysical 
beliefs about the programme, also offers guidance as to the 
sort of hypotheses which may be derived (the "positive heuristic). 
Individual theories in themselves are never entirely refutable. 
They can always be saved by the addition of further auxiliary 
assumptions. Anomalies may gather but do not add up to the 
need to reject totally a research programme. A research 
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programme only finally ceases to hold sway when a rival 
programme develops which has greater explanatory power not only 
in respect of the existing empirical laws, but also with 
respect to novel fp.cts. 
Under this methodological prescription it is necessary to 
take a particular theory (in the protective belt) and test it 
in the context of a wider research programme. Lakatos also 
makes the point that research programmes are never replaced 
as the basis of refutations of hypotheses alone, no matter how 
many they may be. A research programme may"degenerate", i.e. 
save itself from extinction by inventing more and more 
auxiliary assumptions which do not reveal new "novel" facts, 
but it will only be replaced after it has failed in competition 
with an alternative research programme. Therefore any testing 
of hypotheses must take place (in what Lakatos calls a "mature 
science") by examining the results in terms of compAting 
research programmes. 
Under these methodological prescriptions, the research 
programmes concerning the "managerial fiTm"has been chosen 
for attention to see how' successfully 1t challenges the older 
research programme generally referred to as the neo-classical 
theory of the firm. The neo-classical programme was based on 
a "hard core" of concepts such as: 
a) Firms were motivated to maximise profit 
b) Perfect information was available 
c) Competition ensures that firms are price-takers 
d) Equilibrium situations exist. 
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The neo-classical programme was modified to include 
monopoly as a special circumstance and then monopolistic 
competition as a more general circumstance. The stronge~t nud 
most enduring beliefs have been that fi~ms maximise profits 
and that markets, even ones with obvious characteristics 
demonstrating market power possessed by some of its members, 
are nevertheless approximately competitive. The modified 
neo-classical theory is still very much in existence, largely 
on the basis that multi-product firms (which break the 
connection between size of fjrm and market share), international 
firms offering import competition, and oligopolistic rivalry 
(which is generally agreed to pervade most markets) all make 
for an approximation to competitive conditions and enforce 
profit maximising behaviour. A 1:heory of "workable competition" 
has been developed. J.M.Clark (48/1940) who has argued that 
perfect competition has never existed and could not possibly 
exist, and sought to identify alternative criteria in order to 
assess how well competition is working. Scherer (188/1970. 
page 37) has produced a list of these features,.but Stigler's 
list in "The Extent and Bases of Monopoly" (205/1942) is more 
succinct. He suggests that: 
"An industry is workably compeU tive when (i) there 
are a considerable number of firms selling closely 
related products in each important market area, 
(ii) these firms are not in collusi~n~ (ill) the long 
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run average cos~ curve for a new firm is not 
materially higher than that fOl' an ~sti:iblished firm." 
The concept has been inadequately specified so that 
determinate conclusions cannot be drawn (see N.Lee (125/1974», 
but nevertheless illustrates the point that the competitive 
model is still very much in contention as an existing research 
programme. 
The alternative research programme dealing with that is 
probably best described as the "managerial firm" has a different 
"hard core" made up of central assumptions: 
a) Motives other than the maximisation of profits 
deriving frem managerial interests in power, prestige, 
the ability to exercise management discretion, etc, 
more ad~quately explain the activities of the firm. 
b) There is a division of interest between owners and 
managers and the owners being (in the large quoted 
firm) unable to effectively co-ordinate their 
actions and preferring to trade in shares rather than 
go to the organisational expense of enforcing their 
wishes, are unable to ensure that their aims for wealth 
maximisation predominate in determining company policy. 
c) It is possible" to analyse effectively the activity 
of firms without recourse to analysing also the market 
environment, thus avoiding the problems of oligopollstic 
interaction, market uncertainty and the effect of 
general economic disturbances. 
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In fact the two competing paradigms do not necessarily 
support the conjecture of Lakatos that research programmes are 
replaced by another programme which not only explains the 
observational statements of the prior theory but also is able 
to extend its comprehension to new and novel facts. The difference 
is undoubtedly due to the transfer of the methodology from 
the natural sciences which seem to have a propensity for linear 
evolution in theory due to the relative constancy of nature, 
to the social siences where the historical evolution of society 
changes relationships between social groups and institutions 
thus making earlier research programmes anachronistic. If by 
massive legislation the Government were to break up all 
companies into small atomic type firms, it is entirely possible 
that the earlier neo-classical paradigm would recover favour 
since the managerial paradigm draws its support fr.om the 
monopolistic competition and large firm size to be found in the 
industrial context of capitalism in the latter part of the 
20th Century. The earlier programme was devoted to the 
analyses of price, output and the effect of competition, the 
more recent programme to the understanding of growth and 
the constraints of profitability and performance in providing 
investment funds to sustain that growth. Thus both programmes 
deal not with the same factors but different facto~s. 
(7~ 
3.3.2. The Generation of Hypotheses from Marris's Monel 
of the Managerial Firm 
Marris's theories rely upon all the hard core propositions 
of the managerial programme - growth maximisation as the 
objective function, the ownership/control divide, the self-
contained nature of the analysis (i.e. limited to the internal 
problems of balancing growth within the firm with only general 
observations relating to the extra-firm environment). In 
"Managerial Capitalism" (145/1964), Marris does propose a 
, , 
theory of gIow!h in established markets (what he refers to as 
"imitative growth") but his conclusions, which are that after 
struggle a collusive "peace" will be reached, is related to his 
analysis of why "demand-growth" curves decline more than it 
is an attempt to model the problems of oligopolistic 
(7) 
competition. The Marris model is chosen as a representative 
version of the reformulation of the theory of the firm because 
of the elaborate nature of its analysis which permits 
predictions to be made (thus permitting possibilities of 
falsification and therefore defining the mOdel'as a scientific 
one). 
Marris's model is particularly significant because he not 
only defines a revised theory of the firm but also suggests 
how the alternative neo-classical model'might be adapted and 
Downie (59/1958) deals much more effectively with the competitive 
process in terms of growth, change and interaction wi thin ,a market, 
but his model despite making the important contribution of the two-way 
relationship between growth and profitability, is too general and 
simplified and suffers from important defects such as the view that 
existing uncompetitive firms are a source of innovation which is not 
supported by the empirical research done on the nature of technological 
innovations. 
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restored to power. If it is accepted that profit maximisation 
under the constraint of competitive forces is the key element 
in the neo-classical programme, then Marris's work can be 
interpreted as an exploration of whether a mechanism, other 
than that arising from reaching competitive equilibrium, in a 
market might be sufficiently powerful to enforce that discipline. 
If, as Manne (141/1965), Hindley (96/1970) and Yarrow (232/1976) 
have.all argued, there is an effective capital market to 
enforce control over the management grou~, then managers may 
not have the discretion to set the firm's valuation ratio at 
too great a distance from its optimum pOint, and therefore be 
driven to moderate the firm's growth rate. The discrepancy 
between the onwers' desired valuation ratio and the managers' 
preferred position for this parameter may lead to the possibility 
of the shareholders' intervention to remove managers or sell 
shares and create conditions favourable to takeover. This 
particular propOSition must be taken very seriously in the 
light of the voluminous research which has taken place on 
the efficiency of the stock market and which indicates that 
capital markets seem to be competitive and make fair and 
realistic evaluations of the prospects of quoted companies in 
the light of both past share price trends and freely available 
published information. We are therefore presented with the 
paradox that if the Marris theory of takeover on the basis of 
a declining valuation ratio can be established as being 
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successful. then this leads us in the direction of confirming 
the competitive. profit-maximising theory of the firm rather 
than supporting his own version of the managerial firm. 
3.3.2.(1) The "Hard Core" Proposition of the Marris Model 
The first hypothesis to which we address 
ourselves is not in fact a hypothesis at all. If 
we define a hypothesis as statements set out in the 
logical form of a deductive argument which lead to 
observable predictions, then this proposition does 
not attain these standards. The fact that it is 
necessary to employ the term at all is an example 
of the way in which the development of epistomology 
sometimes outstrips the concept language needed 
for description of its functioning. It might be 
better to refer to the proposition as a "conjecture" 
but in doing so we lose the implication of subjecting 
the proposition to test which is the essential 
purpose. I propose to name it the "metaphysical 
hypothesis" since it deals with a fundamental 
assumption about how an aspect of reality (in this 
case that pertaining to the nature of the firm) 
should be organised. In relation to what has 
already been said in the preceding paragraphs, it 
1s the "hard core" which is under scrutiny. The 
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hard core propositions are not open to refutation 
in any direct manner; they can only fail to be a 
source of hypotheses (in the true sense of that term) 
that will stand up to continual attempts at 
falsification. Nevertheless, in considering hypotheses 
-in the. "protective belt" of a research programme, the 
interpretation of the results of such testing is 
continually being made in the light of the fundamental 
·metaphysical assumptions and every "protective belt" 
test is leading back to judgements concerning the 
usefulness of. those fundamental assumptions. 
It was the view of Kuhn (119/1962) that 
'scientific activity was mainly cast in the 
pattern of "normal science", that is to say, that 
problem solving activity is carried out in the 
context of au orthodox theoretical framework. 
But this methodological prescription is a formula 
for Tesearch designed to verify, confirm and invent 
what Popper calls "immunising strategies" (i.e. 
where a hypothesis fails to be confirmed a further 
auxiliary assumption is adopted in order to save 
the hypothesis from destruction). But "sophisticated 
falsification" as proposed by Popper demands that 
at least two theories are available when carrying 
out the test of a hypothesis (i.e. the current 
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orthodox one and the propos~d one) because part of 
the renson for accepting a hypothesis as being more 
useful for purposes of explanation and prediction 
is that it now only explains the facts accounted for 
by the current orthodoxy but also extends the 
explanation and prediction possibilities to new 
situations. Lakatos holds the same belief, that 
in progressive science two research programmes are 
always in competition (see pages 154 to 159 of 
L&katos (121/1972) despite the inability to te3t 
them directly. This then leads to: 
(M 1) Metaphysical Hypothesis. That if one 
wishes to understand takeover behaviour 
with respect to firms quoted on the Stock 
Exchange, one should assume "that such firms 
have policies which are determined by its 
senior management team, and that these 
policies diverge from the wealth maximisation 
required by shareholders. 
If one considers the "protective belt" propositions, 
these are statements which have observational 
implications and are therefore capable of 
falsification (1n the "sophisticated" sense, that 
is accepting that falsification of a singular 
hypothesis is not possible, not only because of the 
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tendency of researchers to introduce new auxiliary 
assumptions into the argument to preserve the 
hypothesis but more fundamentally because a single 
(or even multiple) confirmation(s) of a given 
hypothesis can never justify a universal proposition 
(the problem of induction». The possible 
"protective belt" hypotheses seem to fall naturally 
into three classes. 
3.3.2.(2) The Auxiliary Hypotheses of the Marris Model 
Auxiliary hypotheses are ones designed to 
support the chain of rpasoning leading £rom the 
"hard core" to the statements containing predictions 
about actual behaviour. They are essential to the 
total "story" being told, insofar as, were they to 
be subject to an increasing weight of counter-
evidence, then although the "hard core" assumption 
coul~ still be sustained (since it is by definition 
inviolate to observational based criticism~ confidence 
in the particular research programme would start to 
dwindle. Many of the link hypotheses are not 
susceptible to empirical testing since they are 
designed as theoretical simplifications.to allow 
an "ideal" model to be employed which will allow 
parts of the explanation to be brought into consistent 
relationships with other parts without in any way 
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preventing important empirically based relationships 
to be predicted. This is a necessary part of any 
attempt to abstract from the vast complexity of 
reality in order to produce a theory of manageable 
proportions. Such statements as (a) that growth 
will be steady state with major variables (such as 
profit rate, gearing ratio, liquidity ratio, etc.) 
maintaining themselves in constant proportion to 
each other; (b) that the capital-output ratio for 
all products should remain at a set level; (c) that 
all finance will be raised by retention from net 
profit; are all statements not meant to be taken 
literally and subject to testing. 
Other proposals,. of an auxiliary nature, do 
have a fo~m which is accessible to observation, 
are not just simplifications meant to reduce the 
model to manageable form, and are so essential to 
the justification of the research programme that 
their falsification would cast a dark shadow over 
the paradigm. Amongst these auxiliary propOSitions, 
~ 
we may recognise that the assertions (a) that 
there must be recognisable differences in the 
behaviour of firms whose directors own large stakes 
in the company and firms that are more widely owned 
with respect to rates of growth and profit rates 
(b) that after a certain minimum profit rate is 
3W 
being earned there should be some evidence of an 
inverse relationship between profitability and 
growth levels; are necessary to the success of the 
total narrative. This then leads to: 
AI) Auxiliary Hypothesis (Ownership/Control) 
If we examine fi::.-ms whose directors own a 
large proportion of t~e firm's equity, then 
other things being equal, we should find 
higher profit rates and lower growth rates 
than occur in managerial firms (i.e. ones whose 
share ownership is widely dispersed allowing 
the senior management team to dominate policy). 
A2) Auxiliary Hypothesis (Profitability/Growth) 
Although at low levels of the two parameters 
we would expect profitability and growth to be 
positively related (that is-up to the pOint of 
minimum level of profitability that shareholders 
will tolerate) once either parameter reaches 
high levels we would expect to find an inverse 
relationship with the other parameter. 
Both the above hypotheses could also be cast 1n 
terms of the valuation ratio which we can identify 
with the profit/security trade-off. 
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A3) Auxiliary Hypothesis (The Environmental Situation) 
It is necessary to indicate the domain of 
application of the research programme. In order 
to test any aspect of the research programme 
concerned with the reformulated theory of the 
firm) attention should be restricted to companies 
with a Stock Exchange listing and the period 
involved should be one where a mature capital 
market exists. It follows that the theory 
assumes the general context of a capitalist 
economy. Since both samples taken for this study 
are within the domain of application, there are 
no hypotheses to be directly tested here since 
this application area is the context in which 
all the other hypotheses are to be examined. 
It should be noted that this situation is 
different in the natural sciences where a 
fruitful sourc~ of development has been the 
application of theoretical laws developed'in 
one context to another context, thus providing 
a unification of theory (for example, the 
unification of theories in electricity and 
magnettsm, or Einstein's demonstration of the 
relationship between mass and enerey). But 
it is hard to believe that theories based on 
motivation and the meaning of actions could 
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be so easily transferred between different 
historical periods (unless one was working 
within a Marxist framework where the nature 
of each historic period derives from the 
economic modes of production). 
3.3.2.(3). Hypothesis drawn from the "Protective Belt" 
of the Marris Model 
If we consider some aspect of the behaviour 
of the firm such as merger activity, then the "positive 
heuristic" of the research programme should indicate 
some opportunities for testing predictions about 
that behaviour which derive from and are compatible 
with the "hard core" assumptions. Marris makf!s A 
number of predictions concp.rning how firms may become 
victims of the takeover process. The paradox has 
already been pointed out, however, that if Marris's 
takeover process were to be shown to be an accurate 
picture of how the market for "corporate control" 
provides an efficient discipline on firms who opt 
for growth maximisation rather than wealth maximisation. 
then this would amount to a tr~sformat1on of the 
ownership/control thesis and the growth maximisation 
proposition. Admittedly. it is possible that firms 
may adopt growth maximisation policies that differ 
from profit maximisation policies, and so long as 
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they do not allow the divergence to become too great 
(it has been suggested earlier that divergence 1s 
possible up to the point where the gap exceeds the 
expenses of enforcing control via the takeover 
mechanism), then such firms may continue in existence. 
But since it is not possihle to determine the size 
of this divergence (we would have to be able to work 
out the counter-factual conditional, if the growth 
maximising firm had instead chosen to maximise 
profit, what would its valuation ratio have become), 
then such divergence amounts to what Popper would 
regard as an unscientific conjecture since it would 
not be possible to falsify it. We are therefore 
left in the strange position that Marris's hypotheses 
about takeovers, if confirmed, would be provisional 
support for the profit maximisation programme. If 
falsified, however, they could not act as confirmation 
of the "managerial firm" research programme.· It is 
possible to regard the Marris thesis in two ways. 
One is that it is an attempt to demonstrate that 
"wealth maximisation" still survives as a paradigm, 
despite the change in circumstances from the 
conditions under which it was first held to prevail, 
i.e. partial equilibrium within a market, perfect 
information and price-taking behaviour, and that it 
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is still a proper guide to interpreting behaviour 
even taking into account oligopolistic markets, 
uncertainty and a measure of price-making power. 
In this respect, one can compare the conclusion of 
Latsis (123/1976) in comparing Chambers' theory of 
"Monopolistic Competition" with its neo-classical 
predecessor: 
"Thus perfect and monopolistic competition 
spare the common neo-classical 'hard core'; 
monopolistic competition results from a 
slight modification of the situational 
assumptions of perfect competition, and in 
both cases the assumption of profit 
maximisation is trivial." (p. 27, 123/1976). 
The situations, of course. differ. Chamberlain's 
theory still relies on ideas of perfect information, 
the movement towards equilibrium and the view that 
in equilibrium the firm will make zero profit (i.e. 
its power to set prices will prove to be illusory). 
Marris's theory is very different; the equilibrium 
concept has vanished from the scene in the 
neo-classical sense. there it served the purpose of 
ensuring that the balance of advantage between 
competitors reached a steady state. Marris refers 
to an equilibrium state between growth rates of key 
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variables (page 118 and 119, 145/1967) but this 
seems a case of simplifying complicated mathematical 
inter-relationships rather than reporting a balance 
of motivational drives. In a revealing passage 
(pages 127 and 128, 145/1967), Marris talks about 
equilibrium and its maintenance as being similar to 
the problem of a driver adjusting various parameters 
in order to ensure that he can maintain a constant 
speed: 
"Just as the driver can expect reasonable 
stability characteristics in his steering 
gear, so the high management of a firm 
should be able to arrange similar stability 
in the operation of instrument variables." 
(Page 128, ~45/1967). 
Marris claims: 
."In the present work we employ the approach 
which has been described as that of 'comparative 
dynamics', a method which is particularly 
suited to persons (such as the author) who 
wish to discuss moving equilibria but are 
untrained in classical mathematical dynamics." 
(Page 127, 145/1967). 
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In another passage Marris writes: 
"The whole operation represents an exercise 
in partial equilibrium analysis. This means 
that in general, when policies and conditions 
vary within the single firm which is being 
analysed, all relevant aspects of the 
environment are assumed to remain constant." 
(Page 130, 145/1967). 
This is not what is generally meant by the 
term "partial equilibrium analysis". In economics 
the term is applied to the situation where a 
particular sector (an industry or market) Is analysed 
as though it were operating in isolation from the 
rest of the economy. What Marris appears to have 
in mind is an analogy with the engineering analysis 
of a machine which is assumed to reach steady state 
operation by constant adaptation to changing environments, 
conditions such as temperature, humidity, etc. But 
it has already been stated that the Marris concept 
of balanced growth is not, nor can it be, a realistic 
description of how a firm operates but rather a 
simplifying assumption with respect to a variety of 
variables capable of operating at a number of levels 
which will allow the more general proposition that 
the rate of growth and the rate of profit must move 
together in unison. 
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Marris does not assuMe c~rt~inty. Marris does 
assume that ft firm which offends too severely against 
the criteria of profit maximisation will become a 
victim of a takeover raid. 
Another way of considering Marris is to assume 
that he poses the problem of a clash of paradigms 
more directly. He describes the behaviour of the 
managerial growth maximising firm and contrasts this 
wi th the possible re'sul t in terms of a system that 
enforces, via the stock market, profit maximisation. 
This is much more compatible with the views of 
Lakatos: 
"The history of science suggests that 
tests are at least three cornered fights 
between rival theories and experiment." 
(Page 115, 121/1972). 
Since Marris was writing prior to Lakatos, we 
may excuse him when he sets up a four cornered fight, 
that is between two rival theories and two experiments. 
The two rival theories are the '~rofit Maximisatio~' 
research programme and the "Managerial Firm/Growth 
Maximisation" research programme. The two experiments 
are (a) the conclusion that the growth rate and 
valuation ratio of profit maximising firms and 
growth maximising firms will differ, and (b) the 
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conclusion that firms which sacrifice profitability 
to growth will be destroyed if t~ey carry the process 
to excess. 
Bearing in mind the reservations which have 
been the burden of the preceding passages, it is 
possible to derive from Marris several implications 
of h1s theory which have observable form and which 
are capable of being tested. These represent direct 
predictions about the characteristics of victims. 
In the main, with the exception of preductions Dl 
(below), they are charactistics exhibited by failing 
firms. If confirmed they lend credence to the view 
that the capital market functions with some degree 
of efficiency in penalising failure; that the capital 
market rewards success is clear from the ease with 
which successful firms (i.e. ones earning above 
average rates of profit) are able to raise external 
funds. Hypothesis D2 (see below also) has a very 
special form in which low profitability and high 
growth are both present. This would seem to 
substantiate the Marris theory of the sacrifice of 
profitability to growth but a caveat is in order. 
Presumably the effect of low profitability over time 
is to constrain growth, therefore over a long 
period of time even a fi~m closely following the 
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Marris specification of pursuing unprofitable growth 
will end up in a low growth and low profit situation. 
It will not be possible to distinguish this state 
of affairs from a firm with low growth and low profit 
traits that represents a "sleepy" firm lacking an 
effective management. The hypothesis D3, concerning 
the valuation ratio is therefore quite critical for 
purposes of differentiation •. If the valuation ratio 
(which serves as an index combining the effects of 
high ~rowth rates in the past with a present state 
of low profitability and little prospect of change) 
is a sensitive instrument whose signal quickly brings 
retribution (if the signal js adverse), thAn this 
may well be compatj.ble with the unbaJ anced ~ro\llth 
theory. This demonstrates the importance of the 
valuation ratio to the structure·of Marris's theory. 
Sadly, the same result is also a possible effect of 
a highly efficient capital market which is quick to 
pounce upon a firm whose profit.rate starts to fall 
after a period of sustained growth. 
These remarks about the ambiguity of 
interpretation with respect to the direct behavioural 
predictions illustrate the admonition of Popper 
(page 50, 170/1975) that there are no "crucial 
experiments" and underline the lesson that falsification 
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is a matter of degr~e without the opportunities of 
a sudden-death pay-off. What is very clear is that 
in order to interpret the results of the direct 
hypothesis in a manner favourable to Marris, we are 
dependent upon the auxiliary hypothesis confirming 
that the ownership/control circumstance and the 
profitability/growth association conform to the 
Marris specification. This is in direct contrast 
to the instrumentalist position expressed by Friedman 
in "The Methodology of Positive Economics" (76/1953), 
where the opinien·ls expressed that theorieS are only 
convenient fictions which enable data to be organised 
in a manner which permits successful results to be 
obtained from predictions. Without some confirmation 
of the auxiliary hypotheses to be conjoined with the 
results of the direct hypotheses, interpretation as 
between the two competing scientific research 
programmes would be impossible in the circumstance 
before us. These, then, are the predictions about 
the characteristics of v1ctims: 
Dl) Direct HypotheSis (Ownership/Control) 
That where a large proportion of the equity of 
a company is controlled by the Directors, there 
should be a reduced propensity to being takpn 
over. Companies with a wide dispersion in the 
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ownership of shares should have a higher 
propensity to being acquired. 
(~: Since the resistance of owner controlled 
firms to takeover could be explained by the 
refusal of the controlling group to sell shares 
(even where less than 50% of the company is 
owner controlled) it will obviously be harder 
to acquire the unattached shares since a lower 
'percentage of them will bA available). We would 
therefore require this hypothesis to be related 
.to some demonstration that owner controlled 
firmR had a below average rate of profitability 
taken as a group, and yet still managed to 
escape takeover; On the other hand, we would 
expect some owner controlled firms to be profit 
maximising since the wealth of the Directors 
is closely related to the wealth of shareholders.) 
D2) Direct Hypothesis (Profitability/Growth) 
Firms that are acquired would be expected to 
possess high growth rates in conjunction with 
low rates of profitability. 
D3) 'Direct Hypothesis (Valuation Ratio) 
Victims of a takeover raid may be assumed to 
have a valuation ratio of less than unity and 
there should be statistical evidence indicating an 
inverse correlation between the number of victims 
and the level of the valuation ratio. 
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D4) Direct Hypothesis (Financial Structure) 
Acquired firms may show higher gearing ratios 
and lower liquidity ratios than non-acquired 
firms. 
(Note: This is not a necessary nor a suffjcient 
condition, but is a possibility in firms that 
have not given suffjcient heed to their security 
in the pursuit of growth). 
D5) Direct Hypothesis (Supply of Capital) 
Firms that have fallen victim to a takeover bid 
would be expected to have higher than average 
retention ratios or have an above average rate 
of growth of the provision of external funds 
(either equity or long term debt) or both •. 
D6) Direct Hypothesis (Profit Margins) 
Since firms who have pursued the growth of 
demand too vigorously can be expected to have 
depressed their profit margins (through over 
investment, over commitment of the ability of 
their managerial team, high spending on marketing, 
advertising, or research and development, 
accepting reduced prices to promote growth, or 
creating severe price wars in penetrating 
existing markets), this should be a characteristic 
of acquired firms. 
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D7) Direct Hypothesis (Shareholder Wealth) 
Firms who are taken over should exhibit lower 
than normal growth rates with respect to the 
wealth of their shareholders (i.e. the growth 
of return either by payment of dividends or 
in capital appreciation of the equity shares 
or some combination of these means of rewarding 
shareholders). 
One area of interest which would appear to 
demand a prominent role in any theory of tAkeovers 
is the nature of acquiring firms. Marris is explicitly 
silent on this issue: 
"We shall write as if internal expansion 
were the only method of growth. Alternatively, 
the reader may prefer to regard our theory 
as representing an account of the limits 
on ~rowth rates among firms which do not 
merge, and as such, as an ~X9lanation of 
why the method of merger ia so often 
attractive." (Page 124, 145/1967). 
In fart, he offers a hint as to what he believes to 
be the type of firm which undertakes to adopt a 
policy of acquisitions in an earlier passage: 
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"When one takes over a large company, one 
acquires a particular set of assets, specific 
labour force and specific body of middle and 
junior managers. If the assets are to 
continue to earn, one will have to be able to 
provide a more or less complete new high 
management. If he is some kind of "traditional 
capitalist" he should not, in principle, be 
so well-e~uipped f~r the purpose as the typical 
professional management team, and must 
therefore set his organisational disadvantages 
agdin~t the possible benefits of changes of 
policy; for this reason, in manufacturing 
industry successful raids by traditional 
capitalists are almost unknown. 
Some raiders combine traditional characteristics 
with modern; incorporated but closely held; 
concerned mainly with gettjng rich but nevertheless 
capable of considerable organisation. Powerful 
raids are frequently made by purely managerial 
organisat1ons. The successful among those 
represent involuntary mergerS imposed by one 
professional team upon another." (Pages 31 and 32, 
145/1967) 
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From this I draw the conclusion that Marris 
believed that "raiders" have developed superior 
management talents which will enable them to grow 
at a fast rate without sacrificing profitability, 
unlike the traditional "average" firms with which 
his work is concerned. Where they draw the sources 
of this above-average managerial talent from is not 
made plain, but perhaps it is an early premonition 
of the sort of reasoning Williamson was to develop 
(226/1970 and 227/1971) in his ideas concerning the 
"multi-divisional" hypothesis which it is argu.:d 
r~stores profit maximising efficiency within larger 
organi~ations or more probably it is an echo of 
Galbraith's view (78/1952) that the modern corporation 
is run by "technocrats" who are trained specialists 
and who ensure that production and marketing are 
carried out in ways which result in predictable 
outcomes. 
Kuehn (117/1972) has produced a specific 
examination of the nature of "raiders" (defined as 
those who made three or more takeovers between 
1957 and 1969). The raiders were drawn from a 
sample of public quoted companies which comprised 
the major industrial groups involved in manufacturing 
and service categories (excluding finance). He 
tested several hypotheses and concluded that raiders 
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were growth maximisers, exhibiting faster growth 
rates than average in their industries witb higb 
valuation ratios compared with the median for their 
industries but lower returns on assets. Their 
ability to combine a high valuation ratio with low 
profitability was related to a high dividend payout 
(or its obverse a low retention ratio) which 
produced a combination of fast growth with plentiful 
dividends which ensured that their firms retained 
a good image in the Stock Market and consequently 
a high valuation ratio. 
Kuehn's explanation of acquiring firms as 
growth maximisers seems to contradict the Marris 
suggestion (quoted above) which amounts to the belief 
in a profit maximising enterprise which is nevertheless 
able to maintain high growth rates. Logically, 
unless we assume that giant firms form the majority 
of raiders and have behavioural patterns markedly 
different from the average size of firm, we would 
expect that providing we are dealing with managerial 
firms (i.e. ones not controlled by their owners), 
then growth maximising motivation as enjoined by the 
paradigm would prevail. Why should acquiring firms 
be exempt from Marris's own theory? Unless large 
firms, as suggested above, have developed different 
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motivational drives. Perhaps after a certain size 
the desires for growth are saturated (power, 
prestige, control of discretionary investment and 
staffing having all been attained). Marris's view 
of a special breed of efficient raiders would 
certainly require confirmation of their ability to 
( 8) 
earn high returns. Kuehn's reasoning, however, 
concerning the Jlossibili ty of a high valuation ratio 
linked io a poor profit performance is difficult 
to reconcile with the theory of balanced growth of 
fUuds and demand. 
No specific hypotheses are therefore proposed 
concerning the characteristics of acquiring firms. 
In the empirical work of the thesis, an analysis 
is made of the characteristics of acquiring firms 
in order to throw light on the issue of whether 
they conform to the managerial theory of the firm. 
(8) Marris specifically excludes from his theory any interest in firms 
who by asset stripping operations artificially hold up the price 
of their shares over a short period (see page 32, 145./1967). 
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3.4. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
The arguments of the chapter can be divided into three 
parts. The first part (Section 3.1.) considers the history of 
the theory of the firm and describes the critical arguments 
which cause the downfall of the neo-classical theory of the firm. 
The second division (Section 3.2.) describes the nature of 
"managerial theories" of the firm, and specifically concentrates 
'on that version of the theory which can be found in the works 
of R.Marris. The last part of the chapter looks at the hypotheses 
that can be developed concerning takeovers from the managerial 
theory of the firm which takes growth as its objective function. 
The firm, as conceived by neo-classical theory, had no 
organisational structure, and its existence depended on its 
ability, within a perfectly competitive market, to ensure that 
the price of its product was equal to minimum average cost. 
The increasing lack of realism of this concept, linked to 
successful theoretical attacks on the incompatibility of increasing 
and decreasing costs with partial equilibrium analysis, has led." 
to its demise, and from this was born the concept of a firm that 
had some discretionary options open to it. The idea of the 
"representative firm" was replaced by the study of the individual 
firm and hence to the managerial firm as an analytical construct. 
On the other hand, the theory of "Monopolistic Competition" has 
led to a focus on market behaviour where degrees of monopoly and 
oligopolistic structure exist, and hence to the "Structure, Conduct, 
Performance" research programme. 
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The theory of the firm has been alternatively investigated 
in terms of its organisational behaviour and also in re~at1oD to 
the pursuit of other aims than that of profit maximisatiQ~, ~~\ 
underlying both approaches are the assumptions of:-
a) an uncertain environment, 
b) the separation of ownership from control. 
In seeking to understand the determinants of merger behaviour, 
it is suggested that organisational theories of the firm are not 
sufficient~y elaborated for this purpose, (9) but the managerial 
theories relating to growth as a motivational force have provided 
a rationale for merger activity, which is why they are selected 
for study in this thesis. The theory derived from the work of 
Marris is selected as a representative type of this sort of theory, 
not only because it is more adequately worked out than any other 
theory of this nature, nor because it deals at length with the 
subject of takeover, but also because it is a theory which, unlike, 
say, that of Baumol, deals with long term Situations, and merger 
activity as a form of investment behaviour needs to be treated in 
such a manner. 
Certain problems of using Marris's theory are detailed. He 
assumes steady state policies which are not compatible with his 
assumption of oligopolistic competition. The capital/output ratio 
cannot be treated as a. constant in a theory based on diversification 
of products and markets. Differing levels of m~agerial efficiency 
make the growth/profit curve impossible to determine. 
(9) Even the work of D.E.Williamson, who from a study of organisational 
imperatives, addresses himself explicitly to the subject of mergers, 
does so in terms of the welfare implications rather than in the 
issue of why mergers are undertaken. 
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It is argued, on the strength of a proposition due to 
Lakatos, that there can be no progressive development of a theory 
unless it is being compared with another competing explanation. 
The reason for this is all theories possess anomalies and it is 
only by examining how successfully rival theories fare in 
relation to these anomalies that one can find a criterion of 
choice between their worth. Marris, although working in the 
context of the "managerial firm", also provides a case for the 
existence of a factor which will enforce "profit maximising" 
behaviour; that is, an efficient capital market which, by 
distinguishing deviants from this ideal, assists in the use of 
mergers as a disciplinary measure. Thus Marris contains the 
two principal competing theories, i.e. profit maximisation and 
growth maximisation, within his scheme of thinking. (There is 
some evidence that Marris, although expressing his ideas in terms 
of the "growth maximising" firm, is actually supporting the 
"profit maximisation" thesis). 
The principal ideas of Marris, namely the existence of a 
demand/growth curve and a profit/growth trade-off, are described 
and various testable hypotheses derived. These hypotheses are 
divided into "auxiliary" assumptions concerning the managerial 
firm and then a number of specific statements about the 
circumstances and policies of firms that are acquired by a 
takeover bid. It is pointed out that Marris has very little 
to say about the characteristics of acquiring firms except for 
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a vague and largely unsupported belief that they will be 
efficient by reason of their use of modern managerial techniques. 
Since merger activity is a major method of diversification, it is 
not entirely clear why Marris neglected such activity and treated 
growth as entirely based on internal expansion of the ·firm. One 
result of this is that no hypothesis on the investigation of 
these features within the thesis is set down and such information 
as is revealed depends largely upon empirical analysis. 
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